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Food fraud is defined as intentional behaviour designed to misrepresent or 
sabotage food items by third parties for economic gain. The growing 
incidences of food fraud over the last ten years lends support to the notion that 
traditional food safety intervention countermeasures have been largely 
inadequate. The increase in fraudulent incidents has further resulted in a 
change of focus in theory related to the investigation of food fraud from risk 
mitigation to vulnerability reduction. Food fraud is now classified as a separate 
category of food safety management systems in the literature. This shift in 
focus has also brought into question whether the traditional methods for 
combating food fraud also require a shift from common detection methods 
deployed by food safety managers to consideration of prevention and 
vulnerability reduction.  
The food fraud vulnerability reduction literature has emerged from within 
the theoretical domain of Criminology and has relied on the Routine Activity 
Theory framework for identification of root causes for food fraud. The Routine 
Activity Theory suggests that there are three main factors to consider in the 
reduction of vulnerability to fraudulent activity. These are: opportunity; 
motivation; and countermeasures. Whilst this literature provides a framework 
from which to identify possible areas of vulnerability to food fraud, it does not 
provide a methodology that would allow food producers and processors to 
more accurately quantify and assess their vulnerability to food fraud. This 
study, therefore, takes up the call from researchers in this field to find better 
methods for the prevention of Food Fraud Vulnerability (FFV) factors by the 
development of a holistic model that can assess the level (degree) of 
vulnerability to food fraud for food products targeted at human consumption.  
Embracing a pragmatism view, this research adopted a sequential 
exploratory mixed methods approach. Phase one of the research commenced 
with a qualitative Barrier Analysis approach to extract the main Food Fraud 
Vulnerability factors within specific categories of food fraud as detailed in the 
US Pharmaceutical Food Fraud Database (USP FFD). The second phase of 
the research adopted a quantitative method, applying a Bayesian Network 
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(BN) modelling approach using SPSS Modeler 18.2. The data for the research 
was extracted from 580 incidents of global food fraud recorded between 2000 
and 2018 in the US Pharmaceutical Food Fraud Database (USP FFD). Four 
food product categories were used for this study from the sixteen different 
categories provided by the database. These were: seafood; meat; alcoholic 
beverages; and dairy. These food categories represented just over fifty percent 
of all incidents recorded in the database. Approximately 80 percent of the data 
was used to train and develop the BN model, with the remaining 20 percent 
used for testing the validity and accuracy of the final BN model.  
The Barrier Analysis technique conducted in phase one of this research 
identified new Food Fraud Vulnerability dimensions such as the physical form 
of products, supply chain complexity/transparency, corruption level of the 
detection country, culture and religion, price spikes, the requirement for 
coordination of law enforcement agencies, extensiveness of traceability, and 
food safety, which were subsequently indexed into the appropriate vulnerability 
categories of: opportunity; motivation; and countermeasures. The Bayesian 
network analysis conducted in phase two of the research, produced three main 
findings. First, the study confirmed that the Tree Augmented Naïve BN model 
can provide a robust assessment of vulnerability to food fraud with an accuracy 
of 86%. Second, the variable country of origin was identified as having the 
greatest influence on FFV factors.  Third, the variable food fraud incident type 
was identified as having the least influence on FFV factors.  
The findings from this research make two main contributions to the food 
fraud literature. Firstly, the identification and indexing of new Food Fraud 
Vulnerability dimensions has expanded the current knowledge regarding the 
root causes of Food Fraud Vulnerability. Further, this study has also provided 
valid empirical support for the inclusion of these factors in future studies 
investigating issues relating to vulnerability to food fraud. Next, the model 
based on the Barrier Analysis technique and BN modelling approach has 
provided a methodology to more accurately assess the root causes of food 
fraud for a range of food product types. This model allows future researchers 
to achieve more impactful results and to better understand the inter-
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relationships of food fraud variables through the ability to manipulate both input 
factors and output (FFV) factors within specified conditions.  
The study also makes two practical contributions for food companies, 
authorities in border protection, policymakers and quality assurance agencies 
through the identification of the main factors that are most likely to increase 
the vulnerability to food fraud under different conditions and for different 
product types. This information will assist these groups to implement the most 
appropriate countermeasures to combat the areas of vulnerability, and will also 
assist in the determination of likely FFV factors for future incidents.  
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1 CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 Introduction 
Food fraud is a global problem costing businesses approximately US $49 
billion annually (McGrath et al. 2018) either in lost revenue or in the 
implementation of prevention and detection measures (McGrath et al. 2018; 
Moyer, DeVries & Spink 2017). Experts predict this cost to continue to grow 
noting that new prevention countermeasures and detection tools are needed 
as current protection of the food supply chain are clearly not working (Johnson 
2014; PwC 2015; Spink & Moyer 2011; Spink et al. 2017; Tahkapaa et al. 2015; 
Van Ruth, Huisman & Luning 2017). Increasing incidences of food fraud are 
due in part to the global nature of the problem and the increasing economic 
gain being realised by fraudsters (Spink & Moyer 2011; Van Ruth, Huisman & 
Luning 2017). In spite of increased awareness of and attention being paid to 
the incidences of food fraud, experts predict that the full impact of food fraud 
is still under-represented as many incidents of food fraud remain undetected 
(Spink et al. 2017). New ways of detecting and reducing cases of food fraud 
are needed based on more holistic approaches that reduce the vulnerability to 
food fraud (Spink et al. 2017; Van Ruth, Huisman & Luning 2017; Van Ruth et 
al. 2018).   
This thesis takes up this call from industry and academic experts to find 
ways to better mitigate the level of vulnerability to food fraud for food products 
targeted at human consumption (Spink et al. 2017; Spink, Moyer & Peru 2016; 
Van Ruth et al. 2018). In this study, data recorded by the USP Food Fraud 
Database (FFD) will be used to develop a holistic model that will extend 
existing knowledge of Food Fraud Vulnerability (FFV) factors. The study will 
adopt a two-phase mixed method approach using a qualitative Barrier Analysis 
technique in phase 1 followed by a quantitative Bayesian Network modelling 
approach in phase 2. From this, a holistic model will be developed using 
Bayesian Network Modeling techniques that can assess FFV factors (or root 
causes of food fraud) and quantify the level of vulnerability to these causes for 
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 Background to the Research 
Food fraud is a growing phenomenon that not only has the potential to threaten 
consumers’ health, but also it can have a substantial negative impact on a 
company’s finances, brand reputation, and/or competitive advantage (Johnson 
2014; Lotta & Bogue 2015; PwC 2015; Spink & Moyer 2011; Ting & Tsang 
2014). The health risks for consumers and the economic losses for food 
producers can be devastating. Spink and Moyer (2011) identified three main 
types of risk of food fraud that relate to consumers’ health. These are: (1) direct 
risk or immediate exposure to the toxic or contamination hazards; (2) indirect 
risk or long-time exposure to the contamination hazards; and (3) technical risk 
because of misleading information about ingredients or allergens (p. R159).  
 Melamine in baby formula in 2008 in China is an example of food fraud 
that had a negative impact on public health. In this incident, fraudsters seeking 
economic gain, ‘added melamine to milk to boost the apparent protein content’ 
(Spink & Moyer 2011, p. R159). While the intent of fraudsters was only to gain 
profit, the impact led to ‘ a real public health vulnerability’ (Everstine, Spink & 
Kennedy 2013; Spink & Moyer 2011, p. R158). Six babies died and ‘close to 
300,000 children became ill’ (Everstine, Spink & Kennedy 2013, p. 725). 
Section  Purpose and Topics 
1.1 Introduction Introduction 
1.2 Background  Research background and basic definition 
and concepts 
1.3 Research problem Research Problem and research questions 
1.4 Justifications of Research Research gaps and research contributions 
1.5 Overview of Research 
Methods 
Research Methodology 
1.6 Outline of the Study Snapshot of the study chapters 
1.7 Conclusion Summary 
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Food fraud can also have negative economic and reputational impacts 
on companies and can cause losses including: ‘social loss and punishment; 
third party losses’ (due to costly authenticity testing) (Van Ruth et al. 2018, p. 
375); recall losses; and sales losses (Spink et al. 2017). The potential negative 
economic impact of food fraud on companies can be extreme, as evidenced in 
a recently reported case of apple juice adulterated with high-fructose corn 
syrup. This incident of fraud was estimated to return an additional US$18,000 
per shipment to the fraudsters (Moyer, DeVries & Spink 2017).  
The case of the horsemeat scandal in 2013 in the UK is an example of 
a case of fraud that resulted in economic gain to the fraudsters and reputational 
damage and economic disadvantage to the UK beef industry. In this case, the 
fraud increased the beef price in Europe by almost 45%, and the sales of 
frozen burgers by 13% (Moyer, DeVries & Spink 2017). However, the long-
term reputational damage to the industry was more notable as food (beef) 
production companies (and not the fraudster) were liable and responsible in 
the case of food fraud (Spink & Moyer 2013).  
These publicly reported incidents of food fraud have increased the 
general public awareness of food fraud issues and have heightened the 
interest from researchers to know more about the phenomena. Academic 
interest is still relatively new in this area with Spink and Moyer (2011) being 
the first authors to propose a definition of food fraud when they wrote about 
the famous incident of melamine being added to baby formula in China in 2008. 
Before this time, the cases of food fraud were identified through traditional food 
safety management system. The definition by Spink and Moyer (2011) has 
been largely adopted by the academy (e.g. Lotta & Bogue 2015; Moore, Spink 
& Lip 2012; Silvis et al. 2017; Smith, Manning & McElwee 2017) and posits 
that food fraud is ‘the deliberate and intentional substitution, addition, 
tampering, or misrepresentation of food, food ingredients, or food packaging; 
or false or misleading statements made about a product, for economic 
gain’(Spink & Moyer 2011, p. R158). 
As leading researchers in this field, they further defended the notion that 
the factors and causes of food fraud are unique and important enough to 
consider it as a research domain in its own right, independent from the food 
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safety management system discourse from where it originated (Spink & Moyer 
2011). Their work highlighted that traditional food safety management systems 
were ineffective (Curll 2015; Esteki, Requeiro & Simal-Gandara 2019; Reilly 
2018) in targeting and then minimising food fraud occurrences. They gave two 
reasons for this deficiency. First, food safety intervention (or detection) 
strategies are predicated on prior known (or conventional) toxic chemicals and 
hazards. Experience has shown that ‘fraudsters continually seek ways to avoid 
detection by sourcing adulterants and other methods that are not listed among 
those conventional food safety contaminants’ (Spink & Moyer 2011, p. R158). 
Thus different approaches and methods are required to both detect and 
mitigate against issues of fraud such as determination of vulnerability (Silvis et 
al. 2017; Van Ruth, Huisman & Luning 2017; Van Ruth et al. 2018) 
susceptibility to the fraud occurring in the first place. 
The second reason is related to the different risk outcomes and 
motivations of fraudsters between food fraud and food safety incidents (Lord, 
Flores Elizondo & Spencer 2017; Manning & Soon 2016). When fraudsters are 
motivated to negatively impact public health, or when actions un-intentionally 
affect the health of others, then the act relates to issues of food safety. 
However, when fraudsters are motivated by hopes of economic gain without 
the intent to harm the health of others, and therefore they intentionally interfere 
with food products, then this is known as food fraud (Spink & Moyer 2011, p. 
R159).  
The horsemeat scandal in the UK is an example of the failure of food 
safety strategies to address food fraud (Esteki, Requeiro & Simal-Gandara 
2018; Lord, Flores Elizondo & Spencer 2017; Spink et al. 2017). In this 
incident, fraudsters had been adding less expensive horsemeat to beef 
products in order to realise more profit for a long period of time. While the 
horsemeat was ‘ clearly an illegally added ‘adulterant-substance,’ (Spink et al. 
2017, p 215) there was no identified public health hazards’ and therefore 
reactive strategies to combat this type of food fraud were not deployed (Lord, 
Flores Elizondo & Spencer 2017). In food safety management literature, 
reactive strategies are deployed ‘ whenever public health is threatened’ (Spink 
& Moyer 2011, p. R159). In this example, the horse meat was only detected 
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accidentally when food safety authorities conducted random sampling 
(Kerschke-Risch 2017) of the products to identify the proportion of beef for 
reporting purposes. It is speculated that the process of adulteration may have 
continued for even longer as the addition of the horsemeat had not impacted 
the public health and the routine sampling that identified the issue was 
inconsistent and somewhat random (Spink & Moyer 2011).  
These differences between food safety and food fraud incidents have 
resulted in researchers calling for more innovative ways to combat and prevent 
food fraud (Spink & Moyer 2011; Spink & Moyer 2013; Spink et al. 2017; 
Tahkapaa et al. 2015). Innovative ways to address food fraud should focus on 
learnings from analysis of historical incidents of food fraud (Spink, Moyer & 
Peru 2016) as well as consideration of ways to prevent the root causes of food 
fraud as a means to determining the degree of vulnerability to fraudulent 
activity (Food Fraud Vulnerability - FFV) (Silvis et al. 2017; Spink & Moyer 
2011; Van Ruth, Huisman & Lunning 2017;). This approach requires a shift in 
thinking from ‘risk’ ‘mitigation’ (or reactive strategies deployed by food safety 
management systems) to ‘vulnerability’ ‘prevention’ (Spink et al. 2017, p. 219).  
As a first step in this process, Moore, Spink and Lipp (2012) introduced 
the USP Food Fraud Database (FFD) to assist in the analysis of historical food 
fraud incidents to facilitate innovative ways of protecting the food supply chain 
from the fraudulent intervention (Moore, Spink & Lipp 2012, p. R125). 
Identifying these ‘weaknesses’ or ‘flaws’ in the supply chain are known in the 
literature as areas of vulnerability (Van Ruth, Huisman & Lunning 2017, p. 70).  
The Routine Activity Theory has provided a set of principles to assist in 
better describing and detecting areas of vulnerability to food fraud (Van Ruth, 
Huisman & Luning 2017). Applying this theory, vulnerability to food fraud is 
defined as, ‘the outcome of convergence in time and space’ of a motivated 
offender, a suitable target, and absence of a capable guardian (i.e. traceability 
technology) (Ellis et al. 2016; Van Ruth, Huisman & Luning 2017, p. 71). Thus 
for vulnerability to food fraud to exist, there need to be three factors in 
evidence: These are: opportunity; motivation; and the absence of 
countermeasures (Silvis et al. 2017; SSAFE 2016; Van Ruth, Huisman & 
Luning 2017; Van Ruth et al. 2018).  
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Studies exploring the factors that impact vulnerability to food fraud are 
just emerging in the literature with the key factors most relevant when 
considering vulnerability to food fraud published as recently as 2017. The 
seminal study by Van Ruth, Huisman and Luning (2017) built on the principles 
of the Routine Activity Theory and described three different factors could be 
used to impact vulnerability to food fraud. Further studies by Ruth et al. (2018) 
and Silvis et al. (2017) extended this work and created the SSAFE Food Fraud 
Vulnerability Assessment (FFVA) tool. This tool is designed for self-
assessment of vulnerability to food fraud based on a managers’ perspective.  
Although the above studies addressed and analysed the important FFV 
factors, they did not address the ways to prevent or minimise the vulnerability 
to food fraud. Studies that could address this gap have been cautioned by 
researchers in the field to adopt a holistic approach to consider a range of 
viewpoints (Van Ruth et al. 2018). This proposed study takes up this call, 
combining the work of researchers exploring the assessment of FFV factors, 
with those who have used the Routine Activity Theory frameworks to gain a 
richer view of the factors that can increase the vulnerability to food fraud for 
food products designed for human consumption (Spink, Moyer & Peru 2016).  
The proposed research will integrate this knowledge to create a holistic 
model that assesses the level of vulnerability to food fraud which will be tested 
for validity against real-world food fraud data recorded by a global food fraud 
database. The results of this research will lead to the development of a holistic 
model that can assess the level (degree) of vulnerability to food fraud for a 
range of food categories using Bayesian Network modelling. This information 
will also identify the most relevant factors to consider mitigating or eliminate 
that vulnerability.  
 The Research Problem 
The main aim of this research is to develop a holistic model that can assess 
the level (degree) of vulnerability to fraud for food products targeted at human 
consumption. In order to do so, this research will develop a holistic approach 
to identify and assess FFV factors. Although there are studies that have 
attempted to develop a model in order to prevent the risk of food fraud 
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(Bouzembrak & Marvin 2016; Marvin et al. 2016), these studies have focused 
on identifying the types of food fraud incident (such as (1) improper, fraudulent, 
missing or absent Health Certificate (HC), (2) Illegal importation, (3) 
Tampering, (4) improper, expired, fraudulent or missing Common Entry 
Document (CED), (5) Expiration date, (6) Origin labelling, (7)Theft and Resale) 
rather than attempting to assess the potential vulnerability of various 
categories of food to fraudulent activity. This is the gap in the extant literature 
that this study will address (Silvis et al. 2017; Spink, Moyer & Peru 2016; Van 
Ruth, Huisman & Luning 2017; Van Ruth et al. 2018). Therefore the main 
research question for this study is: 
How can the vulnerability to food fraud for food products designed for 
human consumption be assessed? 
In order to address the research question, a number of sub-questions 
need to be answered. These are: 
Sub-question 1: What are the factors that influence the vulnerability to 
food fraud food products designed for human consumption? 
A recent study by Marvin et al. (2016) exploring ‘the value of using a 
Bayesian Network (BN) modelling’ to mitigate risk of food fraud (p. 463), 
suggested that the type of fraudulent incident may also be an important 
influencer when attempting to develop a holistic model that can assess the 
level of vulnerability to food fraud. Further, they also suggested that the 
development of a holistic model would also benefit from an understanding of 
the relationships between the variables known to be relevant. Thus, sub-
questions 2 and 3 are proposed for this research.  
Sub-question 2: How can the types of food fraud be used to assess 
Food Fraud Vulnerability factors? 
Sub-question 3: Which of the variables, known to influence the 
vulnerability to food fraud, are most important?   
In order to address these questions, potential variables that influence the 
level of vulnerability to food fraud from the literature (Bouzembrak & Marvin 
2016; Marvin et al. 2016) and the source data (database) will be utilised 
using Barrier Analysis technique combined with the Routine Activity Theory 
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to construct a Bayesian Network structure and from that develop a holistic 
model. The justification for this research will be presented next.  
 Justifications for the Research 
As described in the previous sections, the main aim of this research is to 
develop a holistic model that can assess the level (degree) of vulnerability to 
food fraud for food products designed for human consumption. The academic 
literature investigating vulnerability prevention has to date, relied on the 
Routine Activity Theory (Spink et al. 2015; Silvis et al. 2017; Van Ruth, 
Huisman & Luning 2017; Van Ruth et al. 2018) to provide a framework for 
categorising the FFV factors. These previous studies have organised the 
factors into three key groupings: opportunity; motivation; and countermeasures 
(Silvis et al. 2017; Van Ruth, Huisman & Luning 2017; Van Ruth et al. 2018).  
In spite of the increased managerial interest in the issue of vulnerability 
to food fraud, particularly amongst those producing food for human 
consumption, the literature and empirical research addressing and assessing 
Food Fraud Vulnerability factors is only just emerging (Van Ruth, Huisman & 
Luning 2017; Van Ruth et al. 2018). This study contributes to this emerging 
field of scholarship by introducing an alternative method through the 
development of a holistic model that can assess the level of vulnerability to 
food fraud for food products targeted at human consumption. Table 1.2 
presents a summary of the research objectives, research questions and 










Table 1.2: Research gaps and research contributions 
Research Question Research Gaps Research Contribution 
Main Research Question: 
How Can the vulnerability to 
food fraud for food products 
designed for human 
consumption be assessed? 
Prior research has highlighted 
the need for a holistic 
approach to shifting from risk 
mitigation to vulnerability 
reduction (that is different from 
the common food safety 
management system 
strategies) to prevent food 
fraud (Spink & Moyer 2011; 
Spink et al. 2017; Lord, Flores 
Elizondo & Spencer 2017). 
Focus on FFV factors 
classification by the Routine 
Activity Theory is 
recommended (Spink, Moyer & 
Peru 2016; Silvis et al. 2017; 
Van Ruth, Huisman & Luning 
2017; Van Ruth et al. 2018) 
This research will develop a 
holistic approach that can 
assess the level (degree) of 
vulnerability to food fraud for 
food products targeted at 
human consumption 
Sub-question 1: What are the 
factors that influence the 
vulnerability to food fraud 
food products designed for 
human consumption? 
Need to understand the root 
causes of food fraud/or what 
motivates food fraudsters to 
commit fraud 
New classifications of FFV 
factors will be developed and 
indexed using the Barrier 
Analysis method combined 
with the Routine Activity 
Theory categories of 
opportunity, motivation, and 
countermeasures  
Sub-question 2: How can the 
types of food fraud be used to 
assess Fraud Vulnerability 
factors? 
 
Sub-question 3: Which of the 
known food fraud variables 
are most relevant when 
assessing vulnerability to 
food fraud? 
Need to identify variables that 
influence vulnerability to food 
fraud and analyse (or 
compare) these variables 
through the application of 
Bayesian Modeling approach 
based on real data (from food 
fraud database) for different 
food fraud types (Van Ruth, 
Huisman & Luning 2017; Van 
Ruth et al. 2018). Focus on the 
food fraud incident type as a 
possible dynamic variable that 
influences FFV factors (Marvin 
et al. 2016), and other factors 
addressed by the source data 
(Bouzembrak & Marvin 2016; 
Marvin et al. 2016) 
In order to address the Sub-
question 2 and Sub-question 3 
of the study, a Bayesian 
Network model will be 
constructed and tested against 
the theoretical assumptions 
(the Routine Activity Theory). 
The research will analyse 
different potential influencing 
variables of FFV factors and 
determine the most important 
one. 
 
This proposed study is justified according to the three significant needs 
for vulnerability reduction strategies: (1) a need for a holistic approach to 
shifting from risk mitigation to vulnerability reduction; (2) gaps in food fraud 
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research; (3) and benefits for food production companies, border protection 
authorities, governments and quality assurance agencies aiming to reduce 
food fraud (Spink & Moyer 2011; Spink, Moyer & Peru 2016; Van Ruth, 
Huisman & Luning 2017; Van Ruth et al. 2018). 
 The first justification for this study relates to the call from the literature 
to undertake a more innovative approach to combat the problem of food fraud 
(Silvis et al. 2017; Spink & Moyer 2011; Van Ruth, Huisman & Luning 2017; 
Van Ruth et al. 2018). The new approach for food fraud prevention requires 
the shift from risk mitigation (e.g. when using detection technologies), to 
strategies designed to reduce or remove areas of vulnerability with more valid 
tools for assessment (Lord, Flores Elizondo & Spencer 2017; Spink & Moyer 
2011; Spink et al. 2017). Shifting the approach from risk mitigation to 
vulnerability reduction also requires changes in practice in relation to 
responses to the problem of food fraud.  
Vulnerability reduction requires a proactive approach to the 
management of food fraud, relying on identifying the root causes of the 
problem before the fraud occurs (Spink & Moyer 2011). Risk mitigation, by 
contrast, is a reactive approach that identifies strategies for action once the 
fraud has occurred (Spink & Moyer 2011). This change in approach is 
especially important when dealing with fraudulent incidents that have the 
potential to threaten public health (Everstine, Spink & Kennedy 2013). If it is 
possible to prevent the vulnerability to food fraud and isolate the main areas of 
risk prior to fraud occurring, then it should be possible to also reduce the 
incidences of fraud, increase confidence for public safety and reduce the 
economic impact of food fraud for businesses. 
To achieve this outcome in a way that is reliable and robust, researchers 
have supported the practice of using historical data of food fraud incidents, 
recorded in global databases (Everstine, Spink & Kennedy 2013), to test and 
confirm proposed models (Bouzembrak & Marvin 2016; Marvin et al. 2016; 
Tahkapaa et al. 2015). Databases such as Europe (RASFF), or US (EMA) 
have been used in the study by Marvin et al. (2016) combining these to attempt 
to ensure a global approach. However, the study by Bouzembrak et al. (2018) 
have criticised this method stating that the use of these two food fraud 
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databases could lead to the overlap of incidents because of duplication that 
may exist as EMA also ‘collect[s] food fraud reports from the RASFF’ database 
(Bouzembrak et al. 2018, p.289). Therefore, a more robust analysis of food 
fraud incidents, using a comprehensive (global) database is needed.   
This proposed study will take up the call from researchers to use a more 
comprehensive database, such as the USP FFD, for development of a holistic 
model (e.g. Bouzembrak et al. 2018; Bouzembrak & Marvin 2016). This 
database is relatively new and as such, its use in this study will contribute to 
the literature and research in this area of vulnerability to food fraud.  
 The food fraud literature has highlighted the need to be more proactive 
in the fight against food fraud by changing the focus from reaction to prevention 
of fraud. To do this it is important to first identify the root causes of food fraud 
to be able to then prevent the vulnerability to these factors (Spink & Moyer 
2011; Van Ruth et al. 2018). This requires a multi-disciplinary approach to 
research as the root causes of food fraud can be diverse (Spink & Moyer 
2013). This research takes up this call and will consider the insights from 
literature related to the Routine Activity Theory; and Signalling Theory. 
The review of this literature has led to the identification of three gaps 
that this research will address, thus providing a second justification for this 
research. The first research gap relates to factors affecting vulnerability to food 
fraud (Spink, Moyer & Peru 2016; Van Ruth, Huisman & Luning 2017; Van 
Ruth et al. 2018). The literature is in agreement that there is a lack of insight 
into these factors and that more research is needed (Van Ruth, Huisman & 
Luning 2017; Van Ruth et al. 2018). In particular whilst there has been some 
attempt to identify FFV factors using the SSAFE self-assessment tool and 
insights from the Routine Activity Theory approach, empirical analysis of these 
factors and their influencing variables based on real data (e.g. recorded by 
FFD) is still unexplored in the literature (Van Ruth et al. 2018). 
 The second and third research gaps are related to variables that 
influence FFV factors. Although the emerging food fraud literature emphasises 
the need to shift from thinking about intervention (or risk mitigation) strategies 
to that of vulnerability reduction (i.e. Spink et al. 2015), there is lack of 
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comprehensive research that provides evidence about how variables that 
influence FFV factors behave. Specifically, food fraud scholars have called for 
an approach that allows for the modelling of the dynamic and possibly 
reciprocal interrelationship between the food fraud incident types and drivers 
of food fraud (or FFV factors) (Marvin et al. 2016; Bouzembrak & Marvin 2016). 
In addition, these researchers have called for such a model to be rigorously 
tested through the use of real data from a comprehensive food fraud database 
like USP FFD in order to develop an accurate holistic model (Bouzembrak et 
al. 2018). This study fills this gap by undertaking the development and testing 
of such a model.  
 The third justification of this study relates to the benefits for food 
production companies, border protection authorities, governments and quality 
assurance agencies who work to detect and reduce vulnerability to food fraud. 
A significant outcome for these groups would be the ability to identify and the 
root causes and the likelihood of food fraud vulnerability for different types of 
product (dairy versus meat for example). Furthermore, the development of a 
holistic model will help these groups reduce the costs of deploying 
countermeasures by facilitating the use of targeted countermeasures that will 
best combat the area of vulnerability instead of the more traditional scattergun 
approach. Finally, those in positions to create policies for the protection of food 
integrity within the supply chains will be able to use the outputs from the model 
developed by this research to more accurately target areas for focus and 
regulation. 
 Overview of Research Methods 
This thesis has adopted a pragmatism paradigm according to which the 
researcher employs both qualitative and quantitative approaches to 
understand and acquire knowledge about the problem (Creswell 2014)– in this 
case, vulnerability to food fraud. Adopting this paradigm requires the 
researcher to use qualitative data analysis (Williams 2018)  (in this case 
identification of relevant themes or factors that impact vulnerability to food 
fraud through Barrier Analysis method) to build a training model which is then 
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tested against known data using quantitative methods to adjust and then 
validate the final holistic model.  
Therefore, a mixed methods strategy is selected to address the 
research questions (Johnson & Onwuegbuzie 2004)  for this study. The type 
of mixed methods research strategy that is chosen for this study will be 
sequential exploratory where qualitative data is conducted first, followed by the 
analysis of quantitative data (Venkatesh, Brown & Sullivan 2016). This mixed 
methods strategy is ideal for understanding complex research problem 
(Creswell 2014) such as vulnerability to food fraud, which is the focus of this 
study.  
The first phase of the research is qualitative building on previous studies 
suggest that the identification of the key FFV factors (based on Routine Activity 
Theory) is yet to be completed (sub-question 1) (Van Ruth, Huisman & Luning 
2017; Van Ruth et al. 2018). In addition, the identification of these factors 
requires initial exploratory screening of actual food fraud cases (Spink, Moyer 
& Peru 2016; Van Ruth et al. 2018). The purpose of this qualitative approach 
is to identify the root causes of vulnerability to food fraud based on reviewing 
food fraud history.  
The Barrier Analysis method (Blomkvist et al. 2010) will be selected as 
a qualitative approach to understand and identify the root causes of incidents 
(Mahto & Kumar 2008) of food fraud and to extrapolate the factors most likely 
to indicate vulnerability to food fraud. The use of the Barrier Analysis technique 
is supported in the literature specifically related to incidents of security (and/or 
safety) violations (see Blomkvist et al. 2010; Dong et al. 2016; Johnson 2006). 
Four categories of food will be used for this analysis as these make up more 
than fifty percent of all food fraud incidents in the database. These are: seafood 
and seafood products; meat and poultry; alcoholic beverages; and dairy.  
The second phase of the research will be quantitative in nature and will 
adopt a Bayesian Network analysis approach. There are two main reasons for 
the adoption of the approach. First, large data sets (580 cases of food fraud, 
one target variable with 128 input/independent variables) will be used in this 
study to acquire an accurate holistic model using statistical software of SPSS 
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Modeler 18.2. The Bayesian Network analysis approach has been shown to 
be most effective in building a probability model based on prior probability 
incidents identified (within a database) (IBM Nd (b)).  
Second, the Bayesian Network modelling approach has precedence in 
the extant literature and has been shown to be an appropriate and robust 
method for the purpose of understanding the patterns of occurrences and 
interrelationships of variables related to food fraud (see Marvin et al. 2016; 
Bouzembrak & Marvin 2016). Given the nature of this study’s main research 
question which requires an assessment of the level of inputs and pattern 
determination, the quantitative technique would be most appropriate for the 
second phase.  
A secondary data analysis approach will be selected for this research 
because this thesis plans to test FFV factors against real data or food fraud 
incidents to address research gaps. The use of secondary data analysis is 
most suited to this research as this method includes the examination and 
assessment of recorded data (Jenkin 1985). The USP FFD will be selected as 
a secondary database for a ‘greater knowledge of food fraud ‘(Bouzembrak et 
al. 2018; Bouzembrak & Marvin 2016, p. 185). From all 8,721 cases of food 
fraud reported in the USP FFD, this thesis will use four product types of 
seafood, meat and poultry, alcoholic beverages, and dairy products as the 
sample for data analysis as they cover more than 50% of the database records.  
 Outline of the Study  
This thesis will develop a holistic model for determination of vulnerability to 
food fraud for food products designed for human consumption. The structure 
of the thesis is illustrated in the chapters describes next.  
Chapter One – introduction describes an overview of this research by 
emphasising the theoretical background and illustrating its key components 
related to the research problem, research, objectives, research questions, 
research significance, and the research methodology.  
Chapter Two – Literature review will analyse the academic literature in 
multi-disciplinary areas of food fraud, criminology, and business on relevant 
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concepts and theories. Discussions illustrated in this chapter will focus on the 
definition of food fraud and the important differences between food fraud and 
food safety in order to highlight the importance of theoretical framing. The 
discussion will then move to an investigation of the concepts related to the 
vulnerability to food fraud. The chapter then will analyse the FFV concept 
based on the Routine Activity Theory and a preliminary Bayesian Network will 
be proposed.  
Chapter Three – Research methodology will explain the justifications of 
selecting a pragmatist paradigm and mixed methods approach. The study then 
will illustrate the selection of the secondary data analysis approach to address 
the research problem, research questions, and data collection. A detailed 
description of the qualitative (Barrier Analysis technique) and quantitative 
(Bayesian Network modelling) approaches are then provided.  
Chapter Four – Results will provide a discussion of the findings that 
emerge from the research questions composing this research. The discussion 
will present descriptive analysis of variables that influence FFV factors related 
to all four products categories, describing FFV factors identified from Barrier 
Analysis technique (sub-question 1), Building and constructing Bayesian 
Network structure to understand important influencing variables using SPSS 
Modeler 18.2 (sub-question 2 and sub-question 3), and finally, validating the 
holistic model (main research question). 
Chapter Five – Contributions will summarise and integrate the result 
findings described in chapter four with the literature presented in chapter two. 
The results relating to the research question will be discussed and theoretical 
and practical contributions to the research questions will be described in this 
chapter.  
 Conclusion 
Recent incidents of food fraud have stimulated academics to study this 
complex phenomenon. A need to develop a holistic approach to identify and 
assess vulnerability to food fraud for food products has been emphasized in 
the literature. In particular, previous studies suggest focusing on the Routine 
Activity Theory and real cases of food fraud recorded in the USP FFD for the 
16 
 
assessment of FFV factors. This thesis focuses on this need and addresses 
the gaps in the extant literature through the development of a holistic model 
that can assess the level of vulnerability to food fraud for food products 
targeted at human consumption. The main research question was formulated 
about the assessment of the FFV factors, with three sub-questions that explore 
the main factors affecting vulnerability to food fraud (sub-question 1), and 
variables that influence FFV factors (sub-question 2, sub-question 3). A mixed 
methods research will be adopted in order to answer the research questions. 
Barrier Analysis Technique and Bayesian Network modelling approach will 
then be selected for data analysis methods.  
  The following chapter reviews the relevant literature and discusses in 
detail the key concepts formulated by the research questions. In particular, the 
Routine Activity Theory and the Routine Activity Theory will be explored.
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2 CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 Introduction 
Chapter 1 illustrated the growing seriousness of food fraud incidents for 
companies that produce and manufacture food for human consumption. In 
spite of the increased interest in the issue of vulnerability to food fraud, 
particularly amongst those producing food for human consumption, the 
literature and empirical research addressing Food Fraud Vulnerability (FFV) 
factors and its influencing variables is only just emerging (Van Ruth, Huisman 
& Luning 2017; Van Ruth et al. 2018). This research will contribute to this 
emerging field of scholarship through the development of a holistic model that 
can assess the level of vulnerability to food fraud for food products targeted at 
human consumption. Table 2.1 provides an overview of the structure and 
outline of this chapter. 
The chapter commences with the review of the literature relating to food 
fraud, and a discussion of the issues of theoretical framing before moving to 
an investigation of the concepts related to the vulnerability to food fraud. 
Section 2.2 includes definitions of food fraud, its types and important 
differences between food fraud and food safety. Section 2.3 presents the 
theoretical frameworks from criminology literature providing insight into the 
food fraud problem through the area of vulnerability.  
The theoretical frameworks presented in section 2.3 lead to a 
determination of factors that impact vulnerability to food fraud. These 
theoretical frameworks referred to in this section are: the Routine Activity 
Theory; and Signalling Theory. Section 2.4 presents the FFV concept and 
factors affecting vulnerability to food fraud. The chapter concludes with a 
preliminary theoretical framework that proposes inter-relationships between 
FFV factors and its influencing variables. The theory relevant to food fraud will 






Table 2.1: Chapter two structure 
Section Purpose 
2.1 Introduction Introduction 
2.2 Food fraud Definition of food fraud and its different types 
Describing the differences by Food Risk Matrix 
and Food Protection Plan 
2.3 Criminology Literature Justification of selecting the Routine Activity 
Theory to understand root causes of vulnerability 
to food fraud (including the area of vulnerability)  
2.4 Food Fraud Vulnerability Describing FFV factors 
2.5 Conceptual Framework of the study Conceptual model 
2.6 Conclusion Summary 
 
 Food Fraud 
Although food fraud is not a new problem (Tahkapaa et al. 2015), 
academic and industry interest in this phenomenon is relatively recent, 
stimulated by two specific incidents of food fraud; (1) the melamine in the baby 
formula incident in China in 2008 (Lotta & Bogue 2015), and (2) the horsemeat 
scandal in the UK in 2012-2013 (Moore, Spink & Lipp 2012; Spink & Moyer 
2011). The question over the effectiveness of food safety control system on 
handling these cases of intentional adulteration has highlighted the importance 
of the need for developing more specific definition on food fraud different to 
food safety (Spink & Moyer 2011). In the case of China, the melamine was not 
detected in time (before the death of several infants) by food safety officers 
due to the fact that melamine was not defined as food adulterants in the food 
safety management system. Food safety incident was historically defined as 
an unintentional act (Spink & Moyer 2011; Spink et al. 2017) that ‘will not cause 
harm to the consumer’ (Manning & Soon 2016, p. R823). The (intentional) 
motivation and root causes of these two incidents have enforced global food 
protection organisations and academics to set a new definition for food fraud 
(Curll 2015; Lotta & Bogue 2015; Spink & Moyer 2011). 
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Table 2.2 shows common food fraud definitions by organisations and 
academics with the key food fraud type in their definition.  The US Food and 
Drug Administration (FDA) defined food fraud as Economically Motivated 
Adulteration (EMA) that is ‘ Fraudulent, intentional substitution or addition of a 
substance in a product for the purpose of increasing the apparent value of the 
product or reducing the cost of its production, i.e., for economic gain’ (Manning 
& Soon 2016, p. R824). EMA is one type of food fraud and thus this definition 
does not contain all other fraud types (Manning& Soon 2016; Spink & Moyer 
2011). The UK’s FSA described food fraud based on two types of fraud: (1) 
unfit for consumption and (2) misdescription (Manning & Soon 2016). The term 
food fraud is broader than the only EMA type defined by FDA, GMA, NCFPD, 
Elliott Review (2014) and is more specific than ‘general concept of food 




 Table 2.2: Common definitions of food fraud by food organisations and academics 
Organisation/Academics 
 
Definition Food fraud type inclusions 
 




‘Fraudulent, intentional substitution or addition of a substance in a product for the 
purpose of increasing the apparent value of the product or reducing the cost of its 
production, i.e., for economic gain’ 
 
Economically Motivated Adulteration 
(EMA) 
 
Food Standard Agency 
(FSA) 
‘The deliberate placement on the market, for financial gain, with the intention of 
deceiving the consumer, covering two main types of fraud. These include the sale 
of food which is unfit and potentially harmful as well as the deliberate 
misdescription of food, such as products substituted with a cheaper alternative’ 
 




‘Food fraud in the context of food ingredients refers to the fraudulent addition of 
non-authentic substances or removal or replacement of authentic substances 
without the purchaser’s knowledge for economic gain of the seller. It is also 
referred to as economic adulteration, economically motivated adulteration, 
intentional adulteration, or food counterfeiting’ 
 
EMA, Food Counterfeiting 
 ‘Economic adulteration is defined as the intentional fraudulent modification of a 
finished product or ingredient for economic gain through the following methods: 
unapproved enhancements, dilution with a lesser-value ingredient, concealment 
EMA that include Enhancement, 






of damage or contamination, mislabelling of a product or ingredient, substitution 
of a lesser-value ingredient or failing to disclose required product information’ 
Substitution, Conceal damage/product 
information 
National Centre for Food 
Protection and Defence 
(NCFPD) (Researchers 
from University of 
Minnesota) 
‘Economically motivated adulteration (EMA) is the intentional sale of substandard 
food or food products for the purpose of economic gain. Common types of EMA 
include intentional substitution of an authentic ingredient with a cheaper product, 
dilution with water or other substances, flavor or color enhancement using illicit or 
unapproved substances, and substitution of one species with another’ 
EMA which includes substitution, 
dilution, and enhancement 
Spink and Moyer  
(2011) 
the deliberate and intentional substitution, addition, tampering or 
misrepresentation of food, food ingredients, or food packaging, or false or 
misleading statement about a product, for economic gain 
Includes all types of food fraud 
Elliott (2014)  food fraud becomes food crime when it no longer involves random acts by ‘rogues’ 
within the food industry but becomes an organized activity by groups which 
knowingly set out to deceive, and or injure, those purchasing food 
Based on/Similar to FSA definition, 
EMA/Misrepresentation (Manning & 
Soon 2016) 
Source: Elliott Review ( 2014); Johnson (2014, p. 5-6); Manning and Soon (2016); Moore,  Spink and Lipp (2012); Spink and Moyer (2011)
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 In an attempt to provide consistency for academic researchers and 
those policing food fraud, Spink and Moyer (2011) synthesised these various 
perspectives to propose a standard definition of ‘food fraud’ for the first time in 
the Journal of Food Science (Spink & Moyer, 2011). Their definition provided 
a broader conceptualisation of the phenomenon of food fraud than had 
previously been considered by these other standard setting organisations 
(Curll 2015) and was proposed as:  
‘…the deliberate and intentional substitution, addition, tampering or 
misrepresentation of food, food ingredients, or food packaging, or false or 
misleading statement about a product, for economic gain.’ (Spink & Moyer 
2011, p. R158) 
This definition has been generally accepted in the theoretical discourse 
(e.g. Manning & Soon 2016; Lotta & Bogue 2015; Marvin et al. 2016; Silvis et 
al. 2017; Spink, Moyer & Peru 2016) and Spink and Moyer continue to lead 
the research in this field. This definitional consensus has allowed other 
researchers to be more focused in their investigations into aspects of food 
fraud which in turn has extended the impact of their work.   
 In developing their definition, Spink and Moyer (2011) sought to more 
clearly differentiate actions that would be defined as fraudulent in nature from 
those that related to food safety. Drawing from the criminology literature, they 
identified that the main difference in these incidents resided in the motivations 
of those involved. They determined that fraudsters were not generally 
motivated to seek harm to individuals through their acts of food tampering or 
adulteration. Rather, they were motivated to seek economic gain as a result of 
their actions and that these actions were purposeful in nature. Thus their 
definition proposed two key principles that are required for a food 
tampering/adulteration incident to be classified as food fraud. These are: the 
act needs to be intentional; and it needs to be motivated by the desire for 
economic gain. Further, it is the intentional nature of food fraud acts that result 




According to this definition accidental, unintentional, serendipitous 
damage or contamination to food products would not be classified as food 
fraud (Spink & Moyer, 2011). Similarly, food safety incidents are not always 
motivated by the desire for economic gain and thus would also not be defined 
as food fraud using this approach. This approach works both ways with not all 
food fraud incidents also being classified as food safety. For example, the 
substitution of highly valuable food source (Beef) for a similar cheaper one 
(Horse meat) would be classified as food fraud but would not be classified as 
a food safety incident due to the clear intent for economic gain and the lack of 
harm to those who consumed the product (Huck, Pezzei & Huck- Pezzei 2016, 
p. 33).  
  To facilitate investigation and analysis of food fraud, researchers 
interrogate known cases of fraud and food safety that have been collected in 
three main commercial databases. These databases regularly collect and 
classify information on global food fraud incidents (Zhang & Xue 2016) and 
researchers have variously used any one or a combination of these to facilitate 
their study of food fraud (e.g. Bouzembrak et al. 2016; Marvin et al. 2016; 
Moore, Spink & Lipp 2012; Tahkapaa et al. 2015).  
Within these databases, the broad category of food fraud has been 
further sub-divided into different types or categories with the exact number and 
definition generally established by the databases that hold the information. 
These categories are important as they control the scope of any research 
investigation. These databases are: the RASFF database (Rapid Alert System 
for Food and Feed); the EMA database (Economically Motivated Adulteration); 
and the USP database (US Pharmaceutical). Each will now be briefly 
described commencing with the RASFF database. Table 2.3 shows the 






Table 2.3: Main food fraud database features and limitations 
Source: Bouzembrak and Marvin (2016); Manning and Soon (2016); Moore, Spink   
and Lipp (2012); Zhang and Xue (2016) 
 
  The RASFF database is publicly available (since 2014) and releases 
and exchanges information in relation to food fraud incidents in the EU (only 
Europe) (Marvin et al. 2016). The RASFF uses six food fraud types or 
categories. These are: (1) improper, fraudulent, missing or absent health 
certificates; (2) illegal importation; (3) tampering; (4) improper, expired, 
fraudulent or missing common entry documents or import declarations; (5) 
false expiration date; and (6) mislabelling (Bouzembrak & Marvin 2016).  
The main issue with this database is that it confines its listing to 
incidents that have occurred in the EU and thus, non-EU incidents of food fraud 
are not captured (Tahkapaa et al. 2015, p. 181). To account for this deficiency, 









• Food fraud classifications: 
improper, fraudulent, missing or absent 
health certificates; illegal importation; 
tampering; improper, expired, fraudulent or 
missing common entry documents or import 




• Geographic limitation: 
only includes 
incidents in the EU 







• Food fraud classifications: 
Intentional distribution of contaminated 
products; artificial enhancement; 
counterfeiting; substitution;  mislabelling;  
dilution; transhipment; and theft and resale. 
• Geographic limitation- 
Only incidents in the 
USA 
 
• Unavailable at the 
time of data collection 
for this research 
 
USP 
• Includes comprehensive incidents from 
all around the world 
 
• Food fraud classifications: 
Replacement, Addition, Removal 
 
 
• Not publicly available 




database such as the EMA database. Moreover, the RASFF database 
includes both intentional and unintentional incidents (Marvin et al. 2016), 
means that it include food safety incidents which is out of scope of this 
research. 
The EMA (Economically Motivated Adulteration) incident database 
publishes cases (or incidents) of food fraud from the United States (Marvin et 
al. 2016). This database was available upon request up until 2017-2018 and 
is now not accessible. This database classified eight types of food fraud: (1) 
intentional distribution of contaminated products; (2) artificial enhancement; (3) 
counterfeiting; (4) substitution; (5) mislabelling; (6) dilution; (7) transhipment; 
and (8) theft and resale.   
In the literature, EMA and its classifications have been used to analyse 
food fraud types, food products likely to be targeted for food fraud, and food 
source/locations (Zhang & Xue 2016). Whilst this database provided a 
comprehensive inclusion of food fraud types and was particularly useful in 
conjunction with the RASFF database to provide global coverage, its 
discontinuation makes it redundant for the purposes of research post-2017. 
Moreover, the geographical limitation related to both EMA and RASFF is that 
they confined to incidents occurs in the EU only (for RASFF database) and/or 
the USA only (for EMA database) and therefore they do not include 
comprehensive incidents around the world when applying separately (Marvin 
et al. 2016). 
The USP database, established in 2012, is new and provides 
comprehensive documentation of global food fraud incidents. The USP 
database classifies food fraud types into three categories that reference all 
types of food fraud defined by food organisations (e.g. GMA, FDA, etc. see 
Table 2.2) and scholars (Spink & Moyer 2011; Johnson 2014). The categories 
of food fraud used in the USP database are: (1) replacement; (2) addition; and 
(3) removal (Moore, Spink & Lipp 2012; Zhang & Xue 2016).  
The USP food fraud database is regularly updated and currently lists 
thousands of publicly available cases sourced from published literature, media 
reports and regulatory reports (www.foodfraud.org). The recommendation by 
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the USP expert panel from industry and academic also addresses ‘ food 
ingredient adulterant substances including vulnerability assessment’ (Spink, 
Moyer & Peru 2016, p. 309). As this study plans to develop a holistic model 
that can assess the level (degree) of vulnerability to food fraud for different 
food fraud incident types, this USP database will provide the best source of 
data. For this reason, each classification of food fraud adopted in this database 
and its theoretical source will now be briefly described, commencing with 
replacement. 
2.2.1 Food Fraud Types in the USP Database  
The idea of developing the USP Food Fraud Database came from the research 
gap existed in the literature related to systematic efforts needed towards 
collecting and analysing previous cases of food fraud (Moore, Spink & Lipp 
2012). Collecting and analysing cases of food fraud is a fundamental step 
towards developing novel response strategies (Spink, Moyer & Peru 2016) to 
‘ prevent future food fraud’ (Moore, Spink & Lipp 2012, p. R119). The need to 
collect and analyse cases of food fraud was first noticed after the case of 
melamine in the baby formula in 2008 in China. The case was not detected in 
time to save the life of several infants due to the fact that the melamine was 
not considered as contaminants or adulterants by traditional food 
safety/protection systems (Moore, Spink & Lipp 2012; Spink & Moyer 2011). 
Development of a new database that gathers specific cases of food fraud to 
determine ‘an infinite number of potential adulterants’ and identify future 
incidents are deemed essential (Moore, Spink & Lipp 2012; p. R119). 
 Moore, Spink and Lipp (2012) started collecting the case of food fraud 
based on a comprehensive literature review (peer-reviewed journals) and 
media reports. They analysed and coded the data into the database named 
the USP Food Fraud Database (FFD) which is available at www.foodfraud.org 
from 2012. Moreover, an expert panel from industry and academics has 
reviewed the data published in the USP FFD (Spink, Moyer & Peru 2016). The 
USP FFD described specific types of food fraud into three broad categories of 
Replacement, Addition, and Removal as they coded in the USP FFD. Table 
2.4 shows these three categories, their definition and examples. 
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Table 2.4: Food fraud subtypes with examples 
Source: FDA (2009); Lotta & Bogue 2015; Moore, Spink & Lipp (2012), p. R121 
 











- Addition of melamine to milk to artificially increase apparent 
protein contents measured by total nitrogen methods. 
- Addition of water and citric acid to lemon juice to fraudulently 
increase the titratable acidity of the final juice product. 
- Overtreating frozen fish with extra water (ice) 
 
Misrepresentation 
- Substitution of cow’s milk for sheep or goat’s milk.  
- Substitution of common wheat for durum wheat 
- Substitution of Greek olive oil for Italian olive oil. 
- Substitution of synthetically produced vanillin for botanically 





- Addition of Sudan Red dyes to enhance to the color of poor-
quality paprika 






- Removal of nonpolar constituents from paprika (for example, 
lipids and flavor compounds) to produce paprika-derived 
flavoring extracts. The sale of the resulting defatted paprika, 
which lacks valuable flavoring compounds, as normal 
paprika is a fraudulent practice 
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Moore, Spink and Lipp (2012) defined subtype of Replacement as  
(1)‘addition, dilution, or .extension of an authentic ingredient with an adulterant 
or mixture of adulterants’, and  (2) false declaration of geographic, species, 
botanical, or varietal origin, the raw material origin or production process used 
to manufacture an ingredient, and origin to evade taxes or tariffs’  (p. R121). 
The first subtype of replacement was defined as EMA (or intentional 
adulteration) as described in Table 2.2. The second subtype of replacement 
was further defined by Lotta and Bogue (2015) as Misrepresentation that 
encompasses both Falsification and Food counterfeiting. Table 2.4 shows the 
classification of food fraud subtypes based on the definitions by Moore, Spink 
and Lipp (2012), Lotta and Bogue (2015), and FDA (2009). 
2.2.1.1 Replacement 
Types of fraud that are listed under the classification of replacement are those 
where there is, ‘…complete or partial replacement of a food ingredient or 
valuable authentic constituent with a less expensive substitute’ (Johnson 2014, 
p. 8). Replacement types of food fraud have been further categorised in Table 
2.4 having two sub-types: adulteration; and misrepresentation.  
 Food fraud incidents that are classified as Adulteration are those where 
there has been; ‘…a change of identity/or purity of the original and purported 
ingredient by substituting, diluting or modifying it by physical and/or chemical 
means’ (Lotta & Bogue 2015. p. 117). Adulteration can happen in different 
ways and the degree of dilution or sophistication of the change can also vary. 
A recent study by Zhang and Xue (2016) identified that this was the major food 
fraud concern from many Chinese consumers and that this type of food fraud 
has shown to have a higher number of cases in ‘regions with higher level of 
industrialization and urbanization’ than ‘less developed areas’ (p. 193) 
  This form of food fraud can be quite dangerous due to accidental 
serious health consequences for consumers. Addition of melamine to baby 
formula (milk) that increases the ‘protein contents measured by total nitrogen 
methods’ (Moore, Spink & Lipp 2012, p. R121)  is an example of this 
dangerous form of food fraud.  In addition, consumers with allergies, or those 
sensitive to particular substances could be negatively affected through the 
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addition of a substance or through increased ‘quantities of an already present 
substance’ (Spink & Moyer 2013, p. 32).  
  Food fraud incidents that are classified as misrepresentation occur 
through falsification and/or counterfeiting activity. Whilst this is often a less 
dangerous form of food fraud for consumers it can still have health 
consequences if the falsification is also accompanied by mislabelling of 
ingredients (Huck, Pezzei & Huck- Pezzei 2016 ; Lotta & Bogue 2015). 
Falsification occurs when there is a false ‘declaration of geographic species’ 
(e.g. substitution of sheep or goat milk as cow’s milk), or ‘false declaration of 
raw material origin (e.g. substitution of synthetic vanillin for natural vanillin) 
(Moore, Spink & Lipp 2012).  
 Falsification has been reported in the academic literature mostly in 
relation to meat and fish products (Charlebois et al. 2016; Lotta & Bogue 2015) 
and can also include incidents where ‘false declaration of origin’ is made to 
evade taxes/tariffs (Johnson 2014, p. 8). An example of this type is the 
‘importation of catfish from Vietnam labelled as grouper’ to avoid taxes and 
anti-dumping duties (Johnson 2014, p. 8). Other examples are ‘substitution of 
cow’s milk for sheep or goat’s milk’, and ‘substitution of Greek olive oil for 
Italian olive oil’ (Moore, Spink & Lipp 2012, p. R121).  
  Food counterfeiting is another sub-set of misrepresentation (Spink & 
Moyer 2013). In most food counterfeiting incidents, the country of origin is 
changed in order to gain more profit (Huck, Pezzei & Huck- Pezzei 2016 ). 
Other than the country of origin, food authentication certificates can also be 
counterfeited by fraudsters (Johnson 2014) such as in the cases of halal food 
products or organic food products. According to Lotta and Bogue (2015) label 
counterfeiting is related to misleading information about ‘certification or any 
registered trademarks’ (p. 118).  
Counterfeiting organic certifications means that the seller did not obtain 
the required certificate from associated authorities and so the product is not 
compliant with regulations. Examples of this type can be selling ‘high stocking 
density’ eggs as ‘free range’ (Lotta & Bogue 2015, p. 118) and counterfeiting 
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labels where unfit rotten meat was inserted into the product (Bosley 2007) with 
counterfeit halal certificates in France in 2006 (Tahkapaa et al. 2015).  
2.2.1.2 Addition 
Food fraud incidents that would be classified as addition would be those where 
there has been: ‘…the addition of nonauthentic substances to mask inferior 
quality ingredients without the purchasers’ knowledge’ (Moore, Spink & Lipp 
2012, p. R121; Zhang and Xue 2016). Subtypes of addition in food fraud 
incidents as defined by Moore, Spink and Lipp (2012) include: colour 
enhancement using Sudan red dyes to enhance the colour of poor-quality 
paprika’; and taste enhancement like ‘[the] addition of sugar to mask the 
astringent taste of poor-quality pomegranate juice’ (Moore, Spink & Lipp 2012, 
p. R121). 
Colour enhancement actions are most commonly found in food spices 
(Everstine 2013; Galvin-King et al. 2018; Silvis et al. 2017) where the addition 
of dyes to spices is done to improve the value of the product (Galvin-King et 
al. 2018) or to make it look fresher (Everstine 2013). For example, ‘older spices 
may be mixed with freshly ground ones’, or ‘non-spice material may be added 
as an extender’ to enhance the colour (Everstine 2013, p. 16). 
Synthetic dyes that are illegally added to food (i.e. by azo dyes or 
triphenylmethanes) can lead to allergic reactions or can even cause damage 
to the DNA (Galvin-King et al. 2018). Taste enhancement fraudulent practices 
are mostly related to fruit juices according to the literature (Hong et al. 2017). 
Examples are the addition of ‘water, sugars, and other ‘cheap alternatives’ to 
the fruit juice (Hong et al. 2017, p. 3885). Based on the FDA report, ‘addition 
of sugar and water, the addition of pulpwash solids, the substitution of a less 
expensive juice’ are most popular fraudulent practices in fruit juices (Everstine 
2013, p. 11). 
2.2.1.3 Removal 
Food fraud incidents that are classified as removal refer to, ‘…removal of an 
authentic and valuable constituent without the purchasers’ knowledge’ as 
defined by Moore, Spink and Lipp (2012, p. 121). The example of this type of 
food fraud can be the ‘removal of nonpolar constituents from paprika (for 
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example, lipids and flavor compounds) to produce paprika-derived flavoring 
extracts’ (Moore, Spink & Lipp 2012, p. R121). Other examples include the 
removal of valuable components from ‘spent’ spices and selling these as whole 
spices (Everestine 2013, p. 16) and ‘removal of essential oils from nutmeg’ 
(Silvis et al. 2017, p. 83).  
There is limited information about this type of food fraud. According to 
the study by Moore, Spink and Lipp (2012), based on their analysis of food 
fraud incidents published in the database, cases of removal represented less 
than one percent (Moore, Spink & Lipp 2012, p. R123). 
 
2.2.2 Difference Between Food Fraud and Food Safety 
The previous section presented a definition of food fraud and discussed the 
different types as well as outlining the differences between food fraud and food 
safety. Food fraud and food safety are not the only considerations when 
examining food contamination and adulteration risks. The Food Risk Matrix 
(Figure 2.1) is a useful way to identify differences between different types of 
food risk and categorises four types of risk related to food products. These four 
risks are: food safety; food fraud; food quality; and food defence (Spink & 
Moyer 2011).  
Using this matrix, the risk of food fraud is shown where there is 
intentional action (cause) and motivation for economic gain. In contrast, the 
risks relating to food safety incidents occur when there is unintentional harm 
to individuals consuming the product (Spink & Moyer 2011). Food quality risks 
are shown where there are unintentional actions that result in economic gain 
and finally, the risks associated with food defence incidents are the most 
serious as these are (malicious) tampering cases with the intention and desire 


















Figure 2.1: Food risk matrix  
Source: Adapted Spink and Moyer (2011, p. R160) 
 
The difference between the root causes of risks related to food fraud 
and those related to food safety risk explain why traditional food safety 
countermeasures, often used to detect contamination hazards (Bosona & 
Gebresenbet 2013), are not sufficient to detect and combat food fraud (Azuara 
et al. 2012; Curll 2014; Spink & Moyer 2011; Spink et al. 2017; ). Food safety 
risk mitigation refers to, ‘…protecting the food supply from unintentional 
contamination’ (Manning & Soon 2016,p. R823). In contrast, food fraud 
prevention refers to protecting the food supply from intentional adulteration 
with a motive to gain profit. In addition, food safety management systems deal 
with known hazards such as conventional toxic chemicals, however, 
‘fraudsters may use adulterants that are not listed among those conventional 
food safety contaminants’ (Spink & Moyer 2011, p. R158).  
In the food safety management systems, intervention countermeasures 
(see A in Figure 2.2)  are deployed in order to decrease the negative 
consequences of the risk. Therefore, most food safety countermeasures are 
related to authentication technologies where the focus is on detection rather 
than deterrence (Azuara et al. 2012; Curll 2014; Spink & Moyer 2011). The 
authentication technologies deployed by food safety management systems are 
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only once the adulteration is identified and thus, do not serve to prevent food 
fraud (Spink & Moyer 2011).  
 New ways of thinking about prevention of food fraud suggest focusing 
on the determination of the root causes of food fraud or Food Fraud 
Vulnerability (FFV) factors (see B in Figure 2.3) prior to implementing any 
intervention countermeasures (Van Ruth, Huisman & Luning 2017). According 
to a study by Spink, Moyer and Peru (2016), ‘ vulnerability is the potential 
exposure to a risk that may or may not have occurred’ (p. 307). The purpose 
of vulnerability reduction is to eliminate those root causes that create 
opportunity and motivation for fraudsters to commit the crime (Van Ruth, 
Huisman & Lunning 2017). The goal of this shift in thinking is to identify and 
then prevent those FFV factors (or root causes) to ultimately prevent future 




Figure 2.2: FDA Food protection plan progression 








Figure 2.3: Shift from detection to prevention 
Source: Spink and Moyer (2011) Spink et al. (2017, p. R159) 
 
Studies by Bouzembrak and Marvin (2016) and Marvin et al. (2016) 
have tried to find ways to predict food fraud incident (types) in an attempt to 
mitigate or prevent fraudulent activity. Bouzembrak and Marvin (2016) 
employed Bayesian Network (BN) modelling to develop a model to predict the 
types of food fraud most likely to occur when some of the antecedent factors 
such as country of origin, food product type, year that incident occurred, and 
country of detection are known. They have found that the BN model can predict 
future food fraud types with an accuracy of 80% when food fraud type, food 
product type, and country of origin were reported before in the database. Their 
BN model predicts food fraud types based on the cases of food fraud published 
in the RASFF database (EU environment) (Bouzembrak & Marvin 2016) and 
this is one of the main limitations of this model. It is for this reason that food 
fraud researchers have called for more comprehensive consideration be given 
to additional data from other databases like EMA (which is not accessible now) 
or USP (Bouzembrak & Marvin 2016).  
Marvin et al. (2016) developed a Bayesian Network (BN) modelling 
approach for the food production chain that used the RASFF and EMA 
databases together that links all available drivers related to food safety risks, 
focusing on incidents of food fraud. Their model is based on four steps: (1) 
collection of food fraud incidents (based on RASFF and EMA databases); (2) 




Vulnerability Assessment Prevention 
countermeasures 
 
FDA Food fraud prevention plan  
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(4) validation of the BN model. They have found that the BN model can predict 
future food fraud types with an accuracy of 91% when influencing drivers such 
as country of origin, food product type, country of detection, and the year (that 
incidents occurred) were reported before in the database. The limitation of their 
model is that the linking drivers (influencing drivers, root causes or what 
motivates fraudsters) relied on supply chain variables (based on the National 
Sanitation Foundation (NSF 2014)) report and food safety variables 
(unintentional adulteration published in RASFF which are not cases of food 
fraud) (Marvin et al. 2016, p. 468). This work continues to reinforce the gap in 
the extant literature providing cues to the prevention of food fraud based on an 
understanding of the motivation to commit the fraudulent action (Tahkapaa et 
al. 2015; Silvis et al. 2017; Van Ruth, Huisman & Luning 2017; Van Ruth et al. 
2018).  
If food fraud is viewed as a crime, then criminology theories provide 
useful insights for researchers exploring issues of prevention (Spink and 
Moyer 2011; Silvis et al. 2017; Spink and Moyer 2013; Lord, Flores Elizondo 
& Spencer 2017). Criminology literature provides a framework to analyse 
situations where food fraud may occur (Smith, Manning & McElwee 2017). 
These theories are addressed next. 
 
 Criminology Literature  
Criminology theories have aided food fraud researchers to better understand 
the motivations of potential fraudsters and to develop strategies to address 
issues of vulnerability and fraud prevention (Lord, Flores Elizondo & Spencer 
2017; Manning & Soon 2016). There are several criminology theories 
discussed in the literature related to food fraud problem that include: Common 
Sense Theory, Game Theoretical approach Theory, Rational Choice Theory, 
Relative Depreciation Theory, Routine Activity Theory, and Social Control 




Table 2.5: Common theories related to food fraud 




motivation- Fraudsters commit 
fraud for economic gain 






motivation- Fraudsters’ economic 
motivation increases if they know 
there is a low likelihood risk of 
detection 
Hirschauer & Zwoll (2008); 
Manning & Soon (2016); Vatsa, 
Sural & Majumdar (2007) 




(fraudsters) evaluate the benefit 
and consequences of committing 
fraud and make a rational choice 
based on their evaluation 
Pease (2006); Manning & Soon 
(2016); McMurtry & Curling 
(2008) 
Relative Deprivation  
 
Understanding Fraudsters 
motivation- when fraudsters 
perceived themselves as being 
deprived, they will feel injured 
and frustrated and may attempt 
to commit fraud 
Walklate (2007); Manning & 
Soon (2016); Itashiki (2011) 
Social Control Theory (Hisrchi 
1969) 
Understanding Fraudsters 
motivation- Fraudsters motivation 
to commit fraud increases when 
there are (1) low level of 
attachment (social relationships), 
(2) low level of commitments, 
(3)less involvement (time in 
conventional behaviour), and (4) 
low level of beliefs.   
Manning & Soon (2016) 
Routine Activity Approach 
(Cohen & Felson 1979) 
Understanding the root cause 
of Food Fraud Vulnerability- 
Food fraud occurs when there is 
motivated offender, suitable 
victim and absence of guardian 
(or control measures) 
Spink & Moyer (2013); 2017Lord, 
Flores Elizondo & Spencer 
(2017)Manning and Soon 2016; 
Van Ruth et al. ( 2017); Van 
Ruth, Huisman & Luning  (2017) 
  
This study will use the Routine Activity Theory for two main reasons. 
The first reason is that all of the other theories are related to the understanding 
motivation of fraudsters while the Routine Activity Theory is focusing on 
deterrence and understanding how to reduce food fraud vulnerability (Spink & 
Moyer 2013; Van Ruth, Huisman & Luning 2017). The second reason is related 
to its popularity in both criminology literature (Van Ruth, Huisman & Luning 
2017) and the support from the food fraud literature as mentioned in several 
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papers (see Moyer, DeVries & Spink 2017; Silvis et al. 2017; Spink & Moyer 
2013; Van Ruth, Huisman & Luning 2017). The next section will describe the 
Routine Activity theory in detail. 
2.3.1 The Routine Activity Theory  
The Routine Activity Theory emerged in the 1970s (Cohen & Felson, 1979) 
and was developed to explain how crime rates are impacted by the routine 
activities of individuals in a society (Cohen & Felson 1979). The Routine 
Activity Theory allows criminal researchers to investigate how generalised 
patterns of social activity such as spatial and temporal patterns in the family, 
work and leisure, combine with situational factors to impact the likelihood of a 
crime occurring. The Routine Activity Theory suggests that criminal acts occur 
as a result of the convergence of a motivated offender, a suitable target and a 
lack of guardianship or control or supervision. The Routine Activity theory has 
shifted the focus of criminology theories from addressing fraudsters’ motivation 
to ‘ a detailed analysis of criminal events and criminal activities’ (Kleemans, 
Soudijn & Weenink 2012).  
When applied to a food fraud context, the Routine Activity Theory 
assists organisations to identify potential situations where food fraud events 
are more likely to occur. The Routine Activity Theory is presented through the 
Crime Triangle tool (see Figure 2.4) (Hennessey, Busta & Cunningham 2011). 
The Crime Triangle shows that how fraud opportunity occurs based on three 
main characteristics that are : (1) the existence of potential fraudsters; (2) a 
potential victim or ‘suitable target’; and (3) the absence of a capable guardian 
or countermeasures (Manning & Soon 2016; Spink & Moyer 2011; Ellis et al. 
2016; Van Ruth, Huisman & Luning 2017). Based on the Crime Triangle 
(Figure 2.4), guardians (also known as capable guardians in the literature) can 
be investigators who monitor the food fraud system, managers, authorities, 
governments, law enforcement agencies and food producer/manufacturers. 
Guardian and Hurdle gaps (also shown in the model) are countermeasures 
that hinder and/or inhibit fraudulent activity (Spink & Moyer 2013). As these 
factors (Guardian and Hurdle gap) are both considered to be important 
countermeasures for food fraud incidents they are often grouped together, as 
shown in figure 2.4. Guardians and hurdle gaps can be proactive when 
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considered for deterrence purposes or reactive when considered for detection 




The  Routine Activity Theory also focuses on crime prevention 
(Kleemans, Soudijn & Weenink 2012) through employing preventative 
strategies rather than focusing on the potential fraudsters and reactive 
strategies. According to the Crime Triangle, the area inside the triangle shows 
the magnitude of the food fraud opportunity. This area can grow or shrink 
depending on how an organisation manages the other three elements. The 
presence of capable guardians who are able to exert appropriate levels of 
oversight or vigilance have the greatest potential to reduce the vulnerability of 
organisations to food fraud (Kleerman, Soudijn & Weenink 2012, p. 87). Figure 
2.5 shows this process. Capable guardians can decrease vulnerability 
(overlaps) to food fraud by increasing the risk of detection, decreasing the 
opportunities for environmental manipulation by fraudsters and intervening 




Guardian and Hurdle Gap 
Victim
Figure 2.4: Crime Triangle 










  Figure 2.5: The activation of the Routine Activity Theory  based on Crime Triangle 
 Source: Developed from Spink and Moyer (2013, p. 34), Ruth et al (2017),Ellis et al. (2016, p. 11)  
Although the Routine Activity Theory principles have been adopted in the literature to investigate food fraud events and 
prevention methods, they do not focus on the root causes of food fraud (Lord, Flores Elizondo & Spencer 2017). Understanding the 
root causes of food fraud can also help to identify appropriate prevention methods. The root causes of a (food fraud) crime can be 
found by examining both the victims and the fraudster’s routine activities (Senge 1990) and these are discussed next.
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2.3.2 Root Causes of Food Fraud  
Understanding the root causes of a complex phenomenon ‘lie in a way of 
thinking’ (Senge 1990, p. 55) that both victims (in this research food production 
companies) and food fraudsters have shared. In this section, the victim and 
food fraudster’s routines and viewpoints are examined to highlight areas that 
may contribute to the root causes of food fraud. The Routine Activity Theory 
principles are used to provide a framework to understand the root causes of 
food fraud and describe how fraud opportunity occurs. Victims’ routines are 
discussed first.  
Victim routines: 
When food production companies’ routine (or viewpoint) is to react the impact 
of food fraud risk, they deploy authentication or reactive countermeasures. 
Such an example of this reactive strategies is the melamine in the baby formula 
in 2008 in China. The melamine was identified through the authentication 
analysis after several infant have been died due to the intentional adulteration 
by fraudsters. From the food production companies’ viewpoint, reactive 
strategies are a defensive response to the threat of food fraud and are 
generally focused on minimising any reputational or financial damage (Hoecht 
& Trott 2014; Petrie 2016). Whilst reacting to food fraud incidents is important, 
understanding the organisation’s vulnerability to food fraud is a more proactive 
way for companies to reduce their risk of financial or reputational damage. 






According to the Routine Activity Theory principles, if capable guardians 
and proactive countermeasures are absent in the victims’ routine (see in 
Figure 2.5), the area of vulnerability to food fraud will increase both the 
motivation of fraudsters and subsequent opportunities to commit food fraud 
Food Fraud   Threat to companies’      
finance and reputation 
 
Need to deploy 
reactive strategies in 
the supply chain 
Figure 2.6: Companies’ viewpoint 
Source: Hoecht and Trott (2014); Senge (1990 ) 
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(Ellis et al. 2016). Absence of capable guardians can be any reactive measure 
like using authentication countermeasures ‘whenever public health is 
threatened’(Spink & Moyer 2011, p. R159). In cases of food fraud when the 
incident does not harm consumers (e.g. horsemeat scandal), the use of 
reactive measures are become somewhat redundant (Spink & Moyer 2011). 
Furthermore, reactive countermeasures are those that fraudsters can easily 
imitate or counterfeit (like holograms) (Ting & Tsang 2014). This, in turn, 
motivates food fraudsters to use their strategies to manipulate the 
opportunities for fraudulent activity that exist in the victim’s routine. 
Fraudster’s routine:  
Unfortunately, fraudsters can be large in number, with multiple identities using 
multi-sheltered companies (Spink & Moyer 2013) that can manipulate many 
areas of vulnerability to commit fraud (e.g. lack of proactive countermeasure) 
(see Figure 2.6) (Ellis et al. 2016; Stevenson & Busby 2015). Fraudsters are 
proficient at exploiting vulnerability factors in both micro and macro systems 
and they can obscure most of the known ways of detection such as: price; 
purchase location; and packaging through distribution and infiltration strategies 
(Chaudhry & Zimmerman 2013; Johnson 2014; Spink & Moyer 2013; 
Stevenson & Busby 2015).  
According to Stevenson and Busby (2015), distribution and infiltration 
strategies are among the most common for fraudsters. These actions occur 
where inferior signallers (fraudsters) send false signals to the companies and 
legal supply chains, which in turn deceive consumers intentionally (Stevenson 
& Busby 2015). Signalling theory that examines the flow of communication 
between signallers (corporations) and receivers (consumers) assists in 
understanding this process (Connelly, Certo, Ireland & Reutzel 2014; 
Stevenson & Busby 2015).  
False signals sent by fraudsters can be any attempt to make fake food 
products look authentic with a range of tactics such as: using credible locations 
(e.g. an authorised retailer/importer, restaurants, high-end supermarkets, 
hotels, and online markets); copying safety certificates (through duplication 
and reverse engineering); and/or using the same labour pool and 
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authentication technologies for bundling fake and original food products 
(Stevenson & Busby 2015). In sum, the overall viewpoint of food fraudsters is 





These strategies by fraudsters will exploit the information asymmetric 
or situations where the buyer (legal supply chain, distributor, wholesaler, and 
consumers) knows far less than the seller (counterfeiter) (Hobbs 2004) about 
authentication information. The two straight lines (viewpoints of food 
companies and food fraudsters) form a cycle or framework that shows how 















Figure 2.7: Fraudsters’ viewpoint 








Source: Adapted from PwC (2015); Spink, Moyer and Peru (2016); Stevenson and 
Busby (2015) 
  
 Examination of the routine activities (strategies) of both victims and 
fraudsters allows identification of the degree of vulnerability to food fraud. 
Vulnerability to food fraud is generally the root cause of motivation for food 
fraudsters to engage in some form of fraudulent activity (Van Ruth, Huisman 
& Luning 2017) and provides opportunities for more fraud to take place until 
companies find ways to reduce this vulnerability. Therefore, prevention of the 
area of vulnerability can be the solution for treating the cause of food fraud 
problem.  
Vulnerability is an emerging area of research for those investigating 
food fraud (e.g. Moyer, Silvis et al. 2017; Spink & Peru 2016; Van Ruth, 
Huisman & Luning 2017) with researchers suggesting that analysis of Food 
Fraud Vulnerability factors should precede the identification of any preventive 
food fraud countermeasures (Van Ruth, Huisman & Luning 2017) (e.g. 
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guardian or hurdle gaps). Thus, we need to better understand the concept of 
vulnerability to food fraud  (Van Ruth, Huisman & Luning 2017) and the next 
section addresses this. 
 Food Fraud Vulnerability  
According to the principle of vulnerability assessment proposed by the British 
Retail Consortium (BRC) (2015), vulnerability to food fraud can be assessed 
by the following formula (see also Silvis et al. 2017, p. 81). 
Vulnerability to food fraud = Opportunities x Motivation x Control Measures 
These three elements are known as FFV factors and they provide 
researchers with a framework by which to study this phenomenon (e.g. Silvis 
et al. 2017; Van Ruth, Huisman & Luning 2017; Van Ruth et al. 2018). Each of 
these elements has been shown to comprise different dimensions or factors 
that have been shown to variously impact vulnerability to food fraud in different 
contexts (Van Ruth, Huisman & Luning 2017). Table 2.6 provides a summary 
of these elements and their dimensions and the next section describes these 




Table 2.6: FFV factors and their detailed subfactors 
Source: Adapted from Van Ruth, Huisman & Luning (2017, p. 72) 
 
2.4.1 Opportunity 
The opportunity element of the vulnerability to food fraud formula ( Van Ruth, 
Huisman & Luning 2017) describes the suitability of potential targets (or 
victims) (Hollis & Wilson 2014). This means that potential targets’ 
characteristics shape the opportunity structure for fraudsters to commit a crime 
(Pratt et al. 2010). According to Cohen and Felson (1979), a suitable target 
needs to have four characteristics: visibility; accessibility; value; and inertia 
(Leukfeldt & Yar 2016). The first two characteristics are related to the 
availability of target products to fraudsters while the last two dimensions are 
related to the monetary value of target products and the ease or difficulty of 
counterfeiting products (Hollis et al. 2015). Van Ruth, Huisman and Luning 





Technical opportunity: simplicity/complexity of adulteration, 
simplicity/complexity of counterfeiting, availability of technology and 
knowledge of adulterate, availability of detection technology 
In time and space: accessibility to materials production/processing, 




Economic drivers: supply and pricing of materials, special product 
attributes or value determining components of materials, price 
differences in countries, economic health business, level of 
competition, financial strains imposed on suppliers 
Culture and behaviour: business strategy, ethical business culture, 






Technical measures: specificity and accuracy of the fraud monitoring 
system, systematics and autonomy of verification of fraud monitoring 
system, accuracy information system for mass balance control, 
extensiveness tracking and tracing system, fraud contingency plan 
Managerial measures: strictness ethical code of conduct, application 
integrity screening, support whistleblowing system, contractual 
requirements suppliers, social control and transparency across the 
supply chain, established guidance for fraud prevention across the 
supply chain, specificity national food policy, strictness enforcement 
for fraud prevention regulation/law 
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two main dimensions of technical opportunities and time and space (Silvis et 
al. 2017; Van Ruth, Huisman & Luning 2017). Each will now be discussed in 
turn.  
2.4.1.1 Technical Opportunities 
Vulnerability to food fraud is often seen to increase when technical 
opportunities for fraud exist. This refers to factors such as: where the product 
composition is complex (and thus easy to obfuscate); and where the 
knowledge and technology to adulterate (or counterfeit/mislabel/etc.) food 
products (or raw materials) is easily available to fraudsters (SSAFE 2016; 
Silvis et al. 2016). In addition, this element of vulnerability is also increasing 
where the fraud is difficult to detect, and advanced technologies are required 
to identify the fraudulent products (Silvis et al. 2017). 
 Examples of this type of vulnerability have been noted in ground spices 
and beef mince due to their complex nature (BRC 2015; Van Ruth, Huisman 
& Luning 2017). In the case of mince, fraudulently substituted horsemeat is 
only able to be detected through DNA analysis. In summary, technical 
opportunities increase when the nature of food products are complex, the 
adulteration (or counterfeiting, mislabelling, etc.) technologies are available, 
and detection of the fraudulent practice requires a complex and advanced 
detection technology (SSAFE 2016; Van Ruth, Huisman & Luning 2017).  
 
2.4.1.2 Opportunities in Time and Space 
Opportunities in time and space refer to opportunities or vulnerability to food 
fraud as a result of fraudsters ‘having legitimate accesses to a place where 
fraud can be committed (Van Ruth, Huisman & Luning 2017, p. 71). One such 
example of this factor is when fraudsters use the same personnel who are 
employed in the legitimate production (e.g. in the processing lines) to access 
technologies to allow fraudulent intervention to occur (Stevenson & Busby 
2015).  
Opportunities in time and space also exist when there is a lack of 
transparency or high levels of complexity in the supply chain (Silvis et al. 2017) 
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for the food product. These factors increase the opportunities for fraud to occur 
without easy detection. The complexity of the supply chain structure creates 
barriers to supply chain integration (Wagner & Neshat 2010) and can also 
increase vulnerability due to a lack of observability, and lack of effective control 
in the export channel (Hoecht & Trott 2014; PwC 2015; Stevenson & Busby 
2015).  
2.4.2 Motivation 
The motivation element of the vulnerability to food fraud formula explains why 
food fraudsters ‘would want to commit fraud’ (Van Ruth, Huisman & Luning 
2017, p. 71). This element includes those root causes that increase the 
susceptibility to food fraud and subsequently increase fraud commitment by 
food fraudsters.  The overall motivation for fraud is generally when there is 
likely financial gain (Johnson 2014).  Unlike other food crimes (such as food 
safety incidents), food fraudsters do not generally intend to harm consumers. 
Instead they seek to gain profit from their fraudulent activities (Spink & Moyer 
2011). There are several environmental factors that will increase the 
susceptibility to food fraud used by fraudsters to commit the fraud for economic 
gain. These factors exist in both the macro and micro environmental levels of 
the supply chain.  
Macro factors (e.g. global pricing) are those related to the broad food 
fraud threat assessment while micro factors (e.g. business relationships) are 
those that help understand how and why a ‘specific fraudster is motivated to 
act’ ( Moyer, DeVries & Spink 2017, p. 359). The concept of macro and micro 
motivation factors are key vulnerability drivers for food fraudsters’ decision 
making ( Moyer, DeVries & Spink 2017). Van Ruth, Huisman and Luning 
(2017) explains these micro and macro factors as economic drivers and 
cultural and behavioural drivers that will lead to economic motivation of food 
fraudsters and these will be discussed next.  
2.4.2.1 Economic Drivers 
Economic drivers of vulnerability to food fraud can be found in various business 
and market conditions that can increase the potential return of the fraudulent 
activity to fraudsters. Specifically, it has been noted in: the supply and pricing 
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of materials; value adding product attributes; associated price differences; the 
economic health of businesses; different levels of competition; and where 
financial strain exists (Silvis et al. 2017; Van Ruth, Huisman & Luning 2017).  
Vulnerability to food fraud as a result of the supply and pricing of 
materials occurs when there is economic pressure on raw materials and/or 
food products (SSAFE 2016). These economic pressures can be situations 
where there are export bans on raw materials and food products (SSAFE 
2016) or there is a gap between ’physical availability of’ the food product and 
market demand (Manning & Soon 2014, p.23; Van Ruth, Huisman & Luning 
2017). These pressures result in a shift in prices due to global or national 
shortages ( Moyer, DeVries & Spink 2017 which consequently increase the 
potential for economic returns to fraudsters and thus increase the vulnerability 
to food fraud.  
Vulnerability to food fraud increases when a product has a higher risk 
of being counterfeited /adulterated (or mislabelled, etc.). One such example of 
this factor is products with value adding attributes (Van Ruth, Huisman & 
Lunning 2017). Attributes adding value include ‘composition of raw materials 
(e.g. protein content), production methods (organic)’ (SSAFE 2016), or 
‘particular processing’ (e.g. artisanal products) (Van Ruth, Huisman & Luning 
2017, p. 71). Since these products (like organic and artisanal products) have 
higher value and price, they may more likely be misrepresented and 
counterfeited (Silvis et al. 2917; Van Ruth, Huisman & Luning 2017).  
Vulnerability to food fraud increases when there is poor economic 
health and a high level of competition and price differences in countries, 
resulting in financial strain. Vulnerability to food fraud, as a result of poor 
economic conditions, occurs when there is fear of losing profit, and there is a 
‘gap between financial targets and actual performance’ (SSAFE 2016; Van 
Ruth, Huisman & Luning 2017). In addition, when there is a high level of 
competition among food industries (Silvis et al. 2017), achieving financial targets 
can be difficult (SSAFE 2016) which can cause companies to cut their costs 
(Van Ruth, Huisman & Luning 2017). One such example of this sort of cost 
reduction is the elimination of traceability systems or any advanced technologies 
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(i.e. GS1 standards) that are helpful in deterring food fraud (Van Ruth, Huisman 
& Luning 2017). 
Moreover, vulnerability to food fraud increases when there is price 
asymmetric in countries due to ‘regulatory diversity’ and high level of 
competition in the market. This, in turn, will increase the vulnerability to food 
fraud (Silvis et al. 2017; Van Ruth, Huisman & Luning 2017, p. 71). 
Vulnerability to food fraud as a result of financial strains will also increase when 
there is financial pressure on a supplier to meet the exceeded demand from 
customers. In the case that the supplier is highly dependent on the specific 
customer (Waters 2011), they may choose fraudulent activities to meet the 
exceeded demand (in Van Ruth, Huisman & Luning 2017, p. 72).  
2.4.2.2 Culture and Behaviours 
Cultural and behavioural elements are also known to play a role in increasing 
the motivation of fraudsters (Silvis et al. 2017). One example of these elements 
can be suppliers who are accustomed to buying counterfeit products. The root 
motivation of their behaviours is because they do not want to pay full price for 
the authentic goods as a result of their cultural heritage (Hoecht & Trott 2014).  
Vulnerability to food fraud as a result of cultural behaviours is related to: 
the business strategy and ethical practices of businesses; previous criminal 
offences; and victimisation or even international corruption (Van Ruth, 
Huisman & Luning 2017). For example, employees may be influenced by their 
company’s (business) strategy, having pressure to meet short term financial 
goals. This pressure may motivate them to engage in unethical behaviour ‘for 
the sake of saving themselves from being fired’ (SSAFE 2016; Van Ruth, 
Huisman & Luning 2017, p.72; Van Ruth et al. 2018). So, vulnerability to food 
fraud increases when there is no clear statement in the business strategy (or 
even implicit contacts) (Nyaga, Whipple & Lynch 2010) regarding how these 
financial goals can be achieved (Van Ruth, Huisman & Luning 2017, p. 72). 
 Vulnerability to food fraud as a result of unethical behaviour increases 
when there is a weak ethical business environment (or culture) (Van Ruth, 
Huisman & Luning 2017; Van Ruth et al. 2018). Examples of such factors are 
lack of mutual trust, ignoring reports on unethical conduct, (SSAFE 2016) and 
50 
 
employee dissatisfaction  (Kaptein 2011) The motivation of fraudsters is not 
only impacted by the strategies and policies within food production companies, 
but it is also impacted by these issues across national borders (Van Ruth, 
Huisman & Luning 2017).  
One such example is the corruption level in detecting country (Spink & 
Moyer 2011) that is caused by ‘the geopolitical situation’ (Van Ruth, Huisman 
& Luning 2017, p. 72) or the lack of ‘food safety regulatory/enforcement’ 
system (USP Nd, p. 1603) . This means that businesses in countries with a 
higher corruption rate (e.g. based on the Corruption Perception Index) (Silvis 
et al. 2017) run a greater risk of being vulnerable to illegal or immoral activities 
(Van Ruth, Huisman & Luning 2017; Van Ruth et al. 2018) that can result in 
food fraud.  
Vulnerability to food fraud as a result of victimisation occurs when those 
who are victims of a food fraud activity then commit fraudulent actions on 
others in the future (Van Ruth, Huisman & Luning 2017). In cases of unfair 
competition, where competitors are choosing illegal actions, it is difficult for a 
company to make decisions to either withdraw from the market, choose legal 
actions or ‘swim with the tide’ (Hoecht & Trott 2014; Van Ruth, Huisman & 
Luning 2017, p. 73). In addition, once criminal activity like food fraud has 
occurred in the past, it is more likely to re-occur in the future. This consequence 
is well known in the literature to increase vulnerability to food fraud (Van Ruth, 
Huisman & Luning 2017).  
2.4.3 Countermeasures 
Appropriate countermeasures and capable guardians are necessary to combat 
food fraud (Hoecht & Trott 2014; Spink & Moyer 2011; Ting & Tsang 2014). 
Implementing these, however, remains problematic. Although high technology 
and the infrastructure to store food products in warehouses are now available 
(Marvin et al. 2016), easy imitation of some of these technologies like machine 
readable technologies (Ting & Tsang, 2014) increases the vulnerability to food 
fraud in the supply chain where visibility is low (Stevenson & Busby 2015). 
Such examples of these technologies for food packaging products are 
holograms, and Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) tag colour shifting ink 
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that can be reverse engineered by fraudsters to deceive consumers 
(Stevenson & Busby 2015; Ting & Tsang 2014).  
 Two effective countermeasures recommended in the literature to 
reduce vulnerability to food fraud (Silvis et al. 2017; SSAFE 2016; Van Ruth, 
Huisman & Luning 2017; Van Ruth et al. 2018) are: technical measures and 
management measures. The technical measures (or hard control measures) 
are related to the detection of food fraud incidents while management 
measures (or soft measures) are related to preventive (or proactive) 
countermeasures (Silvis et al. 2017; Van Ruth, Huisman & Luning 2017). Both 
technical and management measures are discussed next.  
 
2.4.3.1 Technical Measures 
Technical measures (hard controls) are those that can effectively detect fraud 
by collecting, documenting and analysing information related to the raw 
materials and final products (Van Ruth, Huisman & Luning 2017). Vulnerability 
to food fraud can be decreased through the adoption of various technical 
measures such as fraud monitoring systems, information systems, and 
traceability systems (Van Ruth, Huisman & Luning 2017). 
 A fraud monitoring system is designed to discover fraudulent incoming 
raw material and to ultimately product the integrity of final products (SSAFE 
2016). This type of monitoring system can take the form of a sampling plan to 
detect fraud, advanced fraud detection methods (e.g. DNA analysis), and/or 
systematic verification of incoming raw materials based on documentation 
(SSAFE 2016; Van Ruth, Huisman & Luning 2017). In addition, mystery 
shoppers or private detectives can help to monitor and detect fake products 
(Berman 2008). Applying this principle to the context of food fraud can be 
training supply chain parties and employees to detect fake food products (and 
their packaging) and to notify the manufacturer upon identification (Chaudhry 
& Zimmerman 2009).  
  Vulnerability to food fraud can be decreased when companies use 
appropriate information systems and traceability technologies. Appropriate 
information systems can systematically collect and analyse information such 
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as the mass balance control of incoming raw materials and final products 
(Everstine, Spink & Kennedy 2013; SSAFE 2016; Van Ruth, Huisman & 
Luning 2017). Through the information systems, data about the product 
location will be shared using a traceability system like Global Solution One 
(GS1). The GS1 traceability system includes three steps of identification, 
capturing and sharing information between the supply chains (GS1 US 2011). 
In this system, producers add a GS1 data metrics code (e.g. GS1 128 barcode, 
RFID tag, EPC, QR barcode) while labelling packages for identification to 
easily follow the product, the transaction and the supply chain and share 
captured information through an information system (Nason 2015).  
 
2.4.3.2 Managerial Measures 
Soft controls or managerial measures are those that can reduce opportunities 
and motivation of fraudsters (Van Ruth, Huisman & Luning 2017). Vulnerability 
to food fraud can be decreased through managerial measures like integrity 
screening, ethical codes of conduct, whistleblowing systems, fraud 
contingency plans, contractual requirements, social control, establishment of 
fraud prevention across supply chain, national food policy, and strict law 
enforcement (SSAFE 2016; Van Ruth, Huisman & Luning 2017; Van Ruth et 
al. 2018). 
Integrity (honesty) screening methods are necessary when recruiting 
prospective employees (Van Ruth, Huisman & Luning 2017). An integrity 
screening test can help to prevent future fraudulent activities by employees. 
Companies need to be strict with zero tolerance in relation to food fraud and 
develop a strict ethical code of conduct (Silvis et al. 2017).  
Companies can also provide a safe environment and a well-designed 
whistleblowing system for their own employees to report fraudulent activities 
anonymously (SSAFE 2016; Van Ruth, Huisman & Luning 2017). In the case 
of emergency and unexpected food fraud incidents, a contingency plan plays 
an important role in dealing with the incidents through the development of 
policies and procurements (Silvis et al. 2017; Van Ruth, Huisman & Luning 
2017). The fraud contingency plan is a plan for both food safety and food fraud 
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issues that is ‘science based’ and is updated to reduce the risk of food fraud 
(SSAFE 2016).  
Building strong relationships within the supply chain network can also 
reduce opportunities to commit fraud (Manning & Soon 2016; Spink 2016) and 
decrease the vulnerability to food fraud for food producers. Research has 
shown that strong relationships and information sharing (Juan Ding et al. 2014; 
Jie et al. 2013)  between stakeholders in the supply chain will further result in 
supply chain integration, competitiveness (Knoll et al. 2017) and supply chain 
transparency. 
 An example of this occurring is the concept of the One such an example 
is Guanxi system in China, a system in China that helps to strengthen 
relationships between supply chain parties (Hoecht & Trott 2014).  This system 
describes It is the use of personal networks that that ensure that indicates 
channel members have strong emotional ties, and thus they are less likely to 
engage in fraudulent activities (Hoecht & Trott 2014). The relationship between 
supply chain networks can also be strengthened through signing legal 
agreements. These legal agreements can clearly state contract conditions and 
can also act as a strong social control. 
 In some countries, low law enforcement and unclear laws (and 
regulations) at the (inter) national level can also increase the opportunities for 
fraudsters to commit the crime (Hoecht & Trott; Van Ruth, Huisman & Luning 
2017). For example, low law enforcement for fraud in China enables fraudsters 
to be “symbolically” penalised which ultimately allows them to continue their 
fraudulent activities after a period of time (Hoecht & Trott 2014). Another 
example is the ‘first to file law’ in Chinese legislation. The first-to-file law means 
that until the company registers a trademark/brand, it has no rights to that 
trademark/brand (Harris 2011). This means that a fraudster can get profits 
from the Chinese market by registering the brand earlier than the original 
companies (intending to enter the Chinese market).  
There are some strategies available for companies to pre-empt 
fraudsters’ motivation as a result of low law enforcement. One such strategy 
can be branding strategy, which helps integrate all parties in the supply chain 
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and creates shared vision by having clear communication, knowledge sharing 
and a trusting relationship (Walters & Glaser 2008; Lewis et al. 2014).  
For example, in China, registering a brand/trademark globally can pre-
empt fraudsters’ motivation at the point of entering the Chinese market (as 
China has ‘first to file’ law) (Chaudhry & Zimmerman 2009). Another strategy 
can be registering the brand, trademark, security features, and transfer 
certificates (e.g. traceability certificate) (Bai, Zhang & Jiang 2013) with 
customs authorities in the host country (e.g. China). This registration helps 
(online) buyers and government authorities to detect counterfeited goods and 
government agencies to seize them; and government (or brand owner) to take 
legal action.  
 Additional variables 
Two influencing variables of FFV factors were added as illustrated in the USP 
FFD. These variables are (1) weight of evidence and (2) types of adulterants. 
The incident records were‘ evaluated with respect to the weight of evidence of 
the references that support them’ (USP FF). For an example, incidents such 
as horsemeat scandals in the UK or melamine in the baby formula in China 
were evaluated as high weight of evidence due to the existence of supporting 
scientific/legal documentation. Accordingly, incidents that were not supported 
by regulatory authorities or legal authorities were evaluated as medium or low 
weight of evidence.  
 The USP FFD also identifies adulterants related to each incidents. 
These adulterants could be chemicals, additives, counterfeits, species, or 
expired types. The chemicals could be formaldehyde, methanol, 
Chloramphenicol, melamine etc. that are not declared in the food product 
ingredients. For an example, the formaldehyde is used as preservatives to 
extend the shelf life food products (e.g. seafood). Chemicals such as methanol 
that are added to the alcoholic beverages are more serious and could lead to 
the death/blindness of consumers. Additives were related to add of colour, 
water, oils, sugar, gelatin, etc. that will enhance the appearance of food 
products. For an example, add of water in India is related to add weight to the 
milk product to get more profit. Counterfeit type of adulterants are related to 
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false declaration of organic/halal food product, certificates, false declaration of 
types of food (e.g. camel meat as lamb meat). The species type of adulterants 
are related to those of declaring false species of food products. For an 
example, declaring non-locally sourced Crab (seafood) as locally sourced 
Crab or Sutchi Catfish as Grouper. Finally, the expired types of adulterants are 
related to those food products that the expiration date of production are altered 
and are resell as fresh food products.  
Although there is a growing awareness acceptance amongst researchers that 
there needs to be of the shift in focus from risk mitigation to vulnerability 
reduction and prevention for of food fraud (Spink, Moyer & Peru 2016; Spink 
et al. 2017; Van Ruth, Huisman & Luning 2017; Silvis et al. 2017), few studies 
to date have addressed this issue.   with the first reported studies only 
appearing in 2017. This is mainly because the concept of Food Fraud 
Vulnerability concept is relatively new and there is limited knowledge of how 
the factors that affect vulnerability interact and impact vulnerability to food 
fraud (Van Ruth, Huisman & Lunning 2017; Van Ruth et al. 2018).  The SSAFE 
Food Fraud Vulnerability assessment tool proposed by Van Ruth et al. (2018), 
and Silvis et al. (2017) is a notable exception to this.  This tool was designed 
for self-assessment of vulnerability to food fraud based on a managers’ 
perspective.  
 
 Conceptual Framework of the Study 
This chapter described the key concepts in the relevant literature through three 
main theoretical domains of: 1) food fraud and its threat to food safety; 2) 
criminology theories; and 3) the concept of Food Fraud Vulnerability. From 
these three multi-disciplinary bodies of literature, the theoretical foundation of 
this study has been constructed. Table 2.7 provides a summary of key themes 
in the literature and relevant research gaps identified in each section. 
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Table 2.7: Summary of food fraud key themes in the literature and research gaps 





Food fraud Definition and 
types 
 
Focus on the 
comprehensive 
food fraud types 
Need to have a clear classification of food fraud types  
(Charlebois et al. 2017; 
Zhang & Xue 2016 p. 193) 
A new classification of food fraud types 
based on USP FFD will be provided 
Difference 
between food 





prevention of food 
fraud (focusing on 
vulnerability 
reduction instead of 
risk mitigation) 
Need for a holistic approach to shift from risk mitigation to 
vulnerability reduction (that is different from the common 
food safety management system strategies) to prevent 
food fraud 
(Bouzembrak & Marvin 
2016; Lord, Flores Elizondo 
& Spencer 2017; Spink & 
Moyer 2011; Spink et al. 
2017; Tahkapaa et al. 2015; 
Van Ruth, Huisman & 
Luning 2017; Silvis et al. 
2017;) 
The study will develop a holistic 
approach that can assess the level 
(degree) of vulnerability to food fraud for 







model on the 
root causes of 




root causes of the 
food fraud problem 
 
Need to understand the root causes of food fraud/or what 
motivates food fraudsters to commit fraud 
(Silvis et al. 2017; Spink & 
Moyer 2011; Van Ruth, 
Huisman & Luning 2017; 
Tahkapaa et al. 2015) 
An integrated model based on Routine 
Activity Theory, Crime Triangle and 
Signalling theory were created to 
present how food fraud incident occurs 














of Food Fraud 
Vulnerability 
 
Need to identify factors affecting Food Fraud Vulnerability 
concept (through the Routine Activity Theory) and analyse 
(or compare) vulnerability to food fraud through the 
application of real data (from food fraud database) for 
different food fraud types. 
 
 
(Silvis et al. 2017; Van 
Ruth, Huisman & Luning 
2017; Van Ruth et al. 2018) 
 
The study will identify FFV factors 
through the Barrier Analysis technique 
and will assess the FFV factors through 
the application of Bayesian Network 
(BN) modelling approach based on real 




This study formulated research questions in order to address the 
research gaps identified from the review of the literature conducted in this 
chapter as follows: 
Main research question: How can the vulnerability to food fraud for food 
products designed for human consumption be assessed? 
As discussed in the literature review, those who research and work in 
the area of food fraud have called for a more innovative and holistic  approach 
that can assess the level (degree) of vulnerability to food fraud for food 
products targeted at human consumption (Everstine, Spink & Kennedy 2013; 
Tahkapaa et al. 2015). This holistic approach needs to be differ from food 
safety management approaches, as efforts to combat food fraud require a 
preliminary focus on vulnerability reduction instead of intervention (or 
detection) (shift from risk mitigation to vulnerability reduction). Such an 
approach would be based on reviewing previous cases of food fraud incidents 
reported in the global online databases (e.g. RASFF and USP).  
  To answer the research question three sub-questions are proposed: 
Sub-question 1:  What are the factors that influence the vulnerability to 
food fraud food products designed for human consumption? 
Sub-question 2: How can the types of food fraud be used to assess 
Fraud Vulnerability factors? 
Sub-question 3: Which of the known food fraud variables are most 
relevant when assessing vulnerability to food fraud? 
Whilst there are limited studies that have addressed food fraud 
prevention, one study by Bouzembrak and Marvin (2016) developed a 
Bayesian Model to predict food fraud incident types reported in the RASFF 
databases. Their BN model predicted food fraud incident types by knowing the 
country of origin and product category (types). However, their model did not 
consider other variables that have been shown to impact the vulnerability to 
food fraud for food items.  
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Another study by Marvin et al. (2016) built on this work by constructing a 
Predictive Bayesian Model (Bouzembrak & Marvin 2016) which included some 
of those the variables. Their BN model was able to predict which types of food 
fraud would be most likely when the country of origin, product category (types), 
country of detection, and year of the fraud occurring were known.   
A criticism of this model was that it also included variables related to food 
safety and did not just focus on those (Tahkapaa et al. 2015)  related to 
vulnerability to food fraud.  Scholars in the emerging field of food fraud 
vulnerability have since called for approaches to extend the knowledge of the 
role and relationships of the factors that influence vulnerability to food fraud 
(Van Ruth, Huisman & Luning 2017).  In particular, they seek models that allow 
for the consideration of the dynamic and potentially reciprocal 
interrelationships between food fraud incident types and root causes of food 
fraud (or FFV factors in this research) (Marvin et al. 2016). Further, scholars 
have also suggested that these relationships are best explored through 
analysis of real data from food fraud incidents (e.g. from the food fraud 
database) (Van Ruth et al. 2018). 
This study will address the research gaps mentioned and will include all 
known factors that have been shown to influence the vulnerability to food fraud 
(sub- question 2 and 3). These factors (See Figure 2.9) will be investigated 
from a global database of food fraud incidents (USP database) that have been 
collected over an eighteen-year period (2000-2018). The results of this 
analysis will allow the researcher to assess the vulnerability to food fraud for a 
specified food product types (Silvis et al. 2017; Van Ruth, Huisman & Luning 
2017; Van Ruth et al. 2018).  
In addition, the analysis will investigate the patterns of relationships 
(see figure 2.9 for the proposed Bayesian Network Structure) between the 
variables known to influence food fraud vulnerability as suggested by the 
literature.  The contribution of this work is to consider all of the known variables 
in one model which will ultimately provide a more rigorous and complete 
understanding of the factors that are involved in the assessment of 





















This chapter reviewed the relevant theories and concepts related to three main 
bodies of research relevant to food fraud. These are: fraud and its threat to 
food safety; criminology theories; and the Food Fraud Vulnerability (FFV) 
concept Definitions of food fraud, the different types of food fraud, and the 
differences between food fraud and food safety have been presented to 
highlight the rationale for the study and the importance of strategies for 
combating food fraud, strategies for the prevention of food fraud and strategies 
to assess the vulnerability to food fraud.  
Criminology theories such as the Routine Activity Theory were reviewed 
to better understand the root cause of vulnerability to food fraud. The FFV 
concept was discussed from the perspective of the Routine Activity Theory to 
highlight the three main areas of vulnerability. These were: opportunity; 
motivation; and countermeasures. A detailed illustration of FFV factors was 
provided. Then the study proposed a BN model based on the literature for the 
development of a holistic model that can assess the level (degree) of 
vulnerability to food fraud for food products designed for human consumption. 
The next chapter, Research Methodology, presents and justifies the proposed 
research paradigm, research design, and research strategy adopted to answer 











3 CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 Introduction 
In Chapter 2, the literature relating to food fraud, criminology theory (the 
Routine Activity Theory), and Food Fraud Vulnerability concept created the 
foundation for the research questions. This chapter presents the research 
design, data collection processes and data analysis methods employed to 
study the research questions. The research questions focus on the 
development of a holistic model that can assess the level (degree) of 
vulnerability to food fraud for food products targeted at human consumption. 
For this purpose, 580 food fraud incident records in the USP Food Fraud 
Database (FFD) will be reviewed using the Barrier Analysis technique. A 
Bayesian Network (BN) model will be constructed based on the FFD to assess 
Food Fraud Vulnerability factors and their interrelationships.  
Table 3.1 provides the structure and outline of this chapter. The chapter 
commences with a discussion about the selection of an appropriate research 
paradigm. The mixed methods approach that is used for this study is then 
illustrated, followed by a description of the selection of secondary data analysis 
methods. The next section describes the data analysis, using the Barrier 
Analysis technique and Bayesian Network modelling approach. The final 
section of this chapter discusses the evaluation of research quality and 











Table 3.1: Chapter 3 structure 
Section     Purpose 
3.1 Introduction  Introduction 
3.2 Pragmatism Research 
Paradigm 
 Selection of suitable research paradigm   
3.3 Research Design: Mixed 
Methods 
 Describing the mixed methods approach 
3.4 Research Strategy: Secondary 
Data Analysis  
Secondary data analysis, identifying the suitable 
database to address research questions and 
evaluating the selected database, Justification of 
selecting Barrier Analysis method and Bayesian 
Modelling approach 
3.5 Data analysis Constructing a BN model for data analysis 
3.6 Evaluation of the Research 
Design 
Reliability and validity for mixed methods research 
3.8. Methodological limitations Limitations related to secondary data analysis 
methods and Sub-question 1 
3.7 Conclusion Summary 
 
 Pragmatism Research Paradigm 
A research paradigm is a set of beliefs and concepts adopted by researchers 
to conduct a study (Mackenzie & Knipe 2006). In fact, research paradigms 
explain the worldview of the researcher (Denzin & Lincoln 2005) and provide 
a framework that leads to selection of a qualitative, quantitative, or mixed 
method approach  (Creswell 2014) in the research. s. Table 3.2 clarifies four 
research paradigms (see Table 3.2) based on three basic assumptions of 
ontology (‘the way in which the researcher sees the world’), epistemology (‘the 
way in which the researcher believes knowledge can be shaped’), and 
methodology (‘the way in which the researcher investigates reality’) 
(Bongiovanni 2016 p. 114). The four research paradigms based on these 
assumptions are Positivism, Critical Theory, Constructivism, and Realism/ 
Pragmatism as described by Guba and Lincoln (1994) (Healy & Perry 2000)). 
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Table 3.2: Research paradigms 
Paradigm 





reality is real and 
apprehensible 
 
‘virtual’ reality shaped by social, 
economic, ethnic, political, 
cultural, and gender values, 
crystallised over time 
 
multiple local and specific ‘constructed’ 
realities 
 
reality is ‘real’ but only imperfectly 



























the researcher is a ‘transformative 
intellectual’ who changes the 
social world within which 
participants live 
 
hermeneutical / dialectical: 
the researcher is a ‘passionate participant’ 




case studies/convergent interviewing: 
triangulation, interpretation of 
research issues by qualitative and by 
some quantitative methods such as 
structural equation modelling 
Method Quantitative Ideological review, civil actions Qualitative Mixed methods 
Adopted from: Healy and Perry (2000), p. 23; Guba and Lincoln (1994); Bongiovanni (2016)
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 This study adopts a pragmatism paradigm according to which the 
researcher employs available approaches to understand and acquire 
knowledge about the (food fraud) problem (Creswell 2003). The pragmatist 
worldview emphasises situational problems and consequences of actions 
(Creswell 2014). The underlying assumption of pragmatism is that the 
researcher should focus on the ‘research problem in social science research 
and then [use] pluralistic approaches to derive knowledge about the problem’ 
(Creswell 2009, p.11). Pragmatists believe that the research questions are the 
most important factor than ‘ the method of data collection’ (Andrew & Halcomb 
2006, p.147) and the researcher have the freedom of choice in selecting the 
research design that ‘effectively answer their research questions’ (Andrew & 
Halcomb 2006, p. 148). The pragmatic researchers ‘look to the what and how 
to research based on the intended consequences’ (Creswell 2009, p.11).  
The justifications for the study were presented in Section 1.4 with the 
main contribution addressing the call in the literature for an holistic approach 
to approach to assessment of vulnerability to food fraud that shifts the focus 
from risk mitigation to vulnerability reduction. In particular, there is a paucity of 
research related to the identification of the factors that impact Food Fraud 
Vulnerability (FFV). The development of an holistic model for FFV assessment 
requires an approach that includes both qualitative and quantitative inputs.  
This study adheres to the pragmatism perspective as the focus of the 
study is related to the problem of food fraud and this research look at ways to 
assess the Food Fraud Vulnerability (FFV) factors. Multiple approaches 
(qualitative and quantitative) will be employed in order to assess the FFV 
factors. The first phase (qualitative) of this study is related to the identification 
of FFV factors using the Barrier Analysis technique based on the principles 
from the Routine Activity Theory. This information will be sourced from records 
of real food fraud incidents recorded in the USP Food Fraud Database (FFD). 
The second phase (quantitative) is related to the application of Bayesian 
Modelling analysis for assessment of the relationships between food fraud 
vulnerability factors and their impact on the vulnerability to food fraud. Thus, 
the philosophical paradigm for this research is based on a pragmatist view. 
Pragmatism offers a more flexible research approach in order to explain an 
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event that ‘rises out of real-world practical problems (Creswell 2009, p.10).’ of 
food fraud. 
 Research Design: Mixed methods 
The research design includes qualitative, quantitative, or mixed methods 
approach (Creswell 2009). Creswell (1994) defined a qualitative study as ‘an 
inquiry process of understanding a social or human problem, based on building 
a complex, holistic picture, formed with words, reporting detailed views of 
informants, and conducted in a natural setting’ (Isaacs 2014, p. 318) The 
qualitative approach focuses on exploring ‘the meaning individuals or groups 
ascribe to a social or human problem’ (Creswell 2014, p. 4). The quantitative 
approach is appropriate for testing theories (Creswell 2014) by assessing the 
existing relationships between variables using statistical procedures ( 
Bongiovanni 2016;Denzin & Lincoln 2008 ). 
A mixed methods research methodology provides the possibility of 
combining qualitative and quantitative data collection (Creswell 2014). It helps 
to use a ‘distinct design that may involve philosophical assumptions and 
theoretical frameworks’ (Creswell 2014, p. 4). It also helps to better understand 
the research problem (Creswell 2014, p. 4) by using qualitative data to be 
combined with quantitative analysis (Adams et al. 2014; Creswell 2014; 
Wisdom & Creswell 2013). Mixed methods is an ideal way to assess complex 
issues (Wisdom & Creswell 2013) like assessment of FFV factors.  
The mixed methods methodology will be applied in this research for two 
reasons. First, the appropriate methodology for the pragmatism approach, the 
selected paradigm of this research is a mixed method (Creswell 2014, Hughes 
n.d.; Kawulich 2012). This is because, in the pragmatism paradigm, the aim of 
the research is to find solutions to problems and ‘instead of methods being 
important, the problem is most important’ (Creswell 2003, p. 11). Second, the 
literature review conducted in chapter Two (sub-section 2.3.2) propose the 
importance of assessing vulnerability to food fraud. Previous research focusing 
on the area of food fraud prevention has embraced the mixed methods as 




- Identify FFV factors
• Routine Activity Theory
- pinpoint the identified FFV factors 
into three main categories of 
opportunity, motivation, and 
countermeasures
Phase 1
• BN modeling appraoch 
- Assessment of FFV factors
- Predictor importance  Analysis 
(Identifying influencing variables)
Phase 2
Figure 3.1: Overall research methods 
methods research is the appropriate methodology for studies on assessing 
Food Fraud Vulnerability factors.  
Adopting a sequential exploratory mixed methods approach provides a 
framework (Venkatesh, Brown & Sullivan 2016) for this research to find out a 
holistic approach for assessment of FFV factors from multiple approaches. The 
framework in this study will begin with qualitative exploration (phase one) using 
Barrier Analysis techniques in order to extract the appropriate Food Fraud 
Vulnerability factors. Then, a Bayesian Network Model (phase two) will be 
developed based on the information and factors explored in the first step and 
from the data source (USP FFD) (Wisdom & Creswell 2013). The overall 
phases of research methods for this research (phase one and Two) are 



















 Research Strategy: Secondary Data Analysis 
Secondary data analysis or archival research is defined as a type of research 
strategy ‘where the research is conducted from existing materials’ (Ukessays 
2013). When selecting a research strategy, Yin (2009) suggests that there are 
five types that can be selected: experiments, surveys, archival analysis, history 
and case studies . These five strategies are described in Table 3.3. These five 
options will be discussed next in order to justify why archival analysis is 
selected for this study.  
 
Table 3.3: Research strategies 




Experiment how, why Yes Yes 
Survey who, what, where, 




who, what, where, 
how many, how much 
No Yes/No 
History how, why No No 
Case Study how, why No Yes 
Source: Paterson (2006, P. 76), Yin (2003, p. 5)  
 
The research questions and objectives of the research are ‘fundamental 
components of determining which research method to utilise’ (Tushi 2015, p. 
16). The experiment strategy is not suitable, as this research will not include 
experiments in the field or laboratory. To understand Food Fraud Vulnerability 
factors or root causes of food fraud, this research is required to obtain data by 
conducting reviews of incidents (see Spink, Moyer & Peru 2016). In addition, 
studies of food fraud are sensitive topics that may often identify and quantify 
problems with no real solutions for companies. A case study research is not 
considered suitable, as this research seeks to assess FFV factors against real 
data or food fraud incidents recorded in the USP FFD. Moreover, the 
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secondary data analysis does not focus on ’contemporary phenomena’, but 
the case study does (Yin 2014, p. 2) .   
The main research objective of this study is to develop a holistic model 
that can assess the level (degree) of vulnerability to food fraud for food 
products targeted at human consumption. The overall objective is testing Food 
Fraud Vulnerability factors against real data or food fraud incidents. The use 
of archival analysis is most suited to this research as this method 
‘encompasses the examination and analysis of recorded data’ (Jenkin 1985, 
cited in Tushi 2015, p. 16-17). In addition, research sub-questions of this study 
include ‘what’ question which is also supported by archival analysis research 
(Yin 2014). Moreover, the use of archival analysis or secondary data analysis 
strategy has also been employed in recent studies to identify research gaps in 
the area of food fraud (e.g. Bouzembrak & Marvin 2016; Marvin et al. 2016; 
Tahkapaa et al. 2015).  
Having explained the justification for using the secondary data analysis 
or archival analysis research methodology, there is a need to describe the 
appropriate framework or processes to conduct secondary data analysis 
(Johnston 2014). This study will follow the secondary data analysis processes 
developed by Johnston (2014) that include: (1) developing the research 
questions; (2) identifying the dataset (or database); and (3) evaluating the 
database. The following sections will describe these processes in detail for this 
research.  
3.4.1 Developing the Research Questions 
The fundamental key to conducting secondary data analysis is to use 
theoretical knowledge ‘to utilize existing data to address the research 
questions’ (Johnston 2014, p. 620). The purpose of this research is to develop 
a holistic model that can assess the level (degree) of vulnerability to food fraud 
for food products targeted at human consumption. The main research question 
that guided this study is: How Can the vulnerability to food fraud for food 
products designed for human consumption be assessed? Sub-questions are: 
sub-question 1: What are the factors that influence the vulnerability to food 
fraud food products designed for human consumption? Sub-question 2: How 
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can the types of food fraud be used to assess Fraud Vulnerability factors? and 
sub-question 3: Which of the variables, known to influence the vulnerability to 
food fraud, are most important? Identification of Database 
This section addresses the need to consider ‘previously collected data 
on the topic’ of food fraud (Johnston 2014, p. 621). Recent studies urge the 
need for research on food fraud to shift from detection/ intervention to 
prevention and vulnerability reduction (e.g. Spink & Moyer 2011; Manning & 
Soon 2016; Ellis et al. 2016; Spink et al. 2017) The first step towards 
developing a measure to prevent food fraud is to review incidents of food fraud 
(Tahkapaa et al. 2015). From the three main databases of food fraud (RASFF, 
EMA, and USP FFD), recent studies only used RASFF and EMA (e.g. Marvin 
et al. 2016; Tahkapaa et al. 2015; Bouzembrak & Marvin 2016). Tahkapaa et 
al. (2015) used the RASFF database (along with two local Finnish local 
authority reports) to determine patterns of food fraud and adulteration. 
Bouzembrak and Marvin (2016) used the RASFF database to predict the type 
of food fraud for imported products to the EU. A study by Marvin et al. (2016) 
also used RASFF and EMA (together) to validate the application of Bayesian 
Modelling in the prediction of food safety risks.  
There are three limitations in using the RASFF database alone or even 
along with the EMA. First, the RASFF database includes incidents of food fraud 
limited to the European Union. Second, the RASFF database includes 
incidents of food crime for both food safety and food fraud types. It means that 
the RASFF database provides cases of both intentional and unintentional 
adulteration (Marvin et al. 2016). Third, in the case of using the RASFF 
database along with the EMA, the overlap of incidents because of duplication 
may exist as EMA also ‘collect[s] food fraud reports from the RASFF’ database 
(Bouzembrak et al. 2018, p.289).  
Although recent studies have suggested using the USP FFD to acquire 
‘greater knowledge of food fraud and to improve the prediction performance’ 
(Bouzembrak & Marvin 2016, p. 185), the data in the USP FFD is not yet used 
and analysed in any studies. In addition, the USP Food Fraud Database (FFD) 
does not have the limitations that exist in other databases. The USP FFD 
includes intentional adulteration (and not unintentional adulteration related to 
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food safety) which is not the case in the RASFF database (Marvin et al. 2016). 
Moreover, the USP FFD provides information and documents in order to 
‘identify trends and vulnerabilities’ (USP 2018). Therefore, this study will use 
USP FFD as it will adequately address the research question by providing a 
comprehensive history of food fraud for FFV factors assessment. The USP 
FFD provides the publicly available data related to each case (incident) of food 
fraud that helps the researcher to easily review them for FFV factor 
identification (Sub-question 1). The USP FFD also provides data sources 
related to influencing variables of FFV factors (i.e. country of origin, country of 
detection, year, etc.) as previous literature stated (see Bouzembrak and 
Marvin 2016; Marvin et al. 2016).  
3.4.2 Evaluating the FFD  
In this research, The Food Fraud Database (FFD) in the United States 
Pharmacopeia Convention (USP) will be selected to review cases of food fraud 
and to address research questions. The USP FFD was established by USP in 
2012, providing information about the patterns of food fraud (USP 2018). The 
food fraud database in the USP also ‘supports compliance with FSMA and 
GFSI requirements’ (USP 2018). FSMA (Food Safety Modernisation Act) and 
the GFSI (Global Food Safety Initiative) are ‘a set of standards’ (GFSI 2017). 
New GFSI compliance requires all companies in the USA to undertake Food 
Fraud Vulnerability Assessment (FFVA) (addressing all types of food fraud and 
all ingredients) along with a completed and documented Food Fraud 
Prevention Strategy (Spink 2017). The expert panel and academics have 
already reviewed and validated the data published in the USP and made 
recommendations to identify the vulnerability of food ingredients (Spink, Moyer 
& Peru 2016) to food fraud. It is important to know that the USP FFD is 
accessible only through subscription purchase options (e.g. annual, 30 days, 
academic annual, and enterprise annual subscriptions) (USP FFD 2018). 
Therefore, it is not publicly and freely available.  
There are more than 8,700 records of food fraud related to four types in the 
USP FFD including incidents, inferences, surveillance, and methods that are 
publicly available (USP FFD 2018). The incident records are those reported in 
the media and include information about ‘the perpetrator, motive, geographic 
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location, and/or other characteristics’ (USP FFD 2018). An inference record is 
provided by ‘published research conducted to develop detection methods for 
adulterants in particular ingredients’ (USP FFD 2018). A surveillance record is 
typically conducted by ‘regulatory agencies, trade organizations, or other 
interest groups, and may also occur as part of published research regarding 
analytical detection methods’ (USP FFD 2018). A method record provides 
extra information about technical countermeasures that have helped detect the 
method record. Definition of each record type, numbers of records and their 























Table 3.4: The FFD record types and definitions 
Record Type Number of 
Records 
from 2000 to 
2018  








‘a documented occurrence of 
food fraud in a food ingredient or 
product within a defined time 
frame’ 
Ingredient name, ingredient 
synonyms, adulterant name, 
hazard (yes, no, unknown), 
fraud type, year reported, 
produced location, distributed 
location, weight of evidence 
(low, medium, high), and 










‘an indication of probable 
knowledge 
of food fraud adulteration without 
sufficient documentation to be 
classified 
as an incident’ 
Ingredient name, ingredient 
synonyms, adulterant name, 
fraud type, hazard, year 











‘a report of sampling and testing of 
foods or ingredients in specified 
geographic locations or at multiple 
points along the supply chain to 
gain knowledge about the scope 
or prevalence of fraud’ 
Ingredient name, ingredient 
synonyms, adulterant name, 
hazard, year reported, 
surveillance country (detected 
or distributed), and references 








provides information on an 
analytical 
method for detecting food 
adulteration 
or authenticating food ingredients 
that 
has been published in a scholarly 
report. 
Ingredient name, ingredient 
synonyms, adulterant name, 
hazard, year published, 
detection methods, and 







Source: USP FFD (2018), Accessed on  July 2018 
 
The USP FFD records are updated regularly, adding new cases of food 
fraud. Other than records of food fraud, the FFD provides five analytics 
features or options for their customers/subscribers. These five data analytical 
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features are: (1) Adulteration Record Time Series for tracking number of food 
fraud cases over time); (2) Ingredient Comparison ( based on the number of 
food fraud reports and adulterants); (3) Geographic Distribution of Incidents 
(discovering incident location); (4) Analytical Methods (to determine technical 
countermeasures); and (5) Ingredient Tabular Display (showing a ‘snapshot of 
the number of records and list of adulterants’) (USP FFD 2018). The USP FFD 
analytic features can be done for an ingredient, a set of ingredients or for all 
ingredients. Figure 3.2 shows a data analytics example of the geographical 
distribution of incidents in the USP FFD for alcoholic beverages. The USP FFD 
collects incidents that are only publicly available. Therefore, none reported (or 
validated) incidents are not included in this database. All analysis results will 
be fully described in Chapter Four.  
 
 
Figure 3.2: Geographic distributions of incidents (country of detection) 






 Data Analysis 
Data analysis is generally defined as the process of inspecting, transforming, 
and modelling data to determine useful information, suggest conclusions, and 
support decision-making (Ayele 2016, p. 13). Data analysis can be divided into 
three forms: descriptive, exploratory, and confirmatory data analysis (Ayele 
2016). Exploratory data analysis focuses on ‘discovering new features in the 
data and confirmatory on confirming or falsifying existing hypotheses’ (Ayele 
2016, p. 13). This research will employ both descriptive and confirmatory data 
analysis.  
Descriptive data analysis is basic analysis including measures at the 
pre-test or post-test phase of data analysis (Creswell 2014). Examples of these 
statistics are mean, frequencies and standard deviations. Using descriptive 
data analysis, this study will present the basic analytical result of a number of 
food fraud reports per year, food ingredient types/ categories, country of origin, 
and types of food fraud reported in the USP FFD. These analyses will help to 
identify trends of food fraud based on time series, food categories that are 
more vulnerable and are at higher risk of being counterfeited, mislabelled, etc., 
countries where food fraud occurs more frequently, and important types of food 
fraud.  
Confirmatory Analysis refers to inferential statistics used to examine the 
hypothesis (Creswell 2014) and research questions. For the purpose of this 
study, developing a holistic model that can assess the level (degree) of 
vulnerability to food fraud for food, a Bayesian Network (BN) model is used 
based on incidents reported in the USP FFD. Bayesian Modelling provides ‘a 
framework for plausible reasoning’ and has the ability toanalyse the causes of 
an outcome (Sharma 2017, p. 3). BNs are graphical models, showing 
relationships between variables (Margarities 2003). They are based on 
probability theory ‘originating from Bayesian statistics and decision theory 
combined with graph theory’ (Bouzembrak & Marvin 2016, p.181). BNs are 
also capable of other features: they can ‘[model] dependencies between 
variables, manage non-linear interaction and integrate different kinds of 
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information about the system such as expert knowledge, measurement data, 
feedback experience and information regarding the system behaviour’ (Marvin 
et al. 2016, p. 464). Bayesian Modelling was adopted in the food fraud 
literature for prediction of food fraud types (see Bouzembrak & Marvin 2016; 
Marvin et al. 2016).  
For this study, Bayesian Modeling will be used to analyse incidents of 
food fraud in the USP FFD and to assess the Food Fraud Vulnerability factors 
based on food fraud types and other known influencing variables. The 
Bayesian modelling approach for this research will include three steps: (1) 
collection of food fraud incidents; (2) identification of Food Fraud Vulnerability 
factors associated to each food fraud incidents which will be derived from the 
literature (e.g. Silvis et al. 2017; Van Ruth, Huisman & Luning 2017; Van Ruth 
et al. 2018), and reports linked to each food fraud incident in the FFD; (3) 
constructing BN models consisting of nodes, edges, and parameters related 
to each node within Conditional Probability Tables (CPT).  
3.5.1 Collecting Cases of Reported Food Fraud  
The USP FFD includes 8,721 records of food fraud from the year 1980 to 2018 
(accessed on 10 July 2018) in the form of four recording types of incidents 
(1,146), inferences (2,897), methods (4146), and surveillance (532). From all 
these four types of food fraud records, only incident records have the complete 
information to determine vulnerability to food fraud, and other variables related 
to influencing variables (e.g. country of origin, country of distribution, weight of 
evidence, contextual and supporting information about the perpetrator, and 
motives) (FFD 2018). Other records like inferences are based on probable 
knowledge from published research. In addition, they do not include the 
variable ‘country of origin’ which is one of the important factors influencing food 
fraud cases (Bouzembrak & Marvin 2016). Methods and surveillance records 
are not selected for this study’s analysis because the former does not have the 
information (or features) of the country of origin and distribution country and 




Table 3.5 shows the list of ingredient groups addressed within the 
incident recording type in the USP FFD from 2000 to 2018 (accessed 10 July 
2018). The seafood, meat and poultry, alcoholic beverages, and dairy products 
cover more than 50% of the database related to incident records. Therefore, 
this study focuses on these top four product types as the sample for this 
research. From all the number of incidents related to these four products, 80% 
will be used to train the BN model and the rest to evaluate the performances 






















Table 3.5: List of ingredient groups and their percentage in the USP FFD from 
2000 to 2018 (from incident type category) 
 
 Source: USP FFD (2018) 
 
The incident records in the USP FFD are divided into three types: 
replacement, addition, and removal with 14 sub-types (10 for replacement, 3 
for addition, and 1 for removal) based on the description provided in the 
Product Group Percentage % 
Meat and Poultry products 16.3 
Dairy ingredients 16.1 
Alcohol 15.8 
Seafood and seafood products 12.4 
Herbs, Spices, and Seasoning 7.4 
Vegetable Oils 5.6 
Grains 5.2 
Olive oil 4.1 
Beverages (Non-alcoholic) 3.2 
Honey 2.4 
Tea and Coffee 2.2 
Fruits and Vegetable juices and concentrates 1.5 
Eggs and egg products 1.8 
Tree nuts and peanuts 1.8 
Confectionary (Chocolate, cocoa, and candy) 1.8 
Food additives and dietary supplements (Flavour, 





database (for food fraud sub-type) and literature (for food fraud types, see 
Moore, Spink & Lipp 2012) (see Table 3.6).  
 
Table 3.6:  Types of food fraud and their sub-types 
Food fraud 
type 















Dilution or substitution with an alternate 
ingredient 
Geographic origin misrepresentation Misrepresentation of geographic origin 
Unapproved biocides Use of non-declared, unapproved or 
banned biocides (preservatives, 
antibiotics, anti-fungal agents, etc.) 
Animal Misrepresentation Misrepresentation of animal origin 
Varietal origin misrepresentation Misrepresentation of varietal origin 
Nutritional content fraud Misrepresentation of nutritional content 
Botanical origin misrepresentation Misrepresentation of botanical origin 
Fraudulent Labelling Fraudulent labelling claims 
Addition of non-food substance Dilution or substitution with an alternate 
substance (not food grade) 
Multiple adulterants Formulation of an artificial product 





Addition of colourants Artificial enhancement of perceived 
quality with colour additives 
Artificial enhancement (protein) Artificial enhancement of apparent 
protein content 
Artificial enhancement (other) Artificial enhancement of organoleptic 
qualities 
Removal Removal of authentic constituents Removal of authentic constituents 
Source: Moore, Spink and Lipp (2012); USP FFD (2018) 
3.5.2 Identification of Food Fraud Vulnerability Factors (Sub-question 1) 
The first step towards determining root causes of vulnerability to food fraud 
related to a product is to review the incident and its history (Spink & Moyer 
2011). The Food Fraud Vulnerability factor for each incident can be determined 
by literature (Silvis et al. 2017; Van Ruth et al. 2018; see Table 2.3 in Chapter 
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Two) and the USP FFD. Examples of these factors are supply chain 
complexity, product price, and the legal system. For determining the 
vulnerability factors related to each food fraud incident in the USP FFD, this 
study will use a Barrier Analysis technique. Justification for the adoption of this 
technique is provided next.  
3.5.2.1 Justification of the use of Barrier Analysis technique/method   
The Barrier Analysis (BA) method, has been widely adopted as an assessment 
tool for the identification of barriers to behavioural change (Zafimanjaka 2010; 
Lewis 2016; Stacy 2016).  In particular, it has been used in the critical incident 
analysis ( Mahto & Kumar 2008  ) and identification of root causes of safety 
systems failure (Johnson 2006; Hollnagel & Speziali 2008).  In these contexts, 
Barrier Analysis considers the range of potential hazards, risks and 
organisational factors that act as hurdles to inhibit (or facilitate) anti-social or 
dangerous behaviours in a given context (Huang 2015; Shah 2019).  Barrier 
Analysis relies on the premise that as effective barriers decrease in number, 
then the likelihood of hazardous and/or unwanted behaviours increases 
(Johnson 2006; Shah 2019).    
Over time, the Barrier Analysis method has been adapted to account 
for multiple such as food fraud as well. The BA theory was further developed 
to other methods such as Management Oversight and Risk Tree (MORT) and 
Bowtie methodology (Flynn 2013) which could be effective in food fraud related 
studies (Flynn 2013). 
As Barrier Analysis methods have been shown to be effective at the 
identification of the root causes of critical incidents ( Mahto & Kumar 2008) it 
was determined that this method would be appropriate in this analysis.   The 
BA methods, in particular, ’focus on the barriers that should, but did not, 
prevent the occurrence of an adverse event and/or an unwanted outcome’ 
(Hollnagel & Speziali 2008, p.26; Shah 2019). These barriers are addressed 
in the literature as failed barriers (or effective countermeasures) ‘for identifying 
and resolving’ (or events/incidents (Mahto & Kumar 2008, p. 18). It is important 
to firstly identify the factors (root cause) related to an incident (Dew 1991) 
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rather than simply applying reactive strategies (Huluka & Popov 2012) which 
could be ineffective.    
 In this research, the application of BA for the identification of 
vulnerability factors deemed appropriate as the research is dealing with the 
problem of food fraud hazard when food safety management systems failed to 
address the fraud case or were unsuccessful barriers (or failed safety barriers) 
as stated in related researches (see Figure 3.3).  In addition, BA is more helpful 
when shifting from traditional risk analysis to vulnerability analysis. Figure 3.2 
shows the ideas in the Barrier Analysis technique for food fraud events. As can 
be seen from Figure 3.3, food fraud hazards/events pass through a sequence 
of potential (safety) barriers before reaching their victims/targets. The 
weakness in these potentials (safety) barriers (that are unsuccessful) ‘can be 




Figure 3.3: Barrier Analysis technique 
Source: (Johnson 2006, p. 9) 
 
The Barrier Analysis technique is combined with this study’s framework 
provided in chapter Two based on the Routine Activity Theory. The research 
framework (Model) of this study explained that if capable guardians (or control 
measures or countermeasures) are absent to detect/seize food fraudsters and 
there is failed safety barriers (or ineffective food safety intervention measures), 
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the area of vulnerability to food fraud will increase the motivation of fraudsters 
and the subsequent opportunities to commit food fraud (Ellis et al. 2016). 
Combining the Barrier Analysis technique and the Routine Activity Theory will 
strengthen the credibility of qualitative phase of this research by pinpointing 
the FFV factors into three categories of opportunity, motivation, and 
countermeasures according to the literature (Van Ruth, Huisman & Luning 
2017).Table 3.7  shows the steps undertaken for the BA technique for this 
research. First, the researchers reviewed the cases of food fraud in the USP 
FF to be familiar with the database. Second, the researcher identified target 
(victim) and safety barriers or countermeasures that have used to detect food 
fraud. Third, the researcher identified the filed (safety) barrier that was 
unsuccessful in addressing and deterring case of food fraud. Finally, the 
researcher calibrated the identified factors/dimensions with the Routine 
Activity Theory categories and the literature.  
 
Table 3.7: Steps undertaken for the BA 
Task Rationale 
Initial reviewing 
the incidents of 
food fraud in the 
USP FFD 
To be familiar with the database and review cases of food 
fraud 
Identify Target, 
Victim and safety 
barriers 





Answering the question: Why the safety barrier system (e.g. 
safety officers) was failed to deter incident of food fraud in 
time? (before reaching to consumers and/or before the death 












Facilitating the assessment of vulnerability to food fraud in the 
Bayesian Network (BN) analysis model 
 
Justification of Choosing Bayesian Network Modelling 
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The main research question, assessment of Food Fraud Vulnerability (FFV) 
factor, will be analysed using predictive analytics. Predictive analytics can be 
grouped into three main categories: regression, classification, and clustering 
(Lu 2017, p. 10). Regression analysis is a technique that ‘focuses on 
understanding how dependent variable changes when an independent 
variable is changed’ (Lu 2017, P.10) when the target variable is numerical (or 
continuous) (Lu 2017). Classification analysis is a technique that ‘covers the 
problem of identifying which category a new observation belongs to base on 
information from a training data set’ when the target variable is categorical. 
Clustering analysis is a technique that ‘discovers the natural groupings of a 
data set with unknown class labels’ (Lu 2017, p.10) when the target variable 
can be either numerical or categorical. The description of these three 

















Table 3.8: Types of predictive analytics and definitions 





a dependent variable 
changes when a 
predictor (or 
independent 
variable) is changed’ 
 








‘learn patterns using 
the data attribute 
features from the 
training set and 
these patterns can 
be applied to 
unknown instances 






trees, support vector 
machines (SVM), and 








‘categorize a new 
observation into a 
class membership’ 
 








Source: Lu 2017 
 
From the above definition of these three analysis techniques and based 
on the level of measurement of the target variable (FFV: opportunity, 
motivation, countermeasures) for this study, which is categorical, the 
appropriate analysis technique seems to be classification analysis. From 
common methods of classification analysis methods, this research will use the 
Bayesian approach for two reasons. The first reason is based on the number 
of the dependent variable (FFV factors) and independent variables, and their 
measurement levels of this research. Since this study has one target variable 
of FFV factors that is categorical (three categories of opportunity, motivation, 
countermeasures), with a large set of inputs (more than 100 influencing 
variables) that have different levels of measurements (e.g. ordinal, nominal, 
flags or binary value) the Bayesian approach seems to be appropriate for the 
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analysis (IBM Nd (b)). Comparison between classification methods based on 
the target variable measurement level is shown in Table 3.9.  















































































Second, previous research focusing on the area of food fraud 
prevention has embraced the Bayesian approach as shown in their papers 
(see Marvin et al. 2016; Bouzembrak & Marvin 2016) as a suitable method for 
the purpose of assessment of FFV factors (main research question), 
understanding ‘pattern of occurrences’ (Marvin et al. 2016, p. 468) and 
determining the level of influencing variable importance (Sub-question 2 and 
3). Given the nature of this study’s research question (analysis of the level of 
inputs), the number of independent variables and dependent variable and their 
level of measurement, the Bayesian Network modelling approach seems to be 
an appropriate method for this research. 
3.5.3 BN Model Building (Sub-question 2, Sub-question 3) 
A Bayesian Network is a graphical model and consists of the following: (1) a 
set of random variables (or node) and a set of directed links (or edges) between 
variables; (2) a set of mutually exclusive states within each random variable 
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which explain ‘the condition of a variable’ (Marvin et al. 2016, p. 465); (3) ‘a 
directed acyclic graph’ (DAG) formed from the variables and the directed links 
(or edges) (Jensen & Nielsen 2007; Marvin et al.2016, p. 465, Tien & Der 
Kiureghian 2016). A DAG is a directed graph with no directed path from 𝐴𝑖 to 
𝐴𝑗 (e.g. 𝐴𝑖 → ⋯ → 𝐴𝑗) (Jensen & Nielsen 2007). If there is a link between 
𝐴𝑖 to 𝐴𝑗 , then the random variable 𝐴𝑖 is the parent of 𝐴𝑗 and𝐴𝑗is the child of 𝐴𝑖 
(Marvin et al. 2016; Jensen & Nielsen 2007). A Bayesian Network considers 
the joint probability distribution of all variables, 𝑃(𝑈) = 𝑃(𝐴1, … . . , 𝐴𝑛) ‘given by 
the product of all Conditional Probability Tables’ (Jensen & Nielsen 2007, p. 
36): 
P(U)= ∏ 𝑃(𝐴ⅈ| 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 (𝐴ⅈ))
𝑛
𝑖=1
       (1)
  
Bayesian Networks also have the ability to calculate new probabilities 
when new information about the state of a set of random variables are 
available (Jensen & Nielsen 2007; Hossain & Muromachi 2013). The new 
information provides the evidence, meaning that ‘some of the variables are 
observed’ taking values from their domains (Marvin et al. 2016, p. 466). For 
example, if the evidence (e) related to the state of m variables (𝑒1,……,,𝑒𝑚) 
becomes available, then inserting this new information to Eq. (1) we can get 
E.q (2): 
P(U, e)= ∏ 𝑃(𝐴𝑖|𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 (𝐴𝑖)) ∏ 𝑒𝑗
𝑚
𝑗=1    
𝑛
𝑖=1     (2) 
 
And for A U we have 
P (𝐴|𝑒) =  
∑ 𝑃 (𝑈,𝑒)𝑈{𝐴}
𝑃(𝑒)
        (3) 
 The BN model for this study will comprise (see Figure 3.3): 
(1) A set of seven random variables (or nodes) of food fraud type, country 
of origin, country of distribution, Food Fraud Vulnerability factors, the 
weight of evidence, product, and year.  
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(2) A set of mutual states for each random variable (e.g. for the variable 
food fraud type the states are replacement, addition, and removal). 
(3) A set of directed edges between the variables and an associated 
conditional probability for each of them. The links between the variables 
in the BN are based on family relationships. In this study, Food Fraud 
Vulnerability factor(s) is supposed to be the parent of food fraud type 
(and sub-type), year, country of origin, country of distribution, weight of 
evidence, and product. Relationships between food fraud type and 
other variables are drawn from the literature (see Marvin et al. 2016; 
Bouzembrak & Marvin 2016).  
   To construct the BN model for this study, we will use 80% of the incident 
records from the USP FFD, the machine learning technique ‘Expectation 
Maximisation Algorithm’ and the SPSS Modeler 18.2 software.  
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3.5.4 Example of Bayesian Network Calculations 
 Figure 3.5 shows an example of a BN with three nodes (random variables) of 
Food Fraud Vulnerability (FFV) factors, Food Fraud Type (FFT), and Year(Y). 
Variable FFV factors has three states of Opportunity (O), Motivation (M), and 
(Countermeasures), variable FFT has three states of Replacement (Rep), 
Addition (Add), and Removal (Rem), and finally variable Year has four states 
of Y1 (2002-2006), Y2 (2006-2010), Y3 (2010-2014), and Y4 (2014-2018). It 
can be seen from the edges between these three variables in Figure 3.3 and 
3.4 that FFV and FFT are parents of Year. Variable Year (Y) with its parents 
FFV and FFT, form a conditional probability distribution, 𝑃(𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟|𝐹𝐹𝑉, 𝐹𝐹𝑇) or 
Conditional Probability Table (CPT) (Jensen & Nielsen 2007). CPT and 
Unconditional Probability Tables (UPTs) are shown in Figure 3.5. The UPTs 
are given to a variable (e.g. FFV and FFT) when there is no parent for them 
(Jensen & Nielsen 2007). In this example, we supposed that FFV and FFT are 
independent. UPTs and CPT can be obtained through training the data (Li et 
al. 2014; Marvin et al. 2016, p. 469). In the case that there are no known UPTs, 
1
𝑛
 probability can be assigned, where n is ‘the number of states of the 
parameters’ (Marvin et al. 2016, p. 469).  
  Child variable (Y) is conditionally dependent on the sates of parent 
variables (FFV and FFT). In Figure 3.4, the CPT for the child variable (Y) is a 
table of all possible stated combinations of the parent variables. The first 
probability in the CPT in Figure 3.5 can be described as: given that FFV is (O), 
and FFT is (Rep), the probability that (Y1) will be equal to them is the conditional 









FFV  Probability 
O P(FFV =O) 
M P(FFV =M) 











Rep Add Rem Rep Add Rem Rep Add Rem 
Y
1 
𝑷(𝒀 = 𝒀𝟏| 𝑭𝑭𝑽 = 𝟎, 𝑭𝑭𝑻 = 𝑹𝒆𝒑) 𝑷(𝒀 = 𝒀𝟏|𝑭𝑭𝑽 = 𝑶, 𝑭𝑭𝑻 = 𝑨𝒅𝒅) 𝑷(𝒀 = 𝒀𝟏|𝑭𝑭𝑽 = 𝑶, 𝑭𝑭𝑻 = 𝑹𝒆𝒎) 𝑷(𝒀 = 𝒀𝟏|𝑭𝑭𝑽 = 𝑴, 𝑭𝑭𝑻 = 𝑹𝒆𝒑) 𝑷(𝒀 = 𝒀𝟏|𝑭𝑭𝑽 = 𝑴, 𝑭𝑭𝑻 = 𝑨𝒅𝒅) 𝑷(𝒀 = 𝒀𝟏|𝑭𝑭𝑽 = 𝑴, 𝑭𝑭𝑻 = 𝑹𝒆𝒎) 𝑷(𝒀 = 𝒀𝟏|𝑭𝑭𝑽 = 𝑪, 𝑭𝑭𝑻 = 𝑹𝒆𝒑) 𝑷(𝒀 = 𝒀𝟏|𝑭𝑭𝑽 = 𝑪, 𝑭𝑭𝑻 = 𝑨𝒅𝒅) 𝑷(𝒀 = 𝒀𝟏|𝑭𝑭𝑽 = 𝑪, 𝑭𝑭𝑻 = 𝑹𝒆𝒎) 
Y
2 
𝑷(𝒀 = 𝒀𝟐|𝑭𝑭𝑽 = 𝟎, 𝑭𝑭𝑻 = 𝑹𝒆𝒑) 𝑷(𝒀 = 𝒀𝟐|𝑭𝑭𝑽 = 𝑶, 𝑭𝑭𝑻 = 𝑨𝒅𝒅) 𝑷(𝒀 = 𝒀𝟐|𝑭𝑭𝑽 = 𝑶, 𝑭𝑭𝑻 = 𝑹𝒆𝒎) 𝑷(𝒀 = 𝒀𝟐|𝑭𝑭𝑽 = 𝑴, 𝑭𝑭𝑻 = 𝑹𝒆𝒑) 𝑷(𝒀 = 𝒀𝟐|𝑭𝑭𝑽 = 𝑴, 𝑭𝑭𝑻 = 𝑨𝒅𝒅) 𝑷(𝒀 = 𝒀𝟐|𝑭𝑭𝑽 = 𝑴, 𝑭𝑭𝑻 = 𝑹𝒆𝒎) 𝑷(𝒀 = 𝒀𝟐|𝑭𝑭𝑽 = 𝑪, 𝑭𝑭𝑻 = 𝑹𝒆𝒑) 𝑷(𝒀 = 𝒀𝟐|𝑭𝑭𝑽 = 𝑪, 𝑭𝑭𝑻 = 𝑨𝒅𝒅) 𝑷(𝒀 = 𝒀𝟐|𝑭𝑭𝑽 = 𝑪, 𝑭𝑭𝑻 = 𝑹𝒆𝒎) 
Y
3 
𝑷(𝒀 = 𝒀𝟑|𝑭𝑭𝑽 = 𝑶, 𝑭𝑭𝑻 = 𝑹𝒆𝒑) 𝑷(𝒀 = 𝒀𝟑|𝑭𝑭𝑽 = 𝑶, 𝑭𝑭𝑻 = 𝑨𝒅𝒅) 𝑷(𝒀 = 𝒀𝟑|𝑭𝑭𝑽 = 𝑶, 𝑭𝑭𝑻 = 𝑹𝒆𝒎) 𝑷(𝒀 = 𝒀𝟑|𝑭𝑭𝑽 = 𝑴, 𝑭𝑭𝑻 = 𝑹𝒆𝒑) 𝑷(𝒀 = 𝒀𝟑|𝑭𝑭𝑽 = 𝑴, 𝑭𝑭𝑻 = 𝑨𝒅𝒅) 𝑷(𝒀 = 𝒀𝟑|𝑭𝑭𝑽 = 𝑴, 𝑭𝑭𝑻 = 𝑹𝒆𝒎) 𝑷(𝒀 = 𝒀𝟑|𝑭𝑭𝑽 = 𝑪, 𝑭𝑭𝑻 = 𝑹𝒆𝒑) 𝑷(𝒀 = 𝒀𝟑|𝑭𝑭𝑽 = 𝑪, 𝑭𝑭𝑻 = 𝑨𝒅𝒅) 𝑷(𝒀 = 𝒀𝟑|𝑭𝑭𝑽 = 𝑪, 𝑭𝑭𝑻 = 𝑹𝒆𝒎) 
Y
4 










Figure 3.5: Examples of BN, UPTs, and CPT for three variables of FF, FFV and Year 
 
P(FFV) 









 Evaluation of the Research Design 
In order to evaluate the rigour in mixed methods research, the literature 
suggested ‘assessing integration and the need to justify the use of mixed 
methods’ (Brown et al. 2015, p. 813) as well as assessing the rigour of 
qualitative and quantitative approach separately (Tashakkori and Teddlie 
2010). This study integrated both qualitative and quantitative approach based 
on two main reasons. First, the researcher selected a pragmatism worldview 
in order to use pluralistic methods to address the problem of vulnerability to 
food fraud. The second reason is related to the research questions. The first 
sub-question of the research is exploratory in nature and according to the 
literature identification of key FFV factors is yet to be completed (Van Ruth, 
Huisman & Luning 2017; Van Ruth et al. 2018). Therefore, a qualitative 
approach is deemed to be appropriate. Other sub-questions, as well as the 
main research question, are related to the assessment of FFV factors and 
therefore quantitative approach was selected.  
According to the literature, a qualitative approach can be assessed based 
on the following criteria of credibility, transferability, dependability, and 
confirmability (Lincoln & Guba 1985; Healy & Perry 2000). Credibility refers to 
the ‘assessment of the association between the actual investigation and its 
planned objectives’ (Bonjiovanni 2016, p. 149). To achieve the credibility, the 
research method selected in the qualitative approach (Barrier Analysis 
technique or Sub-question 1) is well established and is based on previous 
studies (Blomkvist et al. 2010; Dong et al. 2016; Johnson 2006). In addition, 
data analysis in the qualitative phase follows the Routine Activity Theory as 
has been approved in assessing and identifying key FFV factors according to 
the literature (Silvis et al. 2017; Van Ruth, Huisman & Luning 2017; Van Ruth 
et al. 2018). Moreover, the credibility of the research is ensured by the 
‘development of familiarity’ with cases of food fraud reported in the USP FFD. 
The researcher will spend extensive time reviewing the incident recorded in 
the database during data collection for about 20 days. This allows the 
researcher to extensively understand the platform of the USP FFD and 
different sources of data presented in the USP FFD.  
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Transferability refers to the assessment of trustworthiness in qualitative 
approach in case of the generalisability factor (Bonjiovanni 2016). To achieve 
transferability, this study will select a large sample of data (580 cases of food 
fraud) from different product categories. Using different categories of food 
product type will help the generalisability of this research by providing 
differences and similarities related to FFV factors. In addition, the researcher 
provided the readers with specific information regarding the research design, 
the sampling strategy, etc. This can help the readers to ensure the 
trustworthiness of the research by providing relevant information on how the 
same results could be obtained (Bonjiovanni 2015) in all other food product 
types.  
Dependability refers to ‘obtaining the same results when the investigation 
is repeated under the same conditions by other researchers’ (Bonjiovanni 
2016, p. 150). To ensure the dependability of this investigation, the researcher 
carefully described the processes or framework to conduct secondary data 
analysis. The framework comprises developing the research question, 
identifying the database, and evaluating the database according to the 
literature (Johnston 2014). In addition, the study will clarify the processes of 
identifying FFV factors using Barrier Analysis technique and the Routine 
Activity Theory and the full data is available in Appendix A 
Finally, confirmability refers to the degree to which the researcher’s 
findings can be confirmed by others, ‘rather than on the choices of the 
researcher’ (Bonjiovanni 2016, p.151). Two steps will be undertaken to ensure 
the confirmability of the present research (specifically related to the Barrier 
Analysis technique results). First, a draft of Barrier Analysis result related to 
each product category as well as the process with all data related to it will be 
sent to two supervisors for verification. Second, the study also will use 
quantitative BN model in order to confirm or disconfirm the assessment of 
identified FFV factors based on predictors addressed in the literature and the 
data source (the USP FFD).  
According to the literature, the quality of a quantitative approach can be 
assessed based on the criteria of validity and reliability (Brown et al. 2015). 
The validity of the quantitative approach refers to ‘the extent to which a concept 
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is accurately measured in a quantitative study’ (Heale & Twycross 2015). 
There are two ways to validate the constructed BN for this study. First, the 
researcher will use approximately 20 % of the incident records (similar to the 
study by Marvin et al. 2016) in the USP FFD to assess FFV factors. For this 
purpose, these incidents will be retrieved from the USP FFD and will be stored 
in Excel. All variables (except FFV) will be used as input in the constructed BN 
model to assess Food Fraud Vulnerability factors as identified by the Barrier 
Analysis Technique. Second, the study will compare the result of the BN model 
to the results previously published by other studies. For example, the result of 
the BN analysis for products will be compared with the research by Tahkapaa 
et al. (2015), and Bouzembrak and Marvin (2016).  
Reliability of quantitative approach refers to ‘to the consistency of a 
measure’ (Heale & Twycross 2015). This research will adopt two steps to 
ensure the reliability of the BN modelling approach. First, the research will 
provide the description of processes undertaken to construct the BN model 
using SPSS Modeler 18.2. The processes include clarification of step by step 
development of Stream by the SPSS Modeler. Furthermore, the study will test 
the reliability of the holistic model through the partition node which split the 
dataset into training (80%) and testing (20%) set according to previous 
research (Marvin et al. 2016). Second, data used to construct the BN model 
will be fully accessible (including each incident with a record ID, influencing 
variable and target variable of FFV) following USQ’s protocols for data 
retrieval.  
 Methodological Limitations 
One methodological limitation that this research had to face relates to the use 
of secondary data analysis. The secondary data analysis has two main 
limitations. First, the data in the secondary data analysis method is collected 
for some other reason/purposes (Johnston 2014). In this research obtaining 
primary data (through either interview or survey) is impossible for the 
researcher due to the sensitivity of addressing food fraud in companies. 
Studies of food fraud are sensitive topics that may often identify and quantify 
problems with no real solutions for companies. Moreover, identifying 
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vulnerability to food fraud requires initial screening of cases of food fraud 
organised within a database (Spink et al. 2016). Therefore, secondary data 
analysis is selected for data collection and data analysis. In order to avoid this 
limitation, the researcher selected the secondary data that is best described in 
the literature for collecting incidents of food fraud (Bouzembrak et al. 2018).  
A second limitation of using secondary data is that ‘the secondary 
researcher did not participate in the data collection process and does not know 
exactly how it was conducted’ (Johnston 2014, p. 625). In this research, 
incidents of food fraud will be carefully collected in the USP FFD from scientific 
literature, media publications, regulatory reports, judicial records, and trade 
association. Therefore, the source of data is available and reliable. In addition, 
the study addressed this limitation by describing a framework for undertaking 
secondary data analysis. This framework was described in section 3.4.  
Another methodological limitation is linked to Sub-question 1, identifying 
FFV factors. The identification of FFV factor based on real data or reviewing 
cases of food fraud is absent in the literature (Van Ruth et al. 2018). Therefore, 
there are a lack of knowledge and/or techniques in order to extract the 
vulnerability factor from a database. The USP FFD addresses the possibility 
of identifying ‘trends and vulnerabilities through a customizable dashboard, 
powerful search capabilities, and automated analytics’ (USP FFD 2018). 
However, identification of FFV factors requires reviewing incidents of food 
fraud from their source. To avoid this limitation, the study will use Barrier 
Analysis technique based on similar studies (Blomkvist et al. 2010; Dong et al. 
2016; Johnson 2006) combined with the Routine Activity Theory in order to 
pinpoint the identified FFV factors into three main categories of opportunity, 
motivation, and countermeasures.  
 Conclusion 
This chapter outlined the research methodology selected in the present study. 
Originated from pragmatism paradigm, this exploratory sequential mixed 
methods investigation adopts a secondary data analysis research strategy. A 
detailed description of framework and processes to conduct secondary data 
analysis including development of research question, identifying the database, 
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and evaluating the database is provided. Data analysis of this research 
revolves around the identification of FFV factors (Sub-question 1), the way  
these factors be assessed by fraud incident types (Sub-question 2), and other 
known influencing variables (Sub-question 3), and BN validation (main RQ). 
Methodological limitations of this study are outlined related to secondary data 
analysis research strategy and also Sub-question 1. Several steps will be 
undertaken to reduce the influence of these limitations. Chapter Four 




4 CHAPTER 4: RESEARCH RESULTS 
 Introduction 
As the previous chapters of this research highlighted, addressing, 
understanding, and answering the three research sub-questions of this 
document will enable assessment of Food Fraud Vulnerability (FFV) factors 
for food products targeted at human consumption. In particular, a better 
understanding of factors that can contribute to FFV factors(Sub-question 1), 
determining the level of influencing variable of food fraud type  (Sub-question 
2), and other known influencing variables (Sub-question 3) are considered 
essential in the assessment of FFV factors for food products designed for 
human consumption.  
Chapter Two laid the conceptual foundation for the study of vulnerability 
to food fraud. By reviewing relevant literature in the field of food fraud, this 
study has cast light on the differences between food fraud and other food 
safety management categories (e.g. food quality) (Spink & Moyer 2011) that 
requires prevention strategies rather than intervention/detection responses. 
Chapter Two also introduced the Routine Activity Theory, a criminal theory that 
provides a framework for the identification of factors (root causes) impacting 
vulnerability to food fraud. Furthermore, chapter Two illustrated the Bayesian 
Network (BN) model to test the existing theoretical assumption provided by the 
Routine Activity Theory for the assessment of FFV factors. Chapter Three 
demonstrated the research design selected in this research, as well as its 
paradigm, strategy, methods, and justification of selecting Barrier Analysis 
technique and Bayesian Modeling analysis approach.  
This Chapter provides an overview of the findings that emerged from 
the research questions comprising this research. This chapter starts with 
descriptive analysis results related to all influencing variables of FFV factors. 
Next, this chapter focuses on describing FFV factors identified from the Barrier 
Analysis technique (Sub-question 1), building and constructing a Bayesian 
Network structure to understand important influencing variables (Sub-question 
2 and Sub-question 3), and finally validating the holistic model (main RQ). The 
structure of the present chapter is shown in Table 4.1.  
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Table 4.1: Chapter 4 structure 
Section     Purpose 
4.1 Introduction  Introduction 
4.2 Descriptive Analysis Descriptive statistics related to influencing variables of 
FFV factors 
4.3 Barrier Analysis Results  FFV factors categories and sub-categories related to 
580 cases of Food Fraud 
 
4.4 Bayesian Network Modeling 
Approach 
 Building and testing the BN model based on food fraud 
incident types (Sub-question 2), and based on other 
known influencing variables (Sub-question 3) 
4.5 Holistic TAN Model Validation Holistic TAN model validation based on the testing sub-
set and previous studies  
4.6 Conclusion Summary 
 
 Descriptive Analysis 
From 2000 to 2018, a total sample of 580 incidents of food fraud reported by 
the USP Food Fraud Database (FFD) relating to four types of food products: 
seafood, meat and poultry, alcoholic beverages, and dairy were reviewed. This 
section summarises the information related to the sample of 580 cases of food 
fraud. The descriptive analysis was used to summarise information related to 
all influencing variables of FFV factors. These variables are product type, 
country of origin, detecting countries, year (reported and detected), type of 
adulterants, the weight of evidence, and food fraud incident types. The 
descriptive data for these factors is presented next commencing with Food 
Fraud Types.  
4.2.1 Food Product Types 
Table 4.2 shows the descriptive statistics related to seafood, meat and poultry, 
alcoholic beverages, and dairy reported by the USP FFD. The information 
related to each food product category, the geographical distribution of 
incidents for these products (based on both the produced country/country of 
origin and distributed country/detecting country), and analysis of time series 




Table 4.2: Total number of Food Fraud incidents based on food product types (from 
2000 to 2018) 
Product Number of incidents Percent 
Seafood 129 22.2 
Meat 162 27.9 
Alcoholic Beverages 161 27.8 
Dairy 128 22.1 
Total 580 100 
 
4.2.1.1  Criteria’s of Detecting Country, Country Of Origin, And Year for 
Seafood And Seafood Product Type  
Fraud incidents related to seafood and seafood products contained 22.2 
percent of all incidents studied in this research. The incidents were related to 
a broad range of fish products. Examples were shrimp, grouper, salmon, 
snapper, caviar, monkfish, haddock, catfish, cod and jellyfish. Figure 4.1 
depicts the geographic distribution of seafood fraud incidents detected 
between 2000 to 2018 provided by the USP FFD automated analytics. A 
considerable number of incidents related to seafood fraud were detected in 
five countries: USA (%34.1), UK (%11.6), Taiwan (%10.9), China (%9,3), and 





Figure 4.1: Geographical distribution of Seafood fraud (detecting country) 
Source: USP FFD (www.foodfraud.org )  
 
Figure 4.2 shows the country of origin of incidents of seafood fraud by 
the continents. As shown in Figure 4.2, most of the seafood fraud incidents 
originated from the Asia, Europe, and America continents. In Asia, most of the 
seafood incidents were originated from China (12.4%), Taiwan(10.08 %), and 
Japan (9.3 %). In America, most of the seafood incidents were originated from 
the USA (27.13 %) and in Europe, most of the seafood incidents were 
originated from the UK (12.4 %).   
 

















Figure 4.2: Seafood fraud incidents' country of origin by continents
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Figure 4.3 depicts the overall increase in the number of seafood fraud 
incidents detected over an eighteen-year period from 2000 to 2018. The 
number of seafood fraud incidents has increased from 5 incidents in 2002 to 
approximately 13 incidents in 2018. At the beginning of this period, the number 
of incidents showed a slight decline until the year 2007 but was then followed 
by rapid changes from 2007 to 2015 following a dramatic increase in 2016. 
The number of incidents reached its highest level of about 35 incidents in 2016 
before falling to about 13 incidents in 2018 
 
Figure 4.3: Seafood fraud time series 
Source: USP FFD  
 
4.2.1.2 Criteria’s Of Detecting Country, Country Of Origin, And Year For 
Meat And Poultry Product Type 
Fraud incidents related to meat and poultry products contained 29.7 percent 
of all incident’s studied in this research as shown in Table 4.2. The incidents 
were related to a broad range of meat products available for human 
consumption. Examples were pork, sheep, beef and mutton. Figure 4.4 depicts 
the geographic distribution of meat and poultry fraud incidents detected 
between 2000 to 2018 provided by the USP FFD automated analytics. A 
considerable number of incidents related to meat and poultry were detected in 





Figure 4.4: Geographical distribution of Meat and Poultry fraud (detecting country) 
Source: USP FFD  
   
  
Figure 4.5 shows the country of origin of incidents of meat and poultry 
fraud by continents. As shown in Figure 4.5, most of the Meat and Poultry fraud 
incidents originated from the Asia, Europe, America, and Africa continents. In 
Asia, most of the meat and poultry incidents were originated from China (21.6 
% ). In America, most of the meat and poultry incidents were originated from 
the USA (10.49 %). In Europe, most of the meat and poultry incidents were 
originated from the UK (19.13 %) and in Africa, most of meat and poultry 
incidents were originated from South Africa (6.79 %).   . 
 
1 0 2  
 
Figure 4.5: Meat and Poultry fraud incidents' country of origin by continents 
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Figure 4.6 depicts the overall increase in the number of meat and 
poultry fraud incidents detected over an eighteen-year period from 2000 to 
2018. The number of fraud incidents in meat and poultry products has 
increased from 2 incidents in 2001 to approximately 23 incidents in 2018. At 
the beginning of this period, the number of incidents remained stable until the 
year 2009 but was then followed by rapid changes from 2009 to 2018. The 
number of incidents reached its highest level to 24 incidents in 2016. 
 
Figure 4.6: Meat and Poultry fraud time series 
Source: USP FFD  
 
4.2.1.3 Criteria’s Of Detecting Country, Country Of Origin, And Year For 
Alcoholic Beverages Product Type 
Incidents related to alcoholic beverages contained 27.8 percent of all incident’s 
studied in this research as shown in Table 4.2. The alcoholic beverage 
category included Vodka, Wine, Gin, Beer and Tequila. Figure 4.7 depicts the 
geographic distribution of incidents of fraud related to alcoholic beverages 
between 2000 to 2018 provided by the USP FFD automated analytics. A 
considerable number of incidents relating to Alcoholic Beverages fraud were 
detected in four countries: the UK (%15.5). China (%13), India (%9.9), and 





Figure 4.7: Geographical distribution of Alcoholic Beverages fraud (detecting country) 
Source: USP FFD  
 
Figure 4.8 shows the country of origin of incidents of alcoholic 
Beverages fraud by continents. As shown in Figure 4.8, most of the alcoholic 
Beverages fraud incidents originated from the Asia and Europe continents In 
Asia, most of the alcoholic Beverage incidents were originated from 
China(13.67 %) and India (9.94 %). In Europe, most of the alcoholic Beverage 
incidents were originated from the UK (12.42 %) and Italy (9.32 %).  
 
 


















Figure 4.8: Alcoholic Beverages fraud incidents' country of origin by continents
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Figure 4.9 depicts the overall increase in the number of fraud incidents 
related to alcoholic beverages over an eighteen-year period from 2000 to 
2018. The number of fraud incidents has increased from about 3 incidents in 
2002 to 20 incidents in 2018. At the beginning of this period, the number of 
incidents showed a slight decline until the year 2008 but was then followed by 
a gradual increase from 2008 to 2012. Then the number of incidents started to 
change rapidly from 2013 and reached the highest point of about 28 incidents 
in 2017.  
 
Figure 4.9: Alcoholic Beverages fraud time series 
Source: USP FFD  
 
4.2.1.4 Criteria’s Of Detecting Country, Country Of Origin, And Year For 
Dairy Product Type 
Incidents related to Dairy products contained 27.8 percent of all incident’s 
studied in this research as shown in Table 4.2. The Dairy product category 
included milk, infant formula, cheese, butter, khoa, ice cream and ghee. Figure 
4.10 depicts the geographic distribution of incidents of fraud related to Dairy 
products between 2000 to 2018 provided by the USP FFD automated 
analytics. As can be seen, A considerable number of incidents related to Dairy 
products were detected in five countries: India (%48.4), China (%14.8), USA 






Figure 4.10: Geographical distribution of Dairy fraud (detecting country) 
Source: USP FFD  
  
The country of origin of incidents of Dairy fraud by continents is shown 
in Figure 4.11. As shown in Figure 4.11, most of the Dairy fraud originated from 
the Asia, and America continents. In Asia, most of dairy incidents were 
originated from India (48.44 %), China (12.5 %), and Pakistan (6.25 %). In 
America, most of the dairy  incidents were originated from the USA ( 7.3%).  





















Figure 4.12 depicts the overall increase in the number of fraud incidents 
related to Dairy products in an eighteen-year period from 2000 to 2018. The 
number of fraud incidents has been increased from about 2 incidents in 2004 
to 19 incidents in 2018. At the beginning of this period, the number of incidents 
remained stable (with slight fluctuations) until the year 2008 but was then 
followed by a rapid increase from 2008 to 2012. Then the number of incidents 
started to fluctuate from 2012 to 2018 and reached the highest point of about 
19 incidents in 2018. 
 
Figure 4.12: Dairy fraud time series 
 
4.2.2 Criteria of Food Fraud (FF) Incident Types 
As mentioned in chapter Two, this research characterised food fraud incident 
types according to the USP Food Fraud Database (FFD). These types were 
all categorised by USP FFD into 15 sub-categories listed in Table 4.3. 
Descriptive statistics for food fraud incident types as well as examples related 
to each incident type are shown in Table 4.3. The majority of food fraud 
incident types were included dilution/substitution with alternative ingredient 
(ODS) (23.8%), Dilution or substitution with an alternate substance (DSAS) 
(22.6%), Fraudulent labelling claims (FLC) (22.6%), Misrepresentation of 
animal origin (MAO) (16.6%), and Other (22.4%). 
1 1 0  
 
 

























Fraudulent labelling claims FLC 1 3 1  4 4 9   
2 2 . 6  
‘ T h e  C a n a d i a n  F o o d  I n s p e c t i o n  A g e n c y  h a s  
c h a r g e d  C r e a t i o n  F o o d s  a n d  i t s  v i c e - p r e s i d e n t ,  
K e f i r  S a d i k l a r ,  w i t h  s e n d i n g  c h e d d a r  c h e e s e  
f a l s e l y  d e s c r i b e d  a s  ‘ k o s h e r ’  t o  J e w i s h  s u m m e r  
c a m p s  i n  J u n e  2 0 1 5  ‘ ( I n c i d e n t  I D :  2 7 9 4 5 1 )  
Dilution or substitution with an 
alternate substance (not food 
grade) 
DSAS 1 3 1  4 4 9  2 2 . 6   
‘ T h e  a u t h o r i t y  d i s p o s e d  o f  m i l k  o v e r  c o n t a m i n a t i o n  
w i t h  h a r m f u l  c h e m i c a l s ,  p o w d e r ,  u r e a  a n d  p o l l u t e d  
w a t e r ’  
Other/Dilution or substitution 
with an alternate ingredient 
ODS 1 0 0  4 8 0  1 7 . 2  ‘ I n  a  p o p u l a r  b a r b e c u e  r e s t a u r a n t  i n  C h a n g s h a ,  
c e n t r a l  C h i n a ' s  H u n a n  p r o v i n c e ,  d i n e r s  t u c k  i n t o  a  
s e l f - s e r v i c e  b u f f e t  o f  b e e f ,  m u t t o n  a n d  v e g g i e s ,  b u t  
n o n e  o f  t h e m  k n o w  t h e  b e e f  t h e y  a r e  e a t i n g  i s  
a c t u a l l y  d u c k  m e a t ’  ( I n c i d e n t  I D :  1 1 6 5 8 6 )  












9 6  
 
4 8 4  
 
1 6 . 6  
 
‘ A n  I c e l a n d  c o m p a n y  s o l d  l i n g  f i s h  ( a l s o  k n o w n  a s  
c a t f i s h )  a s  A t l a n t i c  w o l f i s h  i n  2 0 1 1  a n d  2 0 1 2  t o  
f o r e i g n  m a r k e t  ‘ ( i n c i d e n t  I D :  1 8 7 1 0 7 9 )  
Use of non-declared, 
unapproved or banned 
biocides (preservatives, 




4 7  5 3 3  8 . 1  ‘ P o l i c e  i n  C h i n a ’ s  s o u t h e r n  p r o v i n c e  o f  G u a n g d o n g  
h a v e  s e i z e d  $ 1 2 . 3  m i l l i o n  o f  p o t e n t i a l l y  h a z a r d o u s  
f r o z e n  m e a t  i n c l u d i n g  s o m e  r e p o r t e d l y  s o a k e d  i n  
b l e a c h ’ ( I n c i d e n t  I D :  6 5 6 5 0 )  
Misrepresentation of 
geographic origin 
MGO 2 9  5 5 1  5  ‘ A  T e x a s  s h r i m p i n g  c o m p a n y  p l e a d e d  g u i l t y  
T h u r s d a y  t o  r e l a b e l l i n g  3 5 , 0 0 0  p o u n d s  o f  h a r d - t o -
s e l l  M e x i c a n  s h r i m p  a s  w i l d - c a u g h t  A m e r i c a n  
c r u s t a c e a n s ’  ( I n c i d e n t  I D :  2 4 7 9 9 )  
Misrepresentation of varietal 
origin 
MVO 1 6  5 6 4  2 . 8  ‘ I t a l y ’ s  t r e a s u r y  d e p a r t m e n t  a n d  t h e  I t a l i a n  
a g r i c u l t u r e  m i n i s t r y  a r e  i n v e s t i g a t i n g  q u a n t i t i e s  o f  
c u r r e n t - r e l e a s e  w i n e  t h a t  m a y  h a v e  b e e n  m a d e  
u s i n g  b l e n d i n g  w i n e s  o f  i n f e r i o r  q u a l i t y  n o t  a l l o w e d  
b y  a p p e l l a t i o n  r e g u l a t i o n s ’  ( I n c i d e n t  I D :  1 3 3 9 8 )  
1 1 2  
 
Formulation of an artificial 
product through the use of 
multiple adulterants and 
techniques 
FAP 1 0  5 7 0  1 . 7  ‘ D o d g y  d r i n k s  a r e  b e i n g  s e r v e d  a s  h o u s e  s p i r i t s  i n  
b a r s  a n d  p u b s  a n d  s o l d  i n  i n d e p e n d e n t  l i q u o r  
s t o r e s  i n  t h e  c o u n t r y ' s  b i g g e s t  m a r k e t s ,  i n c l u d i n g  
S y d n e y ,  M e l b o u r n e  a n d  B r i s b a n e ’  ( I n c i d e n t  I D :  




MNC 3  5 7 7  0 . 5  ‘ T h e  M i n i s t r y  o f  H e a l t h  ( M O H )  o n  W e d n e s d a y  
r e c a l l e d  a  b a t c h  o f  b a b y  f o r m u l a ,  ‘ X i a n g  X u e  H a i ’  
w i t h  b a t c h  n u m b e r  2 0 0 5 0 1 1 2 ,  f o u n d  t o  b e  o f  
h a z a r d o u s l y  l o w  n u t r i t i o n a l  v a l u e .  S t o r e s  h a v e  
b e e n  o r d e r e d  t o  s t o p  s a l e s  o f  t h e  p r o d u c t  





Artificial enhancement of 
apparent protein content 
AEP 1 9  5 6 1  3 . 3  ‘ H i g h  l e v e l s  o f  m e l a m i n e  f o u n d  i n  t w o  b a b y  f o r m u l a  
p r o d u c t s  r e c a l l e d  t h i s  w e e k  m i g h t  b e  f r o m  a n i m a l  
f e e d ,  t h e  K w a Z u l u - N a t a l  h e a l t h  d e p a r t m e n t  s a i d  
o n  W e d n e s d a y ’  ( I n c i d e n t  I D :  2 4 5 7 4 )  
Artificial enhancement of 
perceived quality with colour 
additives 
AEC 1 1  5 6 9  1 . 9  ‘ T h e  f a k e  b e e f  w a s  f o u n d  t o  b e  a c t u a l l y  m a d e  f r o m  
p o r k ,  w h i c h  h a d  b e e n  t r e a t e d  w i t h  c h e m i c a l s  s u c h  
a s  p a r a f f i n  w a x  a n d  i n d u s t r i a l  s a l t s  t o  m a k e  i t  l o o k  
l i k e  b e e f ’  ( I n c i d e n t  I D :  1 7 3 9 2 )  
1 1 3  
 
Artificial enhancement of 
organoleptic qualities 
AEO 9  5 7 1  1 . 6  ‘ I n  a n  o n g o i n g  d e b a t e  o v e r  a c c e p t e d  w i n e m a k i n g  
p r a c t i c e s  i n  F r a n c e ,  t h e  B o r d e a u x  c o u r t  o f  a p p e a l s  
h a s  f i n e d  f o u r  c h â t e a u s  a n d  a  c o o p e r a g e  h o u s e  
m o r e  t h a n  $ 1 3 , 0 0 0  e a c h  f o r  a d u l t e r a t i n g  w i n e s  b y  
a d d i n g  w o o d  c h i p s  f o r  f l a v o r ’  ( I n c i d e n t  I D :  
1 0 2 4 2 3 7 )  
Removal Removal of authentic 
constituents 
RMVL 0  0  0  N / A  
 Other Other 1 3 0  4 5 0  2 2 . 4  N / A  
 
Unknown Unknown 6  5 7 4  1  N / A  
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4.2.3 Criteria of Weight of Evidence 
The weight of evidence related to each food fraud incident reported in the USP 
FFD was evaluated based on ‘scientific or legal documentation’ (USP FFD 
2018). For example, a highly documented incident like melamine adulteration 
of milk in China was assigned as High weight of evidence by the USP FFD. 
Medium or Low weight of evidence was associated with ‘incidents with only 
media sources as references, unsupported by associated regulatory or other 
documentation’ (USP 2018). Figure 4.13 shows that 16.72% of the incidents 
were categorised into High weight of evidence, 50% into Medium weight of 
evidence, and 33.28% into Low weight of evidence.  
 
Figure 4.13: Weight of Evidence 
   
4.2.4 Criteria of Type of Adulterants 
Adulterants were those substances used to adulterate the food products. 
Adulterants related to these 580 cases of food fraud were related to the main 
5 categories of additives, chemicals, counterfeit, species, and expired. 
Additives were those substances that were added to enhance the quality 
and/or weight of products. Examples were colour, water and oil. Chemical 
adulterants were those substances that were used to make the product look 
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fresh and nutritious (i.e. formaldehyde, melamine, methanol, etc.). Counterfeit 
types were related to those products that were either fraudulently claimed as 
‘products from defined provenance or production system’ (Van Ruth, Huisman 
& Luning 2017, p. 72) (i.e. organic) or their geographic origin were mislabelled. 
Adulterated species were related to products whose species were different 
from those they were supposed to be (i.e. Turkey meat as Ham). Finally, 
expired types were related to those products that were expired but were still in 
the human food chain. Table 4.4 shows the descriptive statistics for different 
types of adulterants.  
 
Table 4.4: Frequencies of types of adulterants 
Types of Adulterants 
Frequency 
Percent Yes No 
Additives  77 503 13.3 
Chemicals  193 387 33.3 
Expired  56 524 9.7 
Species  115 465 19.8 
Counterfeit  187 393 32.2 
  
  The above sections showed the descriptive statistics for the main 
influencing variables of FFV factors. The following section will present the 
result of Barrier Analysis techniques to identify the most common FFV factors.  
 Barrier Analysis Results (Sub-question 1) 
Chapter Two highlighted study by Van Ruth, Huisman and Luning (2017) that 
provides an overview of the most common and relevant factors that affect 
vulnerability to food fraud which was based on the Routine Activity Theory and 
within three classifications of opportunity, motivation, and countermeasure. 
These three categories and their sub-categories were described in detail in 
chapter Two. Chapter Two also described a lack of further studies analysing 
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these factors based on real data to assess FFV factors. Therefore, in order to 
assess FFV factors, Sub-question 1 aimed to identify factors impacting 
vulnerability to food fraud. The first task the present research had to 
accomplish was to undertake the Barrier Analysis technique to identify FFV 
factors.  
Sub-question 1: What are the factors that influence the vulnerability to 
food fraud for human food products? 
  Here, each incident reported in the USP FFD was carefully reviewed in 
order to find reasons why barriers or authorities (i.e. FDA, USDA, Federal 
Agencies, Trading standards, etc.) failed to detect food fraud events. The 
reasons/barriers were indexed into 13 dimensions (see Table 4.5). The data 
source related to each incident was based on more than 600 media reports 
documented in the USP FFD. All these factors were further grouped into the 
main Food Fraud Vulnerability factors (opportunity, motivation, 
countermeasures) according to the Routine Activity Theory and previous 
research (e.g. Van Ruth, Huisman & Luning 2017) (see Appendix A in the 
Appendices).  
1 1 7  
 
Table 4.5: Description of FFV factors 













Detection of adulterants requires advanced 
laboratory analysis (SSAFE 2016; Van Ruth, Huisman 
& Luning 2017) 
• Determining the identity of product species (e.g. 
cod from sutchi catfish) in restaurants, butcheries, 
etc., confirming the presence of chemicals like 
methanol or isopropanol in alcohol beverages. 
The advanced technologies can be an autopsy, 
DNA analysis, etc. 
 
The physical form of products: (1) Ease of alteration 
(SSAFE 2016) 
 
The physical form of products:  
(2) Nature of the product (BRC 2015) 
• ‘Composition of the raw materials can be 
modified by mixing with low-quality or foreign 
material (e.g. powders, ground meat, etc.) and by 
altering valuable food components (e.g. protein 
content)’ 
• ‘prepared ingredients such as beef mince or 
ground spices are likely to have a greater risk than 
the whole raw material ‘(BRC 2015) 
 
Availability of knowledge and technology to 
adulterate food products (SSAFE 2016) 
• ‘Simple/basic technologies and methods are 
available, and no specialist facilities are required, 
to adulterate the raw materials. The knowledge 
required for adulteration is generally available’ 
Supply chain complexity/ Transparency supply chain 
(SSAFE 2016; Van Ruth, Huisman & Luning 2017 
• The legitimate product, with the original 
packaging and labelling, are either stolen or 
bought (or even have been taken from garbage 
bin) and will be adulterated in the offender’s 
house or facilities. 
 
• ‘Fraud opportunities increase when potential 
fraudsters have legitimate access to the location 
in which the fraud can be committed, i.e. access 
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Opportunity in Time and space (Van Ruth, Huisman & 
Luning 2017) 
to the product, processing lines, etc.’ (Van Ruth, 








Corruption level of the country (Van Ruth, Huisman & 
Luning 2017) 
• High levels of corruption in a country increase the 
risk of fraud (SSAFE 2016). Examples are bribery 
of authorities, and corrupted inspections. 
 
The economic health of the business (country), 
financial strains (Van Ruth, Huisman & Luning 2017), 
Culture, the price spike 
• The economic condition of the country can 
motivate offenders to commit fraud (e.g. turning 
to homemade alcoholic beverages due to the 




Supply and Pricing 
• Economic pressures on raw materials can 
motivate offenders to commit fraud or 
• ‘When gaps exist between physical product 
availability and market demand (Manning & Soon, 
2014) and prices shift due to regional or global 
supply shortages (Moyer, DeVries & Spink 2017) 
fraud vulnerability will also increase’ (Van Ruth, 









Requires coordination between law enforcement 
agencies (Reilly 2018) 
• Detection and combating food fraud incidents 
require food control authorities and law 
enforcement agencies cooperate together. 
Examples of these cases are: (1) when combating 
fraud within international level (in all Europe for 
example), or (2) in case of tax evasion scheme that 
needs multi-agencies to coordinate, and/or (3) 
when there is a need in border regions to stop 
adulterated food reaching to customers. 
 













Extensiveness of Traceability 
• ‘traceability programmes relying on paper 
certificates and documents that can be easily 
falsified’ (Reilly 2018, p. 13) 
 
• Track and tracing system used in companies are 
reactive countermeasures instead of being 
proactive countermeasures (Ting & Tang 2014), or 
traceability technologies can be easily imitated 
(Ting & Tang 2014) 
 
• lack of an effective traceability system to track 
and trace sources (SSAFE 2016), track and trace 
the source of suppliers (SSFE 2016) 
 
• Lack of packaging and labelling in commodity 
products. 
 
Lack of law enforcement 
• No punishment although a violation of laws are 
apparent (Everstine, Spink & Kennedy 2013) 




Food safety (Reilly 2018, SSAFE 2016) 
• Detectability is based on food safety sampling and 
food quality not Food Fraud Vulnerability 
assessment (SSAFE 2016) 
• lack of definition of food fraud (Reilly 2018) 
Whistleblowing system (SSAFE 2016; Van Ruth, 
Huisman & Luning 2017) 
• Lack of a well-designed whistleblowing system 
(e.g. former employees that were sacked from 
companies are reporting fraudulent activities) 
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The results from the Barrier Analysis technique revealed that 
Opportunity factors account for 32.7 % of all incidents, Motivation factors 
account for 6.7 % of all incidents, and Countermeasure factors account for 46 
% of all incidents. The Unknown FFV factor category was related to incidents 
where there was no information provided (either unavailable or in other 
languages). Figure 4.14 shows the frequency of FFV factors by food product 
types as indicated in 580 incidents. The result from the Barrier Analysis 
technique revealed that the majority of incidents in Dairy products were related 
to Opportunity factors, while in seafood, meat, and alcoholic beverages 
countermeasure factors were dominant.
1 2 1  
 


















 From 580 cases of food fraud recorded in the USP FFD, 338 
cases/incidents were originated from 5 countries of USA, China, UK, India, and 
Italy. Incidents originated from these countries cover more than 50% of all 
incidents recorded in the USP FFD. Table 4.6 shows the number of incidents 
in each country of origin based on different product types and categories of 
FFV factors (opportunity, motivation, and countermeasures). In the opportunity 
category of FFV, US, UK, and India have the dominant number of incidents 
orderly in seafood, meat and alcoholic beverages, and dairy food product 
types. In the motivation category of FFV, UK and India have the dominant 
number of incidents orderly in seafood and alcoholic beverages food product 
types. In the countermeasure category of FFV, China has the dominant 
number of incidents in all four food product types of seafood, meat, alcoholic 
beverages and dairy. Next sections will describe each of these FFV factors 




Table 4.6: Frequency of incidents based on country of origin and FFV factors.  







1 3 0 10 23 37 
Meat 8 0 0 13 1 22 
Alcoholic 
 Beverages 
3 2 2 13 1 21 
Dairy 9 39 2 2 6 58 






Seafood 3 0 0 4 0 7 
Meat 0 0 0 1 1 2 
Alcoholic 
Beverages 
0 7 0 0 1 8 
Dairy 0 8 0 0 0 8 
Total 3 15 0 5 2 25 
Countermeasure Seafood 11 1 1 2 10 25 
Meat 25 2 1 15 13 56 
Alcoholic Beverages 18 4 9 4 4 39 
Dairy 7 7 1 0 2 17 





4.3.1 Opportunity (probability: 33%) 
4.3.1.1 Detection of Adulterants Requires Advanced Laboratory 
Analysis 
The need for advanced technologies to detect food fraud was identified as a 
potential Opportunity factor that increases vulnerability to food fraud. This is 
because ‘Fraud detection is impeded when analysis of raw materials requires 
advanced laboratory methods and facilities or if methods are lacking, which in 
turn provide opportunities for potential offenders to commit fraud’ (SSAFE 
2016). This factor was identified in all four types of food product (seafood, 
meat, alcoholic beverages, and dairy).  
In the seafood products, advanced technologies were needed to 
confirm or disconfirm the authenticity of the seafood species and presence of 
preservatives (e.g. formalin, ammonia, etc.). The challenge for authorities or 
even consumers was to identify seafood species mainly because ‘fish can be 
difficult to identify especially in fillet or other processed forms’ (Upton 2015, p. 
8). Therefore, the mislabelled/substituted species were detected only when 
advanced laboratory analysis was available to confirm the adulteration and/or 
substitution.  
‘…… DNA tests on several Casey's Seafood products purchased in Virginia, North 
Carolina and Delaware contained mixtures of Atlantic blue crab and some cheaper 
alternatives native to foreign waters’ (Incident ID:28451) 
 ‘…. the Consumer and Environmental Protection Unit of the Office of the City Attorney 
purchased advertised ‘lobster rolls’ from various sushi restaurants throughout San 
Diego, then sent them to a laboratory where DNA testing confirmed that no lobster 
was in fact in any of the rolls’ (Incident ID: 52904) 
‘…...sold him what he claimed was Russian sevruga caviar, but DNA testing proved 
it was not; the vast majority of the eggs came from American paddlefish, a protected 
species indigenous to the United States’ (Incident ID:36416) 
As mentioned in the above examples, DNA analysis was the most 
common methods for the detection of species’ adulteration/substitution. 
Another application of advanced technologies in seafood fraud detection was 
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to identify preservatives. Preservatives like formalin or ammonia are added to 
extend the shelf life of fish products or make them look fresh. Since these 
preservatives had no smell or colour, detecting the contaminated fish with 
formalin was difficult and often was undetected.  
‘……in absence of a proven testing methodology to detect the presence of formalin 
or ammonia several such cases went undetected’ (Incident ID:1135452) 
‘……The squad confirmed the presence of the preservative using a testing strip 
developed by the Central Institute of Fisheries Technology (CIFT)’ (Incident 
ID:1476705) 
In meat and poultry product types, advanced technologies were needed 
to identify meat species, determine the authenticity of processed meat 
products, and test for dye or preservatives. Most incidents in this category were 
detected in the restaurant or takeaways where customers could not see the 
package or origin of the dishes. Similar to seafood products, the substituted 
meat and poultry species were detected only when advanced laboratory 
analysis was available to confirm the adulteration and/or substitution. 
‘…. Food tests discovered turkey DNA in dishes that were supposed to be lamb’ 
‘…. tested 60 lamb takeaways from a selection of Birmingham and London 
restaurants and revealed that 40% of the meals were contaminated with other meats’ 
(Incident ID:158917) 
‘……An investigator at the agency, Pontus Elvingson, told the BBC that tests were 
still being done to identify the dye.’ (Incident ID:16467) 
‘…...The minced beef was found to contain DNA of pork, chicken, and lamb not listed 
on the label. The minced pork detected the DNA of beef, chicken, lamb, and a beef 
and lamb semi-kebab also found pork traces’ (Incident ID:22166) 
In alcoholic beverages, advanced technologies were mostly needed to 
detect excessive methanol in drinks. Excessive methanol in alcoholic 
beverages could lead to severe sicknesses, blindness or even death. Unlike 
other types of food products, excessive methanol in alcoholic beverages was 
detected only when consumers became sick (or died). Other applications of 
highly advanced technologies were to detect chemical additives (e.g. 
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isopropanol) or testing the level of purity of alcoholic drinks (for example 
measuring how much water was added to dilute alcoholic drinks).  
‘…. Laboratory tests found the deaths were caused by the high methanol level in the 
wine,’ Ly Sovann, a spokesman for the health ministry, told AFP’ (Incident ID:190178) 
‘…. Tests revealed they contained methanol, which is similar to but far more potent 
than ethanol, the alcohol commonly found in liquor’ (Incident ID: 597655) 
‘ …. Laboratory analyses detected deficiencies in following two cases: Hraběnka, dry 
white wine, lot No. 176, country of origin: Hungary and Hraběnka, dry red wine, lot 
No. 155, country of origin: Hungary. Presence of added water amounting to 66% was 
detected in white wine’ (Incident ID:38085) 
In Dairy products, advanced technologies were mostly needed to 
determine chemical adulterants. The adulterants in dairy products included 
unhealthy ingredients that were not for human consumption like formalin and 
urea, bacteria (food safety), gum, high alkalinity due to the presence of 
bacteria, melamine, detergent, ammonia, and listeria. Other applications of 
advanced technologies were to test the level of purity of milk products 
(confirm/disconfirm if they were diluted with water or not) or detect milk origin 
(e.g. from a dairy cow).  
‘….. PFA officials examined 40 containers of milk in Faisalabad today. They found it 
to be adulterated with formalin - a chemical used chiefly as a preservative for 
biological specimens - as well as urea, salt and water’ (Incident ID:132152) 
‘…… The State Public Health Laboratory has found the presence of gum in this 
delicacy which is an act of adulteration as per the provisions of the Prevention of Food 
Adulteration (PFA) Act’ (Incident ID: 29064) 
‘……. In 10 of the samples, high alkalinity was found, indicating the presence of 
chemical agents used to mask the addition of water and the deterioration of the 
product through the action of bacteria’ (Incident ID: 23203) 
4.3.1.2 The Physical Form of Product 
The physical form of the product was identified as a potential Opportunity factor 
that increased vulnerability to food fraud. Fraud detection could be challenging 
for authorities based on how easy the alteration/adulteration of the food 
product or physical form of products was. ‘Easy alteration of the composition 
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of the raw materials provided opportunities for potential offenders to commit 
fraud’ (SSAFE 2016). This could happen when the product was mixed (or 
minced) or processed (Donkey meat mixed with spices and sold as cow meat). 
This factor was detected mostly in the seafood and meat and poultry products.  
‘….. the production cost of the artificial jellyfish was less than half the cost of 
processing real jellyfish. In addition, less time is required to produce artificial jellyfish 
than is needed to process real ones’(Incident ID: 56929) 
‘……. The defendants had allegedly mixed their meat with spices to cover up the bad 
odour of the meat and sold it for 20 Egyptian pounds [about Dh13.6] per kg.... the vets 
says its kinda hard to know the different between the donkey's meat and the cow's 
meat’ (Incident ID:118699) 
‘…. The duck meat is ground into small pieces and mixed with a special red-color 
sauce, which makes it looks and tastes like real beef’ (Incident ID:116586) 
  
4.3.1.3 Availability of Knowledge and Technology to Adulterate Food 
Products 
The availability of knowledge and technology to adulterate food products was 
identified as a potential Opportunity factor that increases vulnerability to food 
fraud. Availability of ‘technology, methods and knowledge to adulterate/modify 
a certain type of raw materials provided opportunities for potential offenders to 
commit fraud’ (SSAFE 2016). This factor detected mostly in dairy products 
when either the adulterants were easily available with a low cost or simple 
methods with no specialist were required to adulterate the product.  
‘……used to buy empty packets of branded milk companies……They would then fill 
in adulterated milk in these packets and sell them (Incident ID:22960) 
‘……Further elaborating on the modus operandi, cops informed that the accused had 
devised two methods to adulterate milk packets. In the first method, they would tear 
open branded milk packets, and mix dirty water in them before sealing them with a 
stapling machine’ (Incident ID:16052) 
4.3.1.4 Supply Chain Complexity/ Transparency Supply Chain 
The supply chain complexity and/or supply chain transparency was identified 
as a potential Opportunity factor that increases vulnerability to food fraud. ‘A 
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complex supply chain that lacks transparency, with short-term/ad-hoc 
relationships, and no/limited information exchange provided opportunities for 
fraud’ (SSAFE 2016). This factor was the root cause of the incidents when a 
legitimate product with its’ original packaging and labelling was either stolen or 
bought (or even fraudsters grabbed them from garbage bin) and was 
adulterated in the offender’s house/ facilities and/or during processing the 
food. Examples of this factor occurred mostly in meat and poultry, alcoholic 
beverages and dairy products.  
A famous example related to meat products was the horsemeat scandal 
in the UK where processed beef (e.g. burgers) were mixed with horsemeat in 
the supply chain to mask the adulteration. In this example, processing the beef 
in different supply chains (Slaughtered in Romania where selling horsemeat 
was legal) had led to the incident. While the beef products had its’ original 
label, it was confirmed that horsemeat was found in many of these products.  
‘…. As horse meat was found in everything from frozen burgers to packaged lasagna, 
recalls of 50,000 tons of meat products were soon underway throughout Europe’ 
(Incident ID: 27425) 
An example in Alcoholic beverages was when the diluted product with 
its adulterants was detected during a supply chain inspection (e.g. van or other 
private vehicles as a means of transporting alcoholic beverages).  
‘……. Recently when a mini-auto coming to Visakhapatnam from Odisha was 
intercepted, liquor bottles were found along with those containing water and spirit. 
‘…...Inquiries by the police revealed that the traders are resorting to two types of 
adulteration—mixing either spirit or water after removing 25 per cent original liquor 
and replacing the brand labels’ (Incident ID: 54276) 
In Dairy products, incidents that categorised into this factor (supply 
chain complexity) were related to the detection of fraudsters during a midnight 
raid into unregistered houses. The fraudsters were using these houses to 
complete their fraudulent activities.  
‘……The Special Operations Team (east) of Cyberabad police on Wednesday busted 
a milk adulteration racket after raiding a house at Ghatkesar’….’The accused Barkha 
Ravi and Md Rasheed prepare a paste by mixing urea, milk powder and sunflower oil 
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by putting the material in a mixer, Inspector SOT, Narsing Rao sad’ (Incident 
ID:15234) 
‘…., an FDA team led by Food Safety Officers Manek Jadhav and Gopal Mahore 
carried out simultaneous raids at two residential apartments in Nutan Complex and 
Shanti Nagar area of Mira Road at about 6 a.m. on Friday’ (Incident ID: 15234) 
4.3.1.5 Opportunity in Time and Space 
The opportunity in time and space was identified as a potential Opportunity 
factor that increases vulnerability to food fraud. Vulnerability to food fraud 
increased ‘when potential fraudsters have legitimate access to the location in 
which the fraud can be committed, i.e. access to the product, processing lines, 
etc.’ (Van Ruth, Huisman & Luning 2017, p. 71). Fraud detection, in this case, 
was difficult and the fraudulent product was detected only through surprise 
visits. This is because fraudsters can dilute/substitute the product through 
legitimate facilities.  
 ‘…. raided a factory near Moonak and arrested nine people, who were making 
synthetic milk in the factory by mixing chemicals’ (Incident ID: 15229) 
‘…. Food inspectors seal facilities used to produce fake donkey meat during a raid in 
Hejian in China's northern Hebei province on January 9, 2018’ (Incident ID: 1386401) 
 Summary. Vulnerability to food fraud related to Opportunity factor was 
further indexed into 5 sub-categories of (1) detection of adulterants requires 
advanced laboratory analysis, (2) physical form of product, (3) availability of 
knowledge and technology to adulterate food products, (4) supply chain 
complexity/ Transparency supply chain, and (5) opportunity in Time and 
Space. The incidents with the Opportunity factor may occur due to one or more 
of the above five sub-category factors.  
  Figure 4.15 shows Opportunity factor related to four product types in 5 
country of origin of China, India, UK, USA, and Italy due to the fact that they 
cover more than 50% of incidents of food fraud. As Figure 4.15 illustrates, in 
Seafood products, opportunity factor was dominant in USA. In meat and 
alcoholic beverages, the opportunity factor was dominant in the UK. In Dairy 
products, the opportunity factor was almost  dominant in India.
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4.3.2 Motivation (probability: 6.7%) 
4.3.2.1 Corruption Level of the Country 
The corruption level of the country was identified as a potential Motivation 
factor that increases vulnerability to food fraud. Fraud detection could be 
impeded when the country had a higher level of illegal or immoral activities for 
economic gain. An example related to this factor was when fraudsters bribed 
police and authorities to bypass quality control inspection. Incidents in this 
category were mostly detected in Seafood, Meat and Alcoholic beverages. 
 ‘…. The fish were then routed by corrupt agricultural inspectors to avoid the usual 
controls, the statement said ‘ (Incident ID: 289925) 
‘…. Producers obtained the pigs by bribing government livestock insurance agents, 
several of whom were also sent for prosecution, it said’ (Incident ID: 13361) 
‘……. A shop owner who sold the homemade spirit for about 20 pence per 200ml has 
been arrested and an investigation has been launched into police officers who 
allegedly took bribes to turn a blind eye to concerns about the drink’ (Incident ID: 
25575) 
 
4.3.2.2 Economic Drivers  
The economic drivers were identified as a potential Motivation factor that 
increased vulnerability to food fraud. It is important to differentiate economic 
drivers with those mentioned as economic profit or economic gain for food 
fraud. All food fraud incidents were related to profit gain. This factor was related 
to those incidents associated with the economic health of businesses (or 
countries), financial strains, and price spikes. The economic driver factors 
were the root causes of all four types of food products’ fraud.  
Financial strains were identified in incidents where there were instances 
of companies or businesses facing high turnover.  
‘......These matters arose from a turbulent time for the Foyles of Glasbury business in 
the summer of 2016 with a high turnover of staff at that time’ (Incident ID: 588891) 
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The economic health of businesses was identified as a factor in times 
of global crisis or when the level of competition was high between companies 
(or companies’ branches). In a competitive environment, companies may try 
illegal or immoral activities to cut their cost and increase their profit.  
‘…. The fraud was detected during an internal investigation by the hotel chain, 
prompted by another chain, Prince Hotels, admitting that its expensive ‘domestically 
produced beef’…… ‘luxury establishments mislabelling ingredients appears to have 
started at the time of the global economic crisis in 2008, probably driven by a desire 
to reduce costs while still keeping prices high’ (Incident ID: 95420) 
The economic condition of countries was identified as a potential FFV 
factor in developing countries. This factor was mainly contributed to alcoholic 
drinks when poor people cannot afford to buy licenced drinks (liquor). 
Therefore, they started drinking homemade or illicit alcoholic beverages which 
may have a high level of methanol or other toxic chemical causing severe 
sicknesses or death.  
‘……Deaths from drinking illegally brewed alcohol are common in India because the 
poor cannot afford licensed liquor. Illicit liquor is often spiked with chemicals such as 
pesticides to increase potency’ (Incident ID: 136101) 
  The price spike was also identified as a motivation factor in Alcoholic 
Beverages. An example of this factor was when product price went up due to 
the rise in duties and/or decline of the country currency (where fraud was 
detected) against the dollar.  
 ‘…. liquor makers blame high duties for rise in bootleg booze…’ (Incident ID: 
1629449) 
‘…. IRNA says that as the nation’s currency plummets against the dollar, and the price 
of liquor rises, consumers increasingly turn to home-made alcohol’ (Incident ID: 
1629395) 
4.3.2.3 Culture and Belief 
The culture was identified as a potential Motivation factor that increases 
vulnerability to food fraud. Vulnerability to food fraud associated with 
motivation increased when there was a religious belief against consuming 
specific products. This factor was detected only in alcoholic drinks where some 
133 
 
countries’ religious cultures prohibited consuming alcoholic beverages (e.g. 
Iran, Pakistan, etc.). So, as there was no licenced liquor available in the 
market, people usually bought them from the homemade or illicit market.  
‘……many people illegally brew alcohol at home, and there have been several cases 
of mass poisonings in the past - in 2014 some 40 people died within a few days as a 
result of drinking tainted alcohol in Sindh’ (Incident ID: 132275) 
4.3.2.4 Supply and Pricing  
The supply and pricing factor was identified as a potential Motivation factor 
that increases vulnerability to food fraud. Vulnerability to food fraud associated 
with this factor increased when product demand exceeded its supply because 
of special occasions (e.g. Diwali), ban, and/or season supply shortages. This 
had happened mostly in alcoholic beverages and dairy products (i.e. where 
the grape harvest for making wines had shortages or during special festivals 
to deliver dairy products).  
‘…. During Diwali, consumption of sweets, milk and its products always increases 
making it the perfect occasion or the suppliers of adulterated ‘khoya’, ‘ghee’ and other 
milk products to get active. To check this, state officials have conducted random raids 
and checks at as many as 40 and odd places in the city within a week’ (Incident 
ID:14231) 
‘…. asked to provide evidence by video because the timing of the trial conflicts with 
the grape harvest’(Incident ID:13347) 
‘…. The action was taken on a priority basis as the supply of milk and milk products 
reach its zenith during the festive season, especially during Diwali. ‘Adulterated milk 
and its products are dangerous as it directly affects the health of its consumer’ 
(Incident ID: 14384) 
Summary. Vulnerability to food fraud related to Motivation factor was 
further indexed into 4 sub-categories of (1) corruption level of the country, (2) 
economic drivers, (3) culture and Belief, and (4) supply and Pricing. The 
incidents with the Motivation root cause may occur due to one or more of the 





Figure 4.16 shows Motivation factor related to four product types in 5 
country of origin of China, India, UK, USA, and Italy due to the fact that they 
cover more than 50% of incidents of food fraud. As Figure 4.16 illustrates, in 
Seafood products, motivation factor was dominant in the UK and China. In 
meat and poultry products, the motivation factor was dominant in the UK and 
USA equally. In alcoholic beverages and dairy products, the motivation factor 
was almost  dominant in India.
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4.3.3 Countermeasure (Probability: 46%) 
4.3.3.1  Requires Coordination Between Law Enforcement Agencies  
The need for coordination between law enforcement agencies was identified 
as a potential countermeasure factor that increases vulnerability to food fraud. 
Vulnerability to food fraud associated with this factor increased when detection 
of food fraud incidents required food control authorities and law enforcement 
agencies to cooperate. Examples were fraud incidences occurring in Europe 
that needed coordination of all European countries in acting against 
adulteration and fraudsters.  
 ‘They worked in co-ordination with Belgium, France, Italy, Portugal, Romania, 
Switzerland and the UK, Europol said in a statement’ (Incident ID: 390535) 
‘….The result of OPSON demonstrate what can be achieved to protect consumers 
worldwide when law enforcement agencies join their efforts and perform coordinated 
actions…. It is a threat which requires such cooperation…’ (Incident ID: 1528051) 
The need for coordination between law enforcement agencies was also 
detected in instances related to border rejection. International cooperation has 
helped the customs authority in the border region to detect fraudulent products 
and prevent them from entering the country.  
‘….As reported by The Namibian, the shipment was stopped as part of a larger 
International Customs Operation by The World Customs Organization. This nineteen 
Customs Organizations were targeting nineteens ports of entry as part of this 
Operation’ (Incident ID: 561485) 
‘….More than 18,600 bottles of counterfeit vodka were destroyed Monday after 
customs officers seized the goods before they entered the northern city of Tianjin……. 
Bath said the case also marked a positive progress on international cooperation to 
fight piracy and China's ability to prevent counterfeit goods from entering its border ’ 
(Incident ID: 142488) 
Furthermore, in serious and organised crime where fraudsters were 
carefully organised and were professional, joint efforts with multiple law 
enforcement agencies seemed to be crucial in identifying fraudsters’ ring.  
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‘….Taipei, April 28 (CNA) Police in Taiwan and China have joined forces to break a 
Chinese counterfeiting ring that allegedly produced and sold fake Taiwanese brands 
of kaoliang liquor in the southeastern Chinese city of Xiamen’ (Incident ID: 95223) 
4.3.3.2 Extensiveness of Traceability  
The extensiveness of traceability was identified as a potential countermeasure 
factor that increased vulnerability to food fraud. This factor was related to those 
cases of food fraud when there was a lack of traceability labelling system in 
the supply chain. Fraud detection can be impeded when there was no 
traceability system is in place. In this case, fraudulent products and/or expired 
products were identified when authorities became suspicions about a product 
with no necessary traceability certificate papers and/or technologies.  
‘…. Initially, the Spanish civil guard (La Guardia Civil) seized 10 tons of tuna for not 
having the necessary traceability for commercialization’ (Incident ID: 1528051) 
‘……discovered products including canned food, salmon and octopus that were up to 
three years past their expiry date’…some of which had no identification or traceability 
details’ 
‘…..60 boxes of shrimp weighing a total of 648 kg, all of them with suspicious labels, 
reports said’ (Incident ID: 868801) 
Another instance of this sub-category of countermeasure factor was 
when companies were using reactive control measures like holograms that 
could be easily counterfeited by fraudsters. Counterfeiting safety certificate 
was among instances where authorities were challenged to identify the original 
one as there were no differences between them. In addition, these reactive 
measures provided challenges for authorities to track and trace the product to 
understand its (country of) origin. These fraudulent products were detected by 
chance (mistakes and misspelling in the packages), bad smell (in alcoholic 
drinks), private detectives tracking illegal transactions, track and tracing 
smugglers, and close inspection of packages.  
 ‘…. The actions of Sea-Pac Ltd in disguising the traceability of the fishery products 
by fraudulently changing labels and documentation,’ said Aberdeen City Council 
commercial team manager Andrew Morrison, ‘had the potential to detrimentally 
impact on food safety of consumers as effective traceability is an essential part of the 
food safety requirements’ (Incident ID: 480706) 
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 ‘…. Prosecutors claimed that Chen received help from Hsiang Ting Kang Co (祥鼎康
), which is owned by Liang, to change the dates on the seafood products and sold 
them’ 
‘…accompanied by a falsified quarantine certificate. ‘It was night, and the duty person 
might not have noticed that it was a fake certificate’ (Incident ID: 100303) 
4.3.3.3 Lack of Law Enforcement  
The lack of law enforcement was identified as a potential countermeasure 
factor that increases vulnerability to food fraud. This factor was related to those 
incidents when authorities did little or nothing to protect consumers or there 
were no fines for fraudsters although a violation of laws was apparent (due to 
lack of evidence or laws). For example, when there were incidents of food 
fraud, authorities did not act until the media reported it. Another example was 
when cases of food fraud in court or in the preliminary investigation were 
abandoned as it was said that there was no supportive evidence or law to 
punish the fraudsters.  
‘….What was new, however, was the crackdown by low-functioning teams from city 
authorities and Uganda National Bureau of Standards. These teams didn’t act until 
media reports highlighted the breadth and depth of the illegal and potentially harmful 
practice……. But the quality controllers are doing little or nothing to protect 
consumers’ (Incident ID: 681928) 
‘……But when contacted by China Daily, the publicity department of the city said they 
had not heard anything about it’ (Incident ID: 17806) 
 ‘…. The show included footage of ICA employees putting labels with new expiration 
dates on packages of meat and reselling them in four different ICA stores.’…. Four 
separate preliminary investigations were launched, but three of the investigations 
were abandoned due to a lack of corroborating evidence ‘ (Incident ID: 36959) 
‘…..This is illegal, but we cannot punish them unless written records are found,’ he 
said’ (Incident ID: 13331) 
 
4.3.3.4 Food Safety  
Food safety was identified as a potential countermeasure factor that increased 
vulnerability to food fraud. This factor was related to those incidents associated 
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with unintentional or intentional contaminations with preservatives or banned 
chemicals. Detection of fraud related to these incidences was based on food 
safety detection methods as there was no food fraud protection plan in place 
(e.g. undertaking Food Fraud Vulnerability Assessment instead of HACCP for 
food safety management systems). These incidences occurred due to 
discrepancies between laws of importing country and exporting country about 
using preservatives (e.g. formalin) in food products, or lack of definitions of 
food fraud in some countries’ law and regulations.  
 ‘…….there is very little public health risk because there was such a low level of 
malachite green detected.’….’Stolt Sea farms won't be able to sell on Canadian 
markets the 310,000 chinook still swimming at the farm in question.’......’CFIA 
approval is needed even if Stolt wants to export all of the fish to countries that don't 
have a zero-tolerance policy for malachite green.’ (Incident ID: 68588) 
‘…USDA inspections send another shipment of Asian fish packing’Hopefully, before 
any vote they’ll have access to more than seafood import lobbyists. ‘.... They might 
start with an updated review of Oceana’s 2014 seafood fraud studies, which found 
fish fraud on every continent except Antarctica’ (Incident ID: 67436) 
‘….Nobody told us it was illegal,’ chief executive Francois Agussol said’ 13363 
‘….a NSW Food Authority inspection revealed discrepancies in the abattoir livestock 
and slaughter records at the abattoir, making it apparent that older animals had been 
processed and supplied to its customers as lamb’ (Incident ID: 19932) 
 ‘…. No authority has yet confirmed whether gelatin is harmless to humans’ (Incident 
ID: 17141) 
4.3.3.5 Whistleblowing System  
The whistle-blowing system was identified as a potential countermeasure 
factor that increases vulnerability to food fraud. The fraud incidents related to 
whistleblowing factor were detected only when current or former (sacked) 
employees reported the fraudulent activity to the relevant authorities. The 
fraudulent product could be undetected without such a reporting system.  
‘….one whistle-blower said: 'I looked at the ingredients and noticed it actually contains 
pork and beef.'I queried it with management, but they didn't care. Three months on 
and the menus still say beef lasagne, and waiters have not been told to warn 
customers’ (Incident ID: 127619) 
140 
 
‘…. The alleged misconduct, dating back to 2011, 2012, and 2013 Marlborough and 
Waipara sauvignon blanc and pinot noir vintages, was brought to light by a 
whistleblower, the Herald has learned.’ (Incident ID: 423125) 
‘….According to police, a senior employee disgruntled about being sacked tipped 
them off about alleged frauds in six wine-producing areas which included the Gironde, 
where Bordeaux is produced’ (Incident ID: 18183) 
‘…In August, the employee informed the capital’s health authorities, who sealed 425 
boxes of four tastes of ice cream and ordered the payment of a NT$1.2 million 
(US$39,550) fine’ 
Summary. Vulnerability to food fraud related to Countermeasure 
factors was further indexed into 5 sub-categories of (1) requires coordination 
between law enforcement agencies, (2) extensiveness of traceability, (3) lack 
of law enforcement, (4) food safety, and (5) whistleblowing system. The 
incidents with the Countermeasure factor may occur due to one or more of the 
above five sub-category factors.  
 
Figure 4.17 shows countermeasure factor related to four product types 
in 5 country of origin of China, India, UK, USA, and Italy due to the fact that 
they cover more than 50% of incidents of food fraud. As Figure 4.17 illustrates, 
in Seafood products, countermeasure factor was dominant in USA and China. 
In meat and alcoholic beverages, the countermeasure factor was dominant in 
China. In dairy products, the countermeasure factor was almost  dominant in 
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 Bayesian Network Modeling Approach 
The previous section addressed Sub-question 1 and provided a 
comprehensive description of factors relevant to vulnerability to food fraud. 
This section utilised findings from Sub-question 1 for assessment of FFV. A 
holistic model based on Bayesian Analysis techniques is proposed using 
SPSS Modeler 18.2. The following research questions were addressed and 
discussed in this section: 
Sub-question 2: How can the types of food fraud be used to assess Food 
Fraud Vulnerability factors?  
Sub-question 3: Which of the variables, known to influence the vulnerability 
to food fraud, are most important? 
Sub-question 2 investigated the impact of food fraud incident types 
(influencing variable) on FFV factors (Opportunity, Motivation, and 
Countermeasures). Sub-question 3 then explored all other known influencing  
variables and their impact on FFV factors. This section consists of three sub-
sections of Bayesian Model building, the effect of fraud incident type on the 
level of vulnerability to food fraud, and all other known important influencing 
variables.  
4.4.1  Bayesian Network (BN) Model Building 
A Bayesian Network was proposed using the records from the USP FFD. Table 
4.7 presents the input variables used to construct the BN model for 
assessment of FFV factors (the target variable), the types of measurement and 
the source of the input variable. The input variables shown with binary 
measurement categorisation (the type of fraudulent incidents; country of 
detection; and type of adulterant) were found to occur in the data base in 
multiple records.  Thus it was important to apply a binary code to each category 
within these variables to avoid multiple entries being recorded for a single cell.  
This resulted in the identification of 128 input variables for the Bayesian 
network. 
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Table 4.7 : Dependant (FFV) and independent influencing variables 
Variable Name  Data type/ 
Measurement  
Description Reference 
Record ID C a t e g o r i c a l /  
N o m i n a l  













h t t p s : / / f f d . d e c e r n i s . c o m / f f d -








C a t e g o r i c a l /  
N o m i n a l  
( 1 )  S e a f o o d  a n d  s e a f o o d  p r o d u c t s ,  ( 2 )  M e a t  a n d  P o u l t r y , ( 3 )  A l c o h o l i c  
B e v e r a g e s , ( 4 )  D a i r y  
Food fraud 
type 
C a t e g o r i c a l /  
B i n a r y / F l a g  
D S A I ,  O D S ,  M G O ,  U N B ,  M A O ,  M V O ,  M N C ,  F L C ,  D S A S ,  F A P ,  A E C ,  A E P ,  A E O ,  




C a t e g o r i c a l /  
B i n a r y / F l a g  










C a t e g o r i c a l /  
N o m i n a l  
( 1 ) A r g e n t i n a ,  ( 2 )  A r m e n i a ,  ( 3 )  A u s t r a l i a ,  ( 4 )  A u s t r i a ,  ( 5 )  B a n g l a d e s h ,  ( 6 )  B e l g i u m ,  
( 7 )  B r a z i l ,  ( 8 )  B u l g a r i a ,  ( 9 )  C a m b o d i a ,  ( 1 0 )  C a n a d a ,  ( 1 1 )  C h i l e ,  ( 1 2 )  C h i n a ,  ( 1 3 )  
C o l o m b i a ,  ( 1 4 )  C y p r u s , ( 1 5 )  C z e c h  R e p u b l i c ,  ( 1 6 )  E g y p t ,  ( 1 7 )  F r a n c e ,  ( 1 8 )  
G e r m a n y ,  ( 1 9 )  G r e e c e ,  ( 2 0 )  H o n g  K o n g ,  ( 2 1 )  H u n g a r y ,  ( 2 2 )  I n d i a ,  ( 2 3 )  I n d o n e s i a ,  
( 2 4 )  I r a n ,  ( 2 5 )  I r e l a n d ,  ( 2 6 )  I t a l y ,  ( 2 7 )  J a p a n ,  ( 2 8 )  J o r d a n ,  ( 2 9 )  K e n y a ,  ( 3 0 )  
K o r e a ( t h e  R e p u b l i c  o f )  ,  ( 3 1 )  L e b a n o n ,  ( 3 2 )  L i b y a ,  ( 3 3 )  L i t h u a n i a ,  ( 3 4 )  M a l a y s i a ,  
( 3 5 )  M e x i c o ,  ( 3 6 )  M o l d o v a  ( T h e  R e p u b l i c  o f ) ,  ( 3 7 )  M y a n m a r ,  ( 3 8 )  N e t h e r l a n d ,  
( 3 9 )  N e w  Z e a l a n d ,  ( 4 0 )  N i g e r i a ,  ( 4 1 )  P a k i s t a n ,  ( 4 2 )  P a l e s t i n e ,  ( 4 3 )  P u e r t o  R i c o ,  
( 4 4 )  R u s s i a n  F e d e r a t i o n ,  R w a n d a ,  ( 4 5 ) R w a n d a ,  ( 4 6 )  S o u t h  A fr i c a ,  ( 4 7 )  S p a i n ,  
( 4 8 )  S w e d e n ,  ( 4 9 ) T a i w a n ,  ( 5 0 )  T h a i l a n d ,  ( 5 1 )  T u r k e y  ,  ( 5 2 )  U g a n d a ,  ( 5 3 )  U k r a i n e ,  
( 5 4 )  U n i t e d  A r a b  E m i r a t e s ,  ( 5 5 )  U n i t e d  K i n g d o m  o f  G r e a t  B r i t a i n  a n d  N o r t h e r n  
I r e l a n d ,  ( 5 6 )  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  o f  A m e r i c a ,  ( 5 7 )  V i e t  N a m ,  ( 5 8 ) W o r l d w i d e ,  ( 5 9 )  
Z a m b i a ,  ( 6 0 )  A l l  E u r o p e ,  ( 6 1 ) N / A  
 
 







C a t e g o r i c a l /  
B i n a r y / F l a g  
A r g e n t i n a ,  A r m e n i a ,  A u s t r a l i a ,  A u s t r i a ,  B a n g l a d e s h ,  B e l g i u m ,  B r a z i l ,  C a m b o d i a ,  
C a n a d a ,  C h i l e ,  C h i n a ,  C o l o m b i a ,  C z e c h  R e p u b l i c ,  D e n m a r k ,  E g y p t ,  E s t o n i a ,  F i j i ,  
F i n l a n d ,  F r a n c e ,  G e r m a n y ,  G r e e c e ,  H o n g  K o n g ,   
I c e l a n d ,  I n d i a ,  I n d o n e s i a ,  I r a n ,  I r e l a n d ,  I s r a e l ,  I t a l y ,  J a p a n ,  J o r d a n ,   K e n y a ,  
K o r e a ( t h e  R e p u b l i c  o f )  ,  L a t v i a ,  L e b a n o n ,  L i b y a ,  L i t h u a n i a ,  M a l a y s i a ,  M e x i c o ,  
M y a n m a r ,  N a m i b i a ,  N i g e r i a ,  N i g e r i a ,  P a k i s t a n ,  P o l a n d ,  P u e r t o  R i c o ,  R u s s i a n  
F e d e r a t i o n ,  R w a n d a ,  S o u t h  A f r i c a ,  S l o v a k i a ,  S p a i n ,  S w e d e n ,  T a i w a n ,  T h a i l a n d ,  
T u r k e y  , U g a n d a ,  U k r a i n e ,  U n i t e d  A r a b  E m i r a t e s ,  U n i t e d  K i n g d o m  o f  G r e a t  B r i t a i n  
a n d  N o r t h e r n  I r e l a n d ,  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  o f  A m e r i c a ,  V e n e z u e l a  ( B o l i v a r i a n  R e p u b l i c  







h t t p s : / / f f d . d e c e r n i s . c o m / f f d -




Year C a t e g o r i c a l /  
B i n a r y / F l a g  
2 0 0 0  t o  2 0 1 8  
Weight of 
Evidence 
C a t e g o r i c a l /  
O r d i n a l  





C a t e g o r i c a l /  
N o m i n a l  
 
 
( 1 )  O p p o r t u n i t y ,  ( 2 )  M o t i v a t i o n ,  ( 3 )  C o u n t e r m e a s u r e s ,  ( 4 )  U n k n o w n  
( S S A F E  2 0 1 6 ;  V a n  R u t h ,  
H u i s m a n  &  L u n i n g  2 0 1 7 ;  
B R C  2 0 1 5 ;  R e i l l y  2 0 1 8 ;  
T i n g  a n d  T a n g  2 0 1 4 ;  
H o e c h t  &  T r o t t  2 0 1 4 ;  
M o y e r  e t  a l . ,  2 0 1 7 ;  
E v e r s t i n e ,  S p i n k  &  
K e n n e d y  2 0 1 3 ;  U S P  F F D ,  
M a r v i n  e t  a l .  2 0 1 6 )  
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Figure 4.18 shows the Bayesian Model Stream constructed by IBM 
SPSS Modeler version 18.2. The steps used to create this Stream were: 
1. Import the external source file as a “Source” node. 
2. Apply the “Partition” node to divide the dataset into a training and 
a testing set. Similar to studies by Bouzembrak and Marvin 
(2016) and Marvin et al. (2016) for the BN validation, the data for 
this research was divided into 80% training and 20% testing set 
to help evaluate the holistic model (validation).  
3. Apply the “Type” node to set the role of the variable, set the FFV 
factor field to “Target” and the remainder of the variables to “Input 
Variables” (except record ID which was set to Record ID).  
4. Exclude cases where the target had a null value using a “Select” 
node.  
5. Create two Bayesian Network models (Tree Augmented Naïve 
(TAN), and Markov Chain Model - with Maximum Likelihood 
parameter learning method) to identify which model will be more 
efficient in presenting the pattern of relationships between the 
variables.  This results in two model nuggets being generated. 
Figure 4.19 presents the results which show that the TAN model 
correctly identified 86.09% of the FFV outcomes compared to 
49.57% of the Markov model. Compare the two model nuggets 
by applying a “Filter” node and create a Gains chart and output 
analysis node to check the accuracy of the model for assessing 
the factors for food fraud vulnerability (Gains chart outputs 
shown in figure 4.20). Gains charts show the proportion of hits in 
each increment relative to the total number of hits in the tree 
using the equation: (hits in increment / total number of hits) x 100 
% (IBM Nd(a)). Figure 4.20 illustrates the result that the TAN gain 
(blue line) is far superior to the Markov model gain (red line) in 
assessing FFV. 
The BN was then constructed using SPSS Modeler 18.2. Two Bayesian 
Networks of TAN and Markov were selected in order to determine the most 
reliable holistic model (Chiroma et al. 2014; Elsayad & Fakhr 2015) Based on 
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the analysis result the TAN model was shown to be able to assess the 
vulnerability to food fraud with a higher accuracy rate of 86%.  The BN model 
was constructed with 128 input variables (or influencing variables).  From this 
model it was identified that some variables were more relevant when 
attempting to assess the vulnerability to food fraud.  In particular were the: the 
country of origin (76%); and type of food product (10%).  The predictor 
importance analysis result also showed that knowing the food fraud type does 
not play a role in assessing the vulnerability to food fraud in this model.  Finally, 
the predictor importance analysis for all variables known to play a role in the 
assessment of vulnerability to food fraud was conducted and the results 
provided in the form of Conditional Probability Tables (CPTs). These were 
provided in full in appendix B and C and summary extracts discussed in this 
chapter. 
1 4 7  
 
 
Figure 4.18: SPSS Modeler Stream 
 
1 4 8  
 
        






Figure 4.19 : Analysis result for TAN and Markov models 
Figure 4.20 : Gain chart result for TAN and Markov models 
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4.4.2 FFV factors and Food Fraud Incident Types (Sub-question 2) 
In order to initially determine the level of impact of FFV factors by food fraud 
type (Sub-question 2), food fraud incident types were selected as the only 
influencing variable and the Bayesian model was tested. The network (Figure 
4.21) shows FFV factors as a parent node (or target node). Figure 4.22 shows 
the ranking of the impact of food fraud incident type on FFV factors by the pre-
processing feature selection of the TAN (Bayesian Network) model. The 
predictor importance of the model suggested that FLC, MAO, ODS, OTHER, 
DSAS, in this order, were the most important variables for assessing 
vulnerability to food fraud. These results addressed the second research sub-
question.  
 
















4.4.3 Patterns of Relationships 
In order to answer the third research sub-question (Sub-question 3) 
determining the most important influencing variables of FFV factors 
(mentioned in Table 4.6), all input variables were selected as influencing  
variables and the Bayesian model was tested. Figure 4.23 shows the network 
between FFV factors and all the important variables and Figure 4.24 shows 
the predictor importance of the target node (FFV factors).  
The model suggested that the Country of Origin of the food products is 
the biggest influencer (76%) in assessing vulnerability to food fraud. The next 
variables important in this assessment were (in order): the type of food product; 
Counterfeiting (as a type of adulterant); China (as a detecting country); and 
fraudulent labelling (as a type of food fraud incident).   
These results mean that when the country of origin and type of food 
product is known, we have a greater ability to more accurately assess the 
vulnerability to food fraud for those products.  In addition, the model suggests 
that food products are more likely to be vulnerable to counterfeiting than other 
types of adulterant.  Finally, these results suggest that most incidents of food 
fraud (as recorded in these international databases) have been detected in 
China and that fraudulent labelling is the most often type of food fraud 
detected.  Examples of how these variables can be further be used to assess 
the vulnerability to food fraud in a practical way, are shown through creation of 




















Table 4.8 shows an extract from the Conditional Probability Table (CPT) for 
the influencing variable, Country of Origin (full table provided in Appendix B).  
When interpreting this table only results above 0.50 were considered.  Thus, 
the table shows three combinations of conditions that assist in the 
understanding of the factors that contribute to a high probability of vulnerability 
for food fraud when we know the country of origin for the food.  These 
combinations are: 
1. Alcoholic Beverages (food product type) are most vulnerable to food 
fraud motivated by the desire for economic gain, or as a result of 
cultural influences (MOTIVATION), when those beverages originate 
from India (see red cells). 
2. Dairy products (food product type) are most vulnerable to food fraud as 
a result of complex supply chains (OPPORTUNITY) when they 
originate from India (see the cell in light red); and 
3. Seafood products (food product type) are most vulnerable to food fraud 
as a result of lack advanced laboratory testing for detection of fraud 




Table 4.8 : Extract from CPT for the country of origin (Full table provided in appendix B) 
Parents Conditional Probability Table- Country of Origin 




Opportunity 0.07 0.5 
Motivation 0 0 
Countermeasure 0.02 0.16 
Unknown 0.09 0.18 
 
 
Meat and Poultry 
Opportunity 0 0.03 
Motivation 0 0.17 
Countermeasure 0.02 0.12 




Opportunity 0.05 0.03 
Motivation 0.58 0.08 
Countermeasure 0.05 0.05 





Opportunity 0.58 0.09 
Motivation 0.8 0 
Countermeasure 0.27 0.08 
Unknown 0.32 0.04 
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Appendix C provides the full Conditional probability tables the other important 
influencing variables discussed earlier.  These tables show how the model 
can be used to assess the probability of vulnerability to food fraud when 
these factors are known 
 TAN Model Validation  
There were two ways to verify the validity of the TAN Network Model developed 
in this research. First, the data was divided to a training (80%) and a testing 
(20%) dataset by the Partition Node (see Figure 4.16). The TAN model that 
was constructed based on 80% (465 cases) of the total data collected from 
USP FFD was used to assess vulnerability to food fraud in 20% (115 cases) 
of the testing subset. The testing sub-set was selected randomly from the 
whole dataset. All variables (except FFV factors) were selected as input 
parameters in the TAN model to assess the vulnerability to food fraud. The 
TAN model can assess vulnerability to food fraud in 86% of the cases with a 
probability of more than 0.5 (see Appendix D in the Appendices).  
Second, the output of the TAN model was compared to the results 
previously addressed by other researchers. Marvin et al. (2016) developed a 
Bayesian Model to predict food fraud type in 91.5% of cases. These authors 
reported a similar result for predictor importance. They reported that country 
of origin was the most important factor (61%) in determining the type of food 
fraud. These authors used the BN model based on other databases (RASFF 
and EMA) to predict the type of food fraud and have used a number of food 
fraud drivers (or FFV) as predictors.  
Another study by Bouzembrak and Marvin (2016) developed a Bayesian 
Model based on parameters of the country of origin and product type that could 
predict food fraud type in 88% of cases. They reported similar findings related 
to the influencing variables, albeit that they did not calculate the influence of 







This chapter addressed the key findings based on the Barrier Analysis 
technique (Sub-question 1) and BN modelling approach (Sub-question 2, Sub-
question 3). This research had identified new FFV dimensions by reviewing 
the incidents of food fraud recorded in the USP FFD using Barrier Analysis 
technique. The new dimensions then were assigned to one of three existing 
FFV factors of opportunity, motivation and countermeasures as described by 
Routine Activity Theory. FFV factors related to the opportunity category 
captures cases of food fraud where detection of adulterants requires advanced 
technologies, changes to the physical form of product (e.g. ground, mince, 
etc.), availability of knowledge to adulterate the product, transparency of 
supply chain, and opportunity in time and space.  
FFV factors related to the motivation category captures cases of food fraud 
related to the corruption level of the country, the economic health of the 
business, financial strain, culture, price spike, and supply and pricing.  
FFV factors related to countermeasures capture cases of food fraud 
related to the need for coordination between law enforcement agencies, the 
extensiveness of traceability, lack of law enforcement, food safety, and 
whistleblowing system. Findings emerging from the Barrier Analysis technique 
in this study indicated that the categories of countermeasures (46%) and 
opportunity (32.7%) were most likely to be a factor when assessing the 
vulnerability to food fraud.  
 The BN was then constructed using SPSS Modeler 18.2. Two Bayesian 
Network of TAN and Markov were selected in order to determine the most 
reliable holistic model. Based on the analysis result the TAN model was shown 
to assess the FFV factors with a higher accuracy rate of 86%. The BN model 
was constructed with 128 input variables (or influencing variables) to assess 
FFV factors. Important influencing variables were then analysed and were 
described as the country of origin (76%), type of food product (10%), 
counterfeit type of adulterants (9%), and China (6%). The predictor importance 
analysis result also showed that food fraud type (Fraudulent Labelling Claim) 
was among the least important factor. Therefore, the result highlighted that 
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food fraud incident types does not impact on the level of FFV factors. In 
addition, the predictor importance analysis for all known influencing variables 
of FFV factors were described through Conditional Probability Tables (CPTs). 
The study is concluded in Chapter Five, which extensively presents findings of 
this investigation and focuses the theoretical and practical contribution 
produced by the research questions.  
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5 CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION 
 Introduction 
This study developed a holistic model to assess the level (degree) of 
vulnerability to fraud for food products targeted at human consumption. This 
study achieved the goal of filling research gaps in the food fraud literature and 
in providing practical contributions and suggestions for food production 
companies, border protection authorities, governments and quality assurance 
agencies (i.e. BRC, PwC, etc.) about ways to reduce the vulnerability to food 
fraud. This chapter explores the relevant findings developed from the main 
research question and three sub-questions and presents the theoretical and 
practical contributions from the research.  
This chapter begins by discussing the results and presenting the 
theoretical contributions for each of the sub research questions. The 
conclusions from each sub-question, will then be aggregated to address the 
overall research question which is: How can the vulnerability to food fraud for 
food products designed for human consumption be assessed? In addressing 
the overall research question, a revised research model demonstrating the 
value of the Barrier Analysis technique and the Bayesian Network modelling 
approach to assess FFV factors is also presented. The practical contributions 
of this research are presented next, followed by the limitations of the research 
and recommendations for future research. The structure of this chapter is 









Table 5.1: Chapter 5 structure 
Section Purpose 
5.1 Introduction Introduction 
5.2 Discussion of results and theoretical 
contribution for sub-question 1 
Summary of the classified FFV factors and 
theoretical contributions related to the new 
dimensions and insights added to FFV factors 
5.3 Discussion of results and theoretical 
contribution of Sub-questions 2 and 3 
Summary of important influencing variables of 
FFV factors and theoretical contribution related 
to Sub-question 2 and 3 
5.4 Theoretical contribution: A Revised 
Research Model (Main Research 
Question) 
A theoretical contribution towards development 
of a holistic approach to assess FFV factors  
5.5 Practical contribution  Practical implications of the research 
5.7 Limitation of the research What are the limitations of this research 
5.8 Recommendations for future research Insights for future studies 
 
 Discussion of Results and Theoretical 
Contribution for Sub-Question 1 
What are the factors that influence the vulnerability to food fraud food 
products designed for human consumption? 
5.2.1 Discussion of Results for Sub-Question 1  
Analysis of the data in relation to sub-question 1 was presented in chapter 4. 
This analysis identified new dimensions of Food Fraud Vulnerability factors 
that were previously obscured in the literature. These new dimensions were 
added to the three existing factors of Food Fraud Vulnerability namely: 
opportunity; motivation; and countermeasures (BRC 2015; SSAFE 2016; Van 
Ruth, Huisman & Luning 2017;) for further testing in relation to sub-questions 
2 and 3. Table 5.2 presents both the factors and dimensions with new additions 





Table 5.2: Overview of FFV factors based on Barrier Analysis technique 
results and the literature  
 FFV factors 










Detection of adulterants 
requires advanced laboratory 
analysis (SSAFE 2016; Van 
Ruth, Huisman & Luning 2017) 
Corruption level of the 
country (Van Ruth, Huisman 
& Luning 2017) 




enforcement agencies  
 
The physical form of 
products  
 
The economic health of the 
business (country), financial 
strains (Van Ruth, Huisman 
& Luning 2017). 





Availability of knowledge and 
technology to adulterate food 
products (SSAFE 2016) 
Supply and Pricing (Van 
Ruth, Huisman & Luning 
2017) 
Lack of law enforcement 
(Hoecht & Trott 2014; 
SSAFE 2016) 
Supply chain complexity/ 
transparency supply chain  
 Food safety (Reilly 2018, 
SSAFE 2016) 
Opportunity in Time and space 
(Ruth et al 2017) 
 Whistleblowing system 
(SSAFE 2016; Van Ruth, 
Huisman & Luning 2017) 
 
Opportunity for food fraud: The findings from the Barrier Analysis technique, 
which reviewed 580 cases of food fraud, identified two new dimensions for the 
Opportunity factor in relation to Vulnerability to Food Fraud. These new 
dimensions were: the physical form of products; and transparency or 
complexity of supply chains.  
Quality assurance standard setting organisations such as BRC (2015) 
and SSAFE (2016) had indicated that the physical form of products should be 
an important consideration when identifying opportunities to commit fraud. For 
example, when the physical aspects of a product were altered (e.g. beef is 
minced or chicken is dyed) and/or where it was combined with other 
components (such as in the case of spices) it could become almost impossible 
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to identify adulterated or substituted ingredients without sophisticated 
laboratory testing. For this reason, there have been no empirical studies to 
date that have included this dimension in their analysis.  This gap has been 
addressed in this study as a result of the empirical evidence provided.  Thus 
we propose to add this as a dimension to the literature. 
The second new dimension added to the opportunity for food fraud 
factor is related to the complexity and transparency of the supply chain. The 
Barrier Analysis revealed that when supply chains became complex they 
tended to also become less transparent, providing more opportunities for 
fraudsters to operate. Global supply chains were particularly vulnerable to this 
action. The database analysed in this study provided a number of examples of 
adulterated or substituted products sold in original packaging as a result of 
complex and opaque supply chains. The most famous case of this type of 
incident was the horsemeat scandal in the UK (2013).  
Motivation for food fraud: The results of the analysis of the Motivation for 
Food Fraud Vulnerability factor identified three new dimensions to be added. 
These were: the corruption level of the detecting country; the culture and 
religion of the detecting country; and the potential for price spikes due to 
currency fluctuations. The analysis revealed that when there was an increased 
tolerance and likelihood of corrupt business practices in detecting countries 
there was a corresponding increase in the motivation for fraudsters to act. In 
these cases, bribery was the most noted action and resulted in food fraud 
detection being impeded in the supply chain and/or in authorities passing the 
fraudulent products through borders without proper inspections.  
The culture and religion of the detecting country was noted as 
particularly apparent in some developing countries where there were strong 
religious prejudices against some products (e.g. sharia law against using 
alcoholic beverages in Pakistan, Iran, etc.). In these cases, the economic 
motivation for fraud was seen in products disguised or altered to avoid sanction 
or detection by fraudsters. This dimension had been difficult to study to date 
as it was often illegal in these countries to consume these products and thus 
consumers were reluctant to participate in conversations about the incidence 
of this fraudulent activity. The benefit of using the Barrier Analysis of 580 cases 
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of food fraud (as done in this study) has allowed this type of motivation to be 
identified and measured, further contributing to the food fraud literature. 
The final dimension to be added to the motivation for Food Fraud 
Vulnerability factor was the potential for price spikes as a result of currency 
fluctuations. As the literature review highlighted, the motivation for food fraud 
has always been based on intentional behaviour for economic gain. Therefore 
motivation to capitalise on price differences, or profit gain due to currency 
changes provided a new dimension to consider when considering vulnerability 
to food fraud.  
A good example of this dimension was noted in the case of Iran where 
adulterated or substituted homemade alcoholic beverage consumption 
increased because the currency plummeted against the dollar and people 
could not afford to buy the authentic product. In this case, fraudsters 
capitalised on the motivation to defraud consumers provided by the price spike 
due to currency fluctuations. 
Once again the literature relating to food fraud motivations had not 
identified this dimension specifically. Rather, scholars had focused on the 
impact of price differential generally as a motivation (Van Ruth, Huisman & 
Luning 2017; Silvis et al. 2017; Van Ruth et al. 2018). Thus, the addition of this 
new dimension was a further contribution of this study  
Countermeasures to detect food fraud: The Barrier Analysis revealed 
three additional dimensions for Countermeasures that are important in the 
determination of vulnerability to food fraud. These were: the requirement for 
coordination of law enforcement agencies; the extensiveness of traceability; 
and food safety. The incidents analysed in this study showed that where 
there was a lack of coordination by various law enforcement agencies and 
where this deficiency was known that this increased the vulnerability to food 
fraud. Thus, this study was able to conclude that when law enforcement 
agencies shared information about cases of fraud and cooperated across 
national and international borders, this was more effective as a 
countermeasure for deterring fraudsters.  
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The traceability of food products has been cited in the literature as an 
important countermeasure for food fraud (Silvis et al. 2017; Van Ruth, 
Huisman & Lunning 2017; Van Ruth et al. 2018). However, these studies 
largely dealt with reactive measures to be activated after a fraudulent activity 
had been detected. Measures such as holograms (e.g. organic certificates) 
and machine readable technologies can be counterfeited themselves (Ting & 
Tsang 2014) and have been shown to be not particularly effective as a food 
fraud countermeasure. Further, the lack of efficient traceability systems built 
into secure packaging and labelling by original companies have made it difficult 
for authorities to detect fraudulent products. This study has found that 
proactive countermeasures such as traceability systems like GS1 (including 
advanced information sharing system along the supply chain) are far more 
effective as countermeasures against food fraud.  
The final dimension to be added to the Countermeasure for food fraud 
was related to the food safety management systems. Barrier Analysis revealed 
that some incidents of food fraud were detected through food safety quality 
controls/ inspections. Quality assurance standard setting organisations such 
as SSAFE (2016) have indicated that an evidenced based sampling plan 
specifically for food fraud detection is an important for identifying 
countermeasures for Food Fraud Vulnerability (FFV) factors.  These sampling 
plans need to be in addition to any sampling that currently exists to detect 
issues of food safety.  
As sampling plans designed for food safety are not able to detect 
intentional root causes of food fraud (Spink & Moyer 2011), many incidents of 
food fraud have remained undetected. For this reason, there are no empirical 
studies to date that have included the effectiveness of food safety sampling 
practices in their Food Fraud Vulnerability (FFV) analysis. This study has 
addressed this issue by providing empirical evidence of the importance of the 
inclusion of an evidence based sampling plan designed to detect food fraud as 
a countermeasure in food supply chains.   
In addition to these new dimensions, the results of this study also 
identified new insights to the existing knowledge of other countermeasures that 
impact on FFV. These were: lack of law enforcement; and whistleblowing 
164 
 
systems. Quality assurance standard setting organisations such as SSAFE 
(2016) have indicated that law enforcement practices with low fines (or no 
fines) increased the vulnerability to food fraud and impeded fraud detection. 
As an example, when an illegal or fake product is present in restaurants, it is 
almost impossible for authorities to fine fraudsters because written records or 
evidence are usually required to make arrests or to impose fines. For this 
reason, there had been no empirical studies to date that have included this 
insight to countermeasure factors in their FFV analysis. This study added to 
the literature by including this empirical evidence and confirmed this inclusion 
through the analysis phase. 
The final insight to be added to Countermeasures for Food Fraud 
Vulnerability factors was the whistleblowing system. Previous studies and 
quality assurance standard setting organisations such as SSAFE (2016), 
highlighted the importance of improving the whistleblowing system for 
detection of fraudulent activities (SSAFE 2016; Van Ruth, Huisman & Lunning 
2017). However, the Barrier Analysis revealed a number of examples where 
former employees who were sacked or fired from their job and who then 
informed authorities about adulteration practices. The Barrier Analysis 
revealed that whilst improving a whistleblowing system as a countermeasure 
for vulnerability reduction was important in some companies, it was less 
relevant when dealing with companies who intentionally engage in food fraud 
crimes.  
In summary, this study has made substantial contributions to the food 
fraud literature through the application of a Barrier Analysis of 580 cases of 
real food fraud and these contributions are presented next. 
5.2.2 Theoretical Contribution for Sub-question 1  
Previous studies in the field of food fraud identified gaps in the literature related 
to factors affecting vulnerability to food fraud(Spink, Moyer & Peru 2016; Van 
Ruth, Huisman & Luning 2017; Van Ruth et al. 2018). According to the food 
risk matrix described by Spink and Moyer (2011) (see Figure 2.1), reducing 
the risk of food fraud requires a prevention strategy rather than an intervention 
strategy. The debate about how to best develop prevention strategies all 
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centre around the importance of being able to identify the root causes or 
factors that influence a product’s vulnerability to food fraud.  
The results from the analysis related to sub-question 1, address the gap 
in the literature, calling for greater insight about the factors that can influence 
the vulnerability to food fraud as evidenced from real data (Van Ruth, Huisman 
& Luning 2017; Van Ruth et al. 2018). In this study, a list of factors that had 
the potential to influence vulnerability to food fraud were initially developed 
from the literature (see chapter 2). The contribution of each of these factors 
was analysed using real data recorded by the USP Food Fraud Database1. 
Detailed classifications of FFV factors that emerged from the Barrier Analysis 
technique were presented in chapter Four.  
This analysis empirically confirmed that each of these factors did impact 
the level of vulnerability to food fraud, and further, that there were new 
dimensions for each factor that previously were not evident in the literature 
(see highlighted factors in Table 5.2). The analysis also identified new insights 
into the performance of the existing practices relating to countermeasures 
which further contributed to the literature. Finally, the analysis also revealed 
that in most types of food fraud, more than one dimension of vulnerability was 
evident making a further contribution to the literature.  
Building on the findings and conclusions from sub-question 1, sub-
questions 2 and 3 addressed gaps in the literature about relationships between 
Food Fraud Vulnerability factors and the variables that influence them. The 






1 As at July 2018 The USP Food Fraud Database is now called Decernis, however for the 
purposes of this thesis the original database name will be used. 
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 Discussion of Results and Theoretical 
Contribution of Sub-questions 2 and 3 
How can the types of food fraud be used to assess Food Fraud 
Vulnerability factors? 
and 
Which of the variables, known to influence the vulnerability to food 
fraud, are most important?   
5.3.1 Discussion of results for sub-question 2 
To address this sub-question a Bayesian Network model was constructed that 
included food fraud incident types as influencing variables and FFV factors as 
target variables. The relationship between food fraud incident types and FFV 
factors that emerged from the predictor importance analysis was presented in 
chapter Four. Whilst these results, provided evidence that three types of food 
fraud: Fraudulent Labelling Claims (FLC); Misrepresentation of Animal Origin 
(MAO); and Other Dilution/Substitution (ODS), were the most important 
influencing variables on Food Fraud Vulnerability factors, the accuracy of the 
TAN model was only 60.86% (see Figure 5.1). Thus, whilst this finding was 
interesting, it could not be used with a high degree of confidence or accuracy 
in assessment of FFV factors.  
Therefore other variables needed to be considered, which was done 




Figure 5.1: BN model analysis for food fraud incident type 
 
5.3.2 Discussion of results for sub-question 3 
To address this sub-question an additional Bayesian Network model was 
constructed that included all known food fraud influencing variables with FFV 
factors as target variables. The analysis aimed to identify the most important 
influencing variables for FFV factors (results provided in chapter 4). When all 
of the influencing variables were included in the TAN Bayesian Network 
analysis, the Food Fraud Vulnerability factors could be assessed with an 
accuracy of 86%. The predictor importance analysis showed that Country of 
Origin and Product Type, together, had the strongest influencing power for 
assessing Food Fraud Vulnerability factors.  
For example, if we know the Product Type (Diary) was being exported 
from a particular country - Country of Origin (India) the model developed for 
this study using data from the USP FFD would be able to assess which Food 
Fraud Vulnerability factors should be considered if seeking to implement either 
deterrents or detection strategies to reduce vulnerability to food fraud. In this 
example, when we apply the Bayesian network analysis, the Opportunity group 
of FFV factors is shown as being the most important. So exporters of this 
product type (Dairy) would need to focus on the dimensions and actions in the 
Opportunity group of FFV factors when looking to reduce vulnerability to food 
fraud activity if exporting their product from India. These results aligned with 
findings from other studies (particularly those of Marvin et al. (2016) where the 
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country of origin and type of food product were also shown to be more 
important than other factors in the assessment of food fraud incident types.  
In addition to Country of Origin and Product Type, the analysis also 
identified, three other predictor variables that contributed to the influencing 
power of the Bayesian network analysis. These influencing variables were: 
Detecting country – where the fraud happened; Types of Adulterants; and 
Incident Type. The predictor importance analysis showed that within each of 
these broad variable categories, more detail could be detected. For example, 
within the Detecting Country influencing variable, China was the most 
commonly cited country where food fraud incidents were detected. Within the 
Types of Adulterants category, counterfeiting was the most commonly found 
action and fraudulent labelling claims were the most commonly found food 
fraud incident type.  
Research by Berman (2008) cautioned exporters to carefully control 
and manage their food supply chains when engaging in the growing China 
market. Berman (2008) noted that when trading with China, counterfeiting 
issues were particularly problematic when it came to incidents of fraud. The 
results of this study support this cautionary advice, with empirical evidence that 
counterfeiting issues also feature more often in cases of food fraud in China. 
The results of this study found statistically that more food fraud incidents in the 
database used for the analysis, were detected in China than in any other 
country. The identification of Type of Adulterants and Incident Types as 
influencing variables of FFV factors was unexpected as this had not been 
previously suggested in the extant literature.  
5.3.3 Theoretical Contribution for Sub-question 2 and 3 
Previous research by Marvin et al. (2016) and Bouzembrak and Marvin (2016) 
had predicted food fraud incident types by looking at variables such as: the 
Year; Country of Origin; Types of food products; and other food fraud drivers 
(these are also known as predictor variables). The aim of these studies was to 
use these variables or factors to predict food fraud incident types. Whilst these 
studies made important contributions to the discourse in relation to food fraud, 
they did not explore the root causes of food fraud, which in turn would have 
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assisted in assessment of the vulnerability of various food processing practices 
and supply-chains to food fraud (Marvin et al. 2016).  
This study takes up this call from Marvin et al. (2016) to assess the root 
causes of food fraud to aid in the development of holistic models for Food 
Fraud Vulnerability. This was done by converting the Bayesian Network model 
into a dynamic model, which facilitated the understanding of the 
interrelationships between food fraud incident types and vulnerability to food 
fraud (Marvin et al. 2016). Using this modelling approach to investigate 
whether Food Fraud Vulnerability factors (once known – sub-question 1), could 
be assessed by food fraud incident type (sub-question 2) and/or by other 
known factors (sub-question 3) has addressed this gap in the food fraud 
literature and thus makes an important contribution to this body of knowledge.  
 The results of this study confirmed that Country of Origin, Product Type, 
Detecting Country; Types of Adulterants; and Incident Type were the most 
important variables in the assessment of Food Fraud Vulnerability. Whilst the 
identification of Country of Origin as a influencing variable of food fraud was 
suggested in the existing food fraud literature, this study provided empirical 
evidence to strengthen and validate this notion and thus made an important 
contribution to the discourse. In addition, the study also empirically identified 
other predictor variables that had not previously been evident in the literature 
and this finding has made additional theoretical contributions. 
 
 Theoretical Contribution: A Revised Research 
Model (Main Research Question) 
The food fraud literature reviewed in chapter 2, called for an empirically tested 
holistic approach to combating and preventing food fraud through the 
identification of areas of vulnerability (Lord, Flores Elizondo & Spencer 2017; 
Silvis et al. 2017; Spink & Moyer 2011; Spink et al. 2017; Van Ruth, Huisman 
& Luning 2017). Taking up this call, this study adopted a holistic approach to 
the assessment of FFV factors, linking all of the influencing variables and their 
dependencies.  The Bayesian modelling approach adopted in this study used 
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real data from internationally reported cases of food fraud (e.g. USP FFD) to 
assess vulnerability to food fraud for different food types, from a range of 
countries and considering the three Routine Activity Theory classifications 
(Opportunity, Motivation and Countermeasures).   This is the first study to have 
adopted this approach to developing a holistic model for assessment of 
vulnerability to food fraud. In addition this model provides a useful tool for food 
production companies and exporters in the management of their supply-
chains. The holistic approach based on the revised research model (presented 
in chapter Two) is shown in Figure 5.2. 

















Step 3: Developing holistic 





Step 1: Initial incident review using the USP 
FFD 
Step 2: Identify FFV 
Factors 





FFV and Routine Activity Theory 
Figure 5.2: Revised research model 
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In order to assess vulnerability to food fraud, previous studies proposed 
that the best way was to initially screen, and review food fraud incidents 
recorded in an organised database (Spink, Moyer & Peru 2016) (e.g. USP 
FFD). This study added to the literature by reviewing 580 cases of food fraud 
from 2000 to 2018 related to four product types: seafood; meat: alcoholic 
beverages: and dairy products; recorded in the USP FFD. In addition to the 
initial screening of recorded food fraud incidents, this study adopted a Barrier 
Analysis technique in phase one to identify the root causes of vulnerability to 
food fraud. Through the Barrier Analysis technique, the Food Fraud 
Vulnerability factors were organised around the three classifications of the 
Routine Activity Theory: Opportunity; Motivation; and Countermeasures. The 
combination of Barrier Analysis and the Routine Activity Theory classifications 
has resulted in an effective way of identifying vulnerability to food fraud.  
 The Bayesian Network modelling approach was developed in phase 
two in order to test the existing theoretical assumptions provided by the 
Routine Activity Theory classifications and Barrier Analysis techniques. An 
algorithm consisting of two Bayesian Network models of Markov and TAN was 
developed using SPSS Modeler 18.2 Stream. Two Bayesian Models (TAN and 
Markov) were compared to find the most accurate model to assess the 
vulnerability to food fraud and to answer the research question for this study. 
Findings from the TAN model had shown that we could assess FFV factors 
with the accuracy of above 80% (86%) for food products.  
This study was the first to combine the Barrier Analysis technique with 
the Routine Activity Theory classifications in a model to assess Food Fraud 
Vulnerability factors and the strength of the results from the TAN model has 
provided evidence that this approach is robust. The contribution of this 
approach to the food fraud literature is significant as future researchers will be 
able to build on this model to assess vulnerability to food fraud in other product 
categories. 
 In conclusion, this study has provided empirical evidence that it is 
possible to assess the vulnerability to food fraud for a range of product types. 
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Once known, these findings allow food manufacturers and others to design 
detection and/or prevention strategies to reduce their vulnerability to food 
fraud. The study identified four key steps (shown in figure 5.2) to be followed 
to achieve this outcome:  
• Step 1: review previous cases of food fraud recorded in global food 
fraud databases (for example, USP FFD).  
• Step 2: identify FFV factors using Barrier Analysis techniques and 
organise these factors into the classifications as indicated in the Routine 
Activity Theory framework (opportunity, motivation, and 
countermeasures).  
• Step 3: develop a holistic model based on the extracted FFV factors 
and other variables addressed in this research; and  
• Step 4: determine proactive measures to combat the specified FFV 
areas.  
 
 Practical Contributions 
The result and contributions of this research will benefit food companies, 
border protection authorities, governments and quality assurance and 
compliance organisations. The study makes three practical contributions which 
are addressed next. 
 The first practical contribution of this study is for the managers of food 
production companies by providing them with guidance on how to guard 
against food fraud through the identification of specific areas of vulnerability. 
The revised model, presented in this chapter, showed that Country of Origin, 
Type of food product, Detecting country (e.g. China), Type of adulterants 
(counterfeiting) and Type of incident (Fraudulent Labelling Claims) are the 
most important predictors of FFV factors.  
 For example, the model shows that the level of vulnerability to food 
fraud will increase, when food is exported to China. In addition, if we include 
information about the Type of product and The Country of Origin into the 
model, we are able to gain more knowledge of the root causes of vulnerability 
and gain greater insights into which of the FFV factors will be most relevant. 
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Once we know this, we can eliminate or reduce the root cause of vulnerability 
through deployment of appropriate countermeasures and/or prevention 
strategies.  
 In order to break the cycle of fraud and minimise future vulnerability, it 
is important to deploy appropriate countermeasures. This study has shown 
that the Tan modelling technique will assist in identifying which vulnerability 
factors are most likely to be relevant for specific food types, which in turn, 
increases the likelihood of deploying the correct and most effective 
countermeasure. 
 The second practical contribution of this research is for border 
protection authorities. The holistic approach presented in Figure 5.2 can be 
further developed into a platform for these authorities to help assess the 
vulnerability to fraud for a range of food products for incoming (imported) food 
products, particularly if they know the country of origin, and/or type of food 
products. For example, based on the information provided in Table 4.8, the 
level of vulnerability to food fraud increases when the product type is dairy, 
and the country of origin is India. Therefore, border protection authorities for 
countries importing dairy products from India, might need to be more vigilant 
around issues of supply-chain sophistication.  
 The third practical contribution of this research is for governments and 
quality assurance and compliance agencies (e.g. PwC, SSAFE, etc.).  
Governments and standard-setting organisations should review their policies 
in relation to the detection and identification of food fraud to incorporate the 
new dimensions of vulnerability found in this research.  In particular, these 
policies need to be more prescriptive in defining what is and what is not 
fraudulent practice, which in turn will allow authorities to apply appropriate 
legal recourse to fraudsters.  Finally, systematic implementation of 
countermeasures, such as evidence based sampling to detect food fraud, will 






 Limitations of the Research 
There were two main limitations of this research. The first is temporal in nature 
and resulted in the research focusing on four categories of food fraud incidents 
rather than including all 16 categories provided by the data-base. The nature 
and time constraints of the PhD study program required a narrowing of the 
scope of the research to facilitate the rigour of analysis and to meet completion 
requirements. The full rationale for choosing four food fraud incident categories 
is outlined in chapter 3 and these incident categories represented more than 
half of all the cases in the database. Whilst this decision may have somewhat 
limited the applicability of the findings, the process, model and analysis results 
still provide valuable insights and contributions to food fraud researchers and 
food production managers. Once again this is an area that could be taken up 
by future researchers who may wish to compare these results against a wider 
range of categories to test the rigour of the model. 
The second limitation of this research is contextual in nature and refers 
to the boundaries of discovery inherent in this study. Specifically, deeper and 
richer understanding of the issues involved in food fraud vulnerability could 
have added to the results through insights from supply chain or food industry 
experts. These additional insights may have allowed more practical 
contributions of the study to be identified. In spite of this, the study’s strong 
empirical contributions to the literature through the results and the modelling 
approach, provide a valuable platform from which future researchers can 
extend the findings.  
 Recommendations for Future Research  
There are a number of further research recommendations that could be 
undertaken to advance research on FFV factors and their influencing 
variables. These practical recommendations are based on the previous 
limitations identified to ensure congruency and scalability of the current study. 
In terms of contextual boundaries of the study, future researchers could 
leverage on the already extensive insight of this study to further investigate 
other sub classification of FFV factors beyond the scope of the 4 identified. 
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Employing the Routine Activity Theory future researchers can sieve through 
other databases and discover new contextual classifications and re-run the 
model on these databases to enable consistency and validity of the initial 
findings (i.e. also in different food fraud cases). For example, this study has 
found that vulnerability to food fraud related to dairy product type has increased 
mostly due to the opportunity factor while in the other product category was 
due to the countermeasure factor. The identification of trends among different 
product types can lead to a better determination of countermeasures for a set 
of product types.  
 Linked to the previous recommendation, food fraud can be seen as both 
a temporal and spatial problem. As an example, horsemeat fraud cases was 
detected in the UK (2013) only after entering the retail market and consumed 
by customers. A suggestion would be to track the longitudinal extensiveness 
(forward and backward tracking) of the food fraud vulnerability incidents like 
the horsemeat incidents in order to determine the specific proactive measures 
that would have likely be imposed for the specific area of vulnerability.  
In the current detrimental case of coronavirus (also known as covid-19) 
outbreak (Shaheen 2020)at the time of writing) which had been linked to the 
consumption of tampered wild animals (, further suggestions provided in 
section 5.6 such as geographical mapping and sequential analysis could help 
track spatial and temporal sequence and patterns of multi-disciplinary nature 
of food fraud, supply chain management, counterfeiting, criminology, and 
business that can help governments take proactive precautionary measures in 
time to reduce the area of vulnerability related to each product type. 
Understanding that these measures are importance first line detection to 
identifying sources of legitimate food fraud cases which could be linked to 
bigger repercussions if not identified sooner 
 For example, branding and brand registration can help minimize the 
vulnerability to food fraud for product exported in a carcass form (for meat and 
poultry product type). This can also encapsulate the mobilization of halal 
certification on certain food types (from preparation to production) where 
incidents of such efforts can add to the early detection and classification of 
food fraud with more accuracy in the future. Databases hence need to be 
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updated with more stringent variables of significant protective measures such 
as this in order to accommodate these new classifications as these new 
variables could be in fact life-saving at its best. This will reduce the FFV factor 
related to the nature of the product when detected early.  
 Finally, methodologically the revised BN model constructed for this 
study can further be developed with new variables based on expert 
judgement or other data sources. For example, perhaps considering the level 
of hazard potential (direct risk; Spink & Moyer 2011) for each food fraud 
incident could add new insights to our understanding of how these variables 
interact.   Further behavioural models and expert interviews could help to 
construct a more robust holistic model which can periodically be updated to 
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1528051 ‘Initially, the Spanish civil guard (La Guardia Civil) seized 
10 tons of tuna for not having the necessary traceability 
for commercialization’......’The result of OPSON 
demonstrate what can be achieved to protect consumers 
worldwide when law enforcement agencies join their 
efforts and perform coordinated actions’, ‘It is a threat 
which requires such cooperation…’ 
Requires coordination between law 
enforcement agencies/ Extensiveness of 
traceability 
Countermeasure 
1476705 ‘The squad confirmed the presence of the preservative 
using a testing strip developed by the Central Institute of 
Fisheries Technology (CIFT).’....’We have been checking 
all the suspected stocks in the wake of recent reports on 
adulterated fish. In support of the drive, we have been 
given three testing kits containing the newly developed 
strips,’ said Mr. Jithinraj 
Detection of adulterants requires advanced 














1135452 ‘in absence of a proven testing methodology to detect the 
presence of formalin or ammonia several such cases 
went undetected, he said’…… ‘Drives would be held in 
check-posts as well as local markets. If the lab tests 
prove adulteration of fish, all stakeholders, including 
transporters, in the supply chain would be prosecuted. If 
required, the food safety department would seek the help 
of police also. The seized truck loads have been sent 
back to their points of origin for disposing,’ Shylaja said.’ 
Detection of adulterants requires advanced 




Detection of adulterants requires advanced 
laboratory analysis (SSAFE 2016) 
Opportunity 
973684 ‘Two out of 75 kinds of food samples were found to have 
illegal chemicals and dyes,’ he said. 





opportunity in time and Space/Nature of 
product, Detection of adulterants requires 




opportunity in time and Space/Nature of 
product 
Opportunity 
868801 ‘discovered products including canned food, salmon and 
octopus that were up to three years past their expiry 
date’…some of which had no identification or traceability 
details’ 
Extensiveness of Traceability (SSAFE 2016; 









794150 ‘The problem was discovered on March 8, 2018, after 
routine FSIS sampling results revealed violative levels of 
the chemical leucomalachite green in the products’ 
Food safety Countermeasure 
681932 This was confirmed by Wilfred Emeku, a veterinary 
pathologist at Makerere University. ‘If it can kill all 
organisms then it can also kill the consumer. It can cause 
damage to the digestive tract, right from the mouth to the 
lower parts. You would probably expect people to have 
symptoms like abdominal pain, vomiting, diarrhea and in 
severe cases even death. Formaldehyde, of course, can 
destroy human tissue, or even damage the nucleus of the 
cells and if this occurs, cancers can develop.’ 
Detection of adulterants requires advanced 
laboratory testing 
Opportunity 
588891 ‘Except that the restaurant had made a vital mistake. It is 
virtually impossible to legally buy salmon caught on the 
River Wye as Natural Resource Wales insists that ‘all 
salmon and sea trout must be returned with minimum 
injury and minimum delay’ to protect the fish populations 
of the rivers.’......These matters arose from a turbulent 
time for the Foyles of Glasbury business in the summer 
of 2016 with a high turnover of staff at that time 
Special product attributes, Financial Strains 




Special product attributes, Financial Strains 






Special product attributes, Financial Strains 




Special product attributes, Financial Strains 
(Van Ruth, Huisman & Luning 2017) 
Motivation 
289925 ‘…. The fish were then routed by corrupt agricultural 
inspectors to avoid the usual controls, the statement 
said ’ 
Corruption level of the country (Van Ruth, 




Corruption level of the country (Van Ruth, 




Corruption level of the country (Van Ruth, 








308648 ‘Taiwan has been hit by a wave of recent incidents where 
food producers and distributors forged labels in order to 
sell products way past their sell-by dates’ 
Extensiveness of Traceability (SSAFE 2016; 
Van Ruth, Huisman & Luning 2017) 
Countermeasure 
480706 ‘The actions of Sea-Pac Ltd in disguising the traceability 
of the fishery products by fraudulently changing labels 
and documentation,’ said Aberdeen City Council 
commercial team manager Andrew Morrison, ‘had the 
potential to detrimentally impact on food safety of 
consumers as effective traceability is an essential part of 
the food safety requirements.’ 
Extensiveness of Traceability (SSAFE 2016; 




303024 ‘ 60 boxes of shrimp weighing a total of 648 kg, all of them 
with suspicious labels, reports said’ 
Extensiveness of Traceability (SSAFE 2016; 




Extensiveness of Traceability (SSAFE 2016; 
Van Ruth, Huisman & Luning 2017) 
Countermeasure 
315389 ‘Federal criminal experts collected samples of the 
products for examination in order to prove the evidence 
produced with the apprehensions already made 
throughout the investigations’ 
Detection of adulterants requires advanced 
laboratory analysis (SSAFE 2016) 
Opportunity 
115077 ‘Trading standards are able to trace some of the sellers 
but often buyers pay in cash and don’t see the van that 
the sellers use.’ 
Extensiveness of Traceability (SSAFE 2016; 
Van Ruth, Huisman & Luning 2017) 
Countermeasure 
572342 The companies failed to pass food safety checks to enter 
the EU, according to the Rapid Alert System for Food and 
Feed (RASFF). 















Detection of adulterants requires advanced 







Lack of Law Enforcement (SSAFE 2016) Countermeasure 
202 
 
132219 Dr T K Shankar, head of quality assurance, CIFT, Kochi, 
said, ‘Food safety officers (FSO) from different parts of 
the state send samples of fish to check contamination in 
the institute’s laboratories. The reports are sent to the 
respective food safety authorities.’ 










Food Safety/Lack of definition of food 
fraudBorder rejection 
Countermeasure 
100303 ‘The Taipei District Prosecutors Office raided a site on 
Taipei’s Renai Road Thursday where they found 
evidence dating back to 2014 that dates had been 
changed on the products, which included three types of 
abalone from Chile’s Panamericana Seafood, ice fish 
and salmon.’.....’Prosecutors claimed that Chen received 
help from Hsiang Ting Kang Co (祥鼎康), which is owned 
by Liang, to change the dates on the seafood products 
and sold them.’ 
Extensiveness of Traceability Countermeasure 
100301 
 
Extensiveness of Traceability Countermeasure 
100299 
 
Extensiveness of Traceability Countermeasure 
96418 The problem was discovered on July 11, 2016, after 
routine FSIS sampling results revealed a violative level 
of the chemical gentian (crystal) violet in the product. 





95420 ‘The fraud was detected during an internal investigation 
by the hotel chain, prompted by another chain, Prince 
Hotels, admitting that its expensive ‘domestically 
produced beef’ had in fact come from Chile.’.....’luxury 
establishments mislabelling ingredients appears to have 
started at the time of the global economic crisis in 2008, 
probably driven by a desire to reduce costs while still 
keeping prices high’ 
Economic Health and Level of Competition, 




Economic Health and Level of Competition, 




Economic Health and Level of Competition, 




Economic Health and Level of Competition, 
Special product attributes 
Motivation 
90337 ECNS) -- Police in Jinan, capital of East China's 
Shandong province, have seized tons of turbot fish 
contaminated with banned drug furacilin, and arrested 
three suspects, dzwww.com reported on Monday. 
 
Furacilin has been banned as a veterinary drug by the 
Chinese Ministry of Agriculture since 2005 due to health 
risks that could lead to cancer and birth defects. 
Food safety, Lack of law enforcement Countermeasure 
71657 
 





71573 ‘Analysis showed the fish was actually Pangasius 
Hypophthalmus, a type of catfish known as the iridescent 
shark.’…..The market-town chippy that sold counterfeit 
cod shops have been able to get away with the scam 
because neither fish has a strong taste, and any 
difference is often masked by batter, salt and vinegar’ 
Ease of alteration, detection of adulterants 
requires advanced laboratory testing 
Opportunity 
71452 ‘The Times had the crab DNA tested by Bob Ulrich in 
USF’s College of Marine Science, the identification 
performed by PureMolecular’ 
Detection of adulterants requires advanced 
laboratory analysis (SSAFE 2016) 
Opportunity 
71220 ‘The meat was scooped out from a variety of lobster 
dishes and sent off to a lab, where DNA tests were 
carried out to see if there was anything fishy about the 
lobster’ 
Detection of adulterants requires advanced 




Ease of alteration- DETECTION REQUIRES 
ADVANCED LABORATORY TESTING 
Opportunity 
68861 Ito-Yokado, and the others are suspected of conspiring 
to falsely name the importer as Takayama Seafood Co., 
a fisheries wholesaler in Tokyo, and reselling the eel 
products to Yokoyama-based seafood distributor Yamato 
Foods Co. and others last year, the police said 
Extensiveness of Traceability (SSAFE 2016; 




68588 ‘However, Stephen said there is very little public health 
risk because there was such a low level of malachite 
green detected.’,,,,,’Stolt Sea farms won't be able to sell 
on Canadian markets the 310,000 chinook still swimming 
at the farm in question.’......’CFIA approval is needed 
even if Stolt wants to export all of the fish to countries that 
don't have a zero-tolerance policy for malachite green.’ 
Food Safety/Lack of definition of food 
fraudBorder rejection 
Countermeasure 
68286 ‘…..Kaohsiung, Sept. 14 (CNA) Kaohsiung authorities 
have seized more than 51 tonnes of expired and 
unlabeled food from two food companies in the city’  ‘The 
suspects allegedly sold the products to downstream 
vendors after replacing the original expiry date labels with 
new forged ones, the authorities said’....’The authorities 
seized 51 tonnes of frozen food products during the raid, 
including soft-shell shrimp, squid and lumpfish, as well as 
packing lists, sales slips, and inventory lists of the 
companies.’ 
Extensiveness of Traceability (SSAFE 2016; 




Extensiveness of Traceability (SSAFE 2016; 
Van Ruth, Huisman & Luning 2017) 
Countermeasure 
67436 ‘USDA inspections send another shipment of Asian fish 
packing’Hopefully, before any vote they’ll have access to 
more than seafood import lobbyists. ‘....They might start 
with an updated review of Oceana’s 2014 seafood fraud 
studies, which found fish fraud on every continent except 
Antarctica’ 







Extensiveness of Traceability (SSAFE 2016; 
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Extensiveness of Traceability (SSAFE 2016; 
Van Ruth, Huisman & Luning 2017) 
Countermeasure 
58088 where they changed the items' packaging and altered 
their production dates to evade taxes and avoid 
quarantine, Li Fudong of the QCD Anti-Smuggling 
Department told CCTV. 
Extensiveness of Traceability- Requires 
coordination between law enforcement 




Extensiveness of Traceability- Requires 





Extensiveness of Traceability- Requires 





Extensiveness of Traceability- Requires 
coordination between law enforcement 
agencies 
Countermeasure 
56929 the production cost of the artificial jellyfish was less than 
half the cost of processing real jellyfish. In addition, less 
time is required to produce artificial jellyfish than is 
needed to process real ones. 
Ease of alteration Opportunity 
56326 
 





Opportunity in time and Space Opportunity 
56019 
 
Opportunity in time and Space Opportunity 
52904 ‘ ...the Consumer and Environmental Protection Unit of 
the Office of the City Attorneypurchased advertised 
‘lobster rolls’ from various sushi restaurants throughout 
San Diego, then sent them to alaboratory where DNA 
testing confirmed that no lobster was in fact in any of the 
rolls.’ 
Detection of adulterants requires advanced 




Extensiveness of Traceability (SSAFE 2016; 
Van Ruth, Huisman & Luning 2017) 
Countermeasure 
51462 ‘CBC found empty cartons for frozen fish fillets imported 
from Kazakhstan in the Wildcat's garbage bin. The fillets 
are marketed as a cheaper substitute for pickerel’ 
Extensiveness of Traceability (SSAFE 2016; 
Van Ruth, Huisman & Luning 2017) 
Countermeasure 
50413 ‘Chinese food authorities have not been particularly 
active in pursuing the cases brought to their attention, 
according to interviews and news reports, and there is 
not even a consensus at which point in the production 
line the operation takes place’…..Such gel, the presence 
of which is not typically detectable upon superficial 
inspection, is injected some time between when the 
shrimp are caught and when they’re sold, in order to add 
weight and thus earn a greater profit. 
Lack of Law Enforcement (SSAFE 2016) Countermeasure 
36416 ‘sold him what he claimed was Russian sevruga caviar, 
but DNA testing proved it was not; the vast majority of the 
eggs came from American paddlefish, a protected 
species indigenous to the United States’ 
Detection of adulterants requires advanced 






Detection of adulterants requires advanced 
laboratory analysis (SSAFE 2016) 
Opportunity 
36076 ‘The problem was discovered on July 11, 2016, after 
routine FSIS sampling results revealed a violative level 
of the chemical gentian (crystal) violet in the product’ 





Requires coordination between law 
enforcement agencies 
Countermeasure 
31884 ‘state and U.S. authorities have begun to clamp down 
with inspections, DNA testing and even indictments’ 
Detection of adulterants requires advanced 




Nature of Product (BRC 2015), Easy alteration opportunity 
31321 The following day, at MKG’s customer’s business 
premises, FDACS inspectors found the same 54, ten 
pound cases, of the haddock observed on September 15, 
again bearing false ‘Product of the USA’ labels. An 
additional 20 cases of haddock were located in the 
customer’s place of business, also falsely labeled by 
MKG to conceal the origin of the product being China. 
Extensiveness of Traceability (SSAFE 2016; 
Van Ruth, Huisman & Luning 2017) 
Countermeasure 
31088 ‘Between June and August 2004, Universal Group 
purchased over 90,000 pounds of frozen fish fillets worth 
over $300,000 that was invoiced as ‘China basa’, a type 
of Asian catfish. Universal commissioned a cold storage 
facility to re-label the containers of the fish as grouper, 
and sold the relabeled fish to a national restaurant chain.’ 
Extensiveness of Traceability (SSAFE 2016; 







Extensiveness of Traceability (SSAFE 2016; 
Van Ruth, Huisman & Luning 2017) 
Countermeasure 
30990 ‘Selling farm-raised Asian catfish and Lake Victoria perch 
falsely labeled as grouper, selling foreign farm-raised 
shrimp falsely labeled as U.S. wild caught shrimp, selling 
shrimp they falsely claimed to be larger, more expensive 
shrimp than they actually were, and for buying fish they 
knew had been illegally imported into the United States’ 
Extensiveness of Traceability (SSAFE 2016; 



















Extensiveness of Traceability (SSAFE 2016; 




30667 ‘a scheme through which Platt oversaw the false 
repackaging and labeling of 1,500 pounds of frozen chum 
Salmon fillets. The fillets, which were ‘Product of China,’ 
were re-labeled as being chum Salmon fillets, ‘Product of 
Russia.’ In addition, Platt and Shifco pled guilty to a 
scheme to re-label more than a million pounds of less 
marketable shrimp from Thailand, Malaysia, and 
Indonesia, as being from Panama, Ecuador, and 
Honduras’ 
Extensiveness of Traceability (SSAFE 2016; 
Van Ruth, Huisman & Luning 2017) 
Countermeasure 
29852 ‘The falsely labeled shrimp was later sold by Alphin 
Brothers in interstate commerce to customers in 
Louisiana’ ‘Federal regulations require seafood retailers 
to provide customers with notice of the country of origin 
and the method of production, wild-caught or farm-raised, 
of shrimp and other shellfish. These regulations are 
known by the acronym COOL, which stands for ‘country 
of origin labeling.’’ 
Extensiveness of Traceability (SSAFE 2016; 
Van Ruth, Huisman & Luning 2017) 
Countermeasure 
29317 ‘Independent DNA testing’ confirmed that the largest 
Hispanic-owned U.S. food company made the switch, 
according to a complaint filed late Wednesday in the 
federal court in San Jose, California. 
Detection of adulterants requires advanced 
laboratory analysis (SSAFE 2016) 
Opportunity 
28451 at DNA tests on several Casey's Seafood products 
purchased in Virginia, North Carolina and Delaware 
contained mixtures of Atlantic blue crab and some 
cheaper alternatives native to foreign waters. 
Detection of adulterants requires advanced 







24799 ‘Garcia kept the shrimp in the same plastic crates but got 
rid of labels reading ‘Pollo Supermercado’ and other 
messages in Spanish. It shipped the crates to 
Brownsville, Texas, and slapped new tags on them, 
indicating the shrimp had been caught by a Texas shrimp 
boat, the Regio.Then the company created false bills of 
lading and sold the shrimp to a New Orleans-based 
distributor, according to U.S. Attorney Kenneth Polite’s 
office’ 
Extensiveness of Traceability (SSAFE 2016; 




Lack of Law Enforcement (SSAFE 2016) Countermeasure 
20363 Researchers at the University of South Florida tested 
restaurant and raw grouper samples from across metro 
Atlanta, using a new technology designed to quickly 
detect mislabeled fish ‘Paul and his partner, Dr. Bob 
Ulrich, invented a new genetic test that is designed to 
spot fish imposters in less than an hour, rather than 
several days needed for traditional DNA testing’ 
Detection of adulterants requires advanced 




Food Safety/Lack of definition of food 
fraudBorder rejection 
Countermeasure 
17806 ‘But when contacted by China Daily, the publicity 
department of the city said they had not heard anything 
about it’ 
Lack of Law Enforcement (SSAFE 2016), Food 
safety 
Countermeasure 
17788 ‘We will also conduct an internal test to re-check the 
products. Usually, we only make random checks,’ he 
said. 
Food safety Countermeasure 
17786 
 
Food safety Countermeasure 
212 
 
17741 ‘Indonesia's parliament blamed the Ministry of Health for 
failing to properly monitor food standards’ 






17357 The CFS spokesman said a warning letter was sent to 
the retailer involved. The agency is ‘collecting sufficient 
evidence for prosecution.’…..’CFS, a unit of the Food and 
Environmental Hygiene Department that serves the 
Special Administrative Region that governs Hong Kong, 
targeted formaldehyde in noodlefish in a recent targeted 
food surveillance exercise. 
 
Results showed that one of the 10 samples taken 
contained formaldehyde at a level of 600 parts per million 
(PPM). The test samples were collected from various 
retail outlets.’ 
Food safety Countermeasure 
17271 The exporter had ‘significantly impeded this proceeding 
by submitting information containing material 
misrepresentations and inaccuracies.’ 
Requires coordination between law 






17141 No authority has yet confirmed whether gelatin is 
harmless to humans 
Lack of Law Enforcement (SSAFE 2016), Food 
safety (lack of definition of food fraud) 
Countermeasure 
17022 N/A N/A N/A 
16910 seized four shipments of black eggs from Caviarteria 
after DNA testing said it was underrated, 





































Detection of adulterants requires advanced 
laboratory testing 
Opportunity 
16086 Some results were positive for chloramphenicol, and Mr. 
Odom issued an emergency order requiring tests of all 
Chinese shrimp and crawfish sold in the state. But Mr. 
Odom said he had also found traces of the drug in some 
boxes of shrimp labeled ''Product of Louisiana,'' meaning 
that somewhere along the line processors may have 
mixed foreign shrimp with the local catch. 
Food safety/border rejection Countermeasures 
214 
 
16079 ‘The test, conducted by Taiwan?s Eastern Television on 
Tuesday, showed the crab sample contained the harmful 
chemical chloramphenicol, Ming Pao Daily reported on 
Wednesday’ test will be done to all products imported 
from China 
Food safety/border rejection Countermeasures 
16070 Until recently, the sensitivity of the methodology to detect 
chloramphenicol in shrimp could find the drug down to 5 
parts per billion (ppb). Recently, Canada, and the 
European Union (EU), have refined their methods to 
detect even lower levels, and, have taken action on food 
products from China and Viet Nam found to be 
contaminated by chloramphenicol 
Food safety/border rejection Countermeasures 
15663 ‘….replaced sea bass with a cheaper oriental perch, then 
forged an email confirming it was the same fish’ 
Extensiveness of Traceability (SSAFE 2016; 




Detection of adulterants requires advanced 
laboratory testing 
Opportunity 
13363 Nobody told us it was illegal,’ chief executive Francois 
Agussol said. 
Food Safety/Lack of definition of food 
fraudBorder rejection 
Countermeasure 
13319 ‘The Sunday Mail can reveal that DNA testing of samples 
taken off shelves found that expensive fillets being sold 
as haddock were a different fish altogether’    ‘As a 
problem has been found in the smoked fish, it would be 
worthwhile carrying out DNA analysis on prepared 
uncooked meals claiming to contain a specific species.’ 
Detection of adulterants requires advanced 






Detection of adulterants requires advanced 




Detection of adulterants requires advanced 




Detection of adulterants requires advanced 




Detection of adulterants requires advanced 




Detection of adulterants requires advanced 




Detection of adulterants requires advanced 




Detection of adulterants requires advanced 




Detection of adulterants requires advanced 




1609906 ‘It came after trading standards officers visited the store 
in June last year, following a complaint, and found a 1kg 
sample of lamb actually contained 10 per cent beef as 
well as 23 food items past their use-by date. Collectively 
these items added up to over a year - 374 days - past 
their use by dates. Both the supermarket and Mr Iqbal 
had been cautioned before for the same offences’ 
Detection of adulterants requires advanced 
laboratory testing 
Opportunity 
1589639 ‘ The chemical which is purchased for KSh 650 for a 500 
grams packet is readily available in local agrovets and 
pharmacies’ 
availability of adulterants/ Detection requires 
laboratory testing 
Opportunity 
1529784 ‘A Grand Jury indicted Randal Hamby, a corporate official 
of the Atlanta-based Amigos Meat Distributor, June 26 
for conspiracy, forging an official device and mark, and 
the adulteration and misbranding of poultry products’.... 
‘He is accused of seeking a ‘technology specialist’ to 
create, manufacture, and print fraudulent labels that 
included the USDA mark of inspection’. 
Extensiveness of Traceability/ Food safety 
(inspection) 
Countermeasures 
1422102 ‘In three separate raids conducted over the course of a 
few weeks, officers found that individuals and companies 
were apparently tampering with seals and labels to 
extend the shelf life of expired food products’...... ‘This 
latest fraud involves taking expired food products that 
should legally be destroyed, altering their labels, and 
putting them back on the market’.........’ An inspection of 
the warehouse revealed ‘anomalous’ labeling, and signs 
that these had been tampered with, said Civil Guard 
sources. 







Extensiveness of Traceability Countermeasures 
1386401 ‘Food inspectors seal facilities used to produce fake 
donkey meat during a raid in Hejian in China's northern 
Hebei province on January 9, 2018’.....’That is the 
warning from authorities in China after a media 
investigation revealed that some butchers in a city famed 
for its donkey burgers had engaged in a nefarious plot to 
substitute donkey with cheaper meats’ 
Nature of Product (mixed/mince/burgers), 
Opportunity in time and space 
Opportunity 
1142822 N/A N/A N/A 
1059858 N/A N/A N/A 
913376 ‘On Friday, officers with the committee inspected the 
factory and found 340 kilos of beef meatballs, 25 kilos of 
pork meatballs and some ingredients, such as 60 kilos of 
tapioca starch flour, 125 kilos of Master Chef seasoning 
and other ingredients to mix with the meat.’........’ The 
committee said the business was operating without legal 
permission, adding that the location had no proper 
technical specifications or sanitary standards’ 
Food safety/ Lack of definition of food fraud/lack 




Food safety/ Lack of definition of food fraud/lack 
of law enforcement 
Countermeasures 
868799 ‘ police found a freezer with 30000 kilos of meat, some of 
which had no identification or traceability details’ 
Extensiveness of Traceability Countermeasures 
766007 
 





Food safety Countermeasures 
788492 
 
Extensiveness of Traceability Countermeasures 
655996 ‘ A man has appeared in court charged with selling 
mislabelled meat which falsely advertised the produce as 
British’...... ‘The charges included the sale of non-British 
meat under banners stating ‘Best British Beef, Best 
British Pork, Best British Chicken and Poultry and Best 
British Lamb’’...... ‘The food labelling system, announced 
by Defra Secretary Michael Gove, will showcase Britain's 
animal welfare standards coupled with a detailed country 
of origin label, and could be rolled out across 
supermarkets after Brexit’. 
Extensiveness of Traceability Countermeasures 
656002 
 
Extensiveness of Traceability Countermeasures 
656012 
 
Extensiveness of Traceability Countermeasures 
656018 
 
Extensiveness of Traceability Countermeasures 
681928 ‘What was new, however, was the crackdown by low-
functioning teams from city authorities and Uganda 
National Bureau of Standards.These teams didn’t act 
until media reports highlighted the breadth and depth of 
the illegal and potentially harmful practice’....’. But the 
quality controllers are doing little or nothing to protect 
consumers’. 
Lack of law enforcement/ Food safety (weak 






Lack of law enforcement/ Food safety (weak 
controls over food fraud) 
Countermeasures 
518940 ‘The country’s largest supplier of supermarket chicken 
suspended production at one of its main processing 
plants on Sunday in the wake of a Guardian and ITV 
News investigation that revealed poor hygiene standards 
and food safety records being altered’....’The food group 
said the problems related to food hygiene rather than 
regulatory breaches at the factory’. 
Food safety /staff needs training on food fraud 
and food safety compliance with law 
Countermeasures 
303110 ‘Upon inspection the Health Bureau of Taichung City 
found 1,674 boxes of frozen pig intestines without any 
expiration date labels, 333 boxes with the labels ripped 
off’ 





Extensiveness of Traceability/ Food safety 
(inspection) 
Countermeasures 
390535 ‘ They worked in co-ordination with Belgium, France, 
Italy, Portugal, Romania, Switzerland and the UK, 
Europol said in a statement’…...’ Microchips and 
documentation were modified by the crime group’ 
Requires coordination between law 
enforcement agencies / Extensiveness of 





390509 ‘The Ras Al Khaimah Police, in collaboration with the 
RAK Municipality, have busted a factory involved in 
manufacturing and selling expired meat’.... ‘‘The factory 
management proved to have manipulated the validity 
dates of their meat products by repacking them in new 
plastic bags and cans with revised dates, and offering 
them for sale,’ said Brig Menakhas’...... ‘The public health 
section of the RAK Municipality has an efficient 
cooperation mechanism with the RAK Police to crack 
down on all such crimes,’ added Brig Menakhas. 
Extensiveness of Traceability/ requires 
coordination 
Countermeasures 
309055 ‘He said it was almost impossible for farmers to know 
when restaurants are falsely claiming to be serving their 
products. 
 
‘In a lot of cases it comes from whistle blowers or strong 
supporters of our brand who bring it to our attention,’ Mr 
Jones said.’.......’I don't really know how we fix the 
problem long term because there is no one to police it, 
which is really frustrating,’ she said.’.... ‘In a lot of cases 
it comes from whistle blowers or strong supporters of our 
brand who bring it to our attention,’ Mr Jones said. 
Lack of law enforcement/Whistle blowing 
system 
Countermeasures 
317190 ‘It said the food consignment was seized by the Jordan 
Food and Drug Administration, and that those involved 
were arrested, noting the efforts of official and security 
agencies and the follow-up by the competent authorities 
to stop spoiled food from reaching the public and ensure 
food safety in the country’ 
Requires coordination between law 
enforcement agencies , Food safety 
Countermeasures 
287441 ‘but the nature of the products – hamburgers, meat balls 
etc – meant that the deception could only be uncovered 
through analysis in a specialised laboratory’ 
Nature of Product (hamburger)/ detection 




121424 ‘Buildings were dilapidated, in places open to the 
elements, the surrounding land is infested with rats and 
parts were covered with standing water which was 
contaminated with sewage.’ 
Food safety Countermeasures 
121420 
 
Food safety Countermeasures 
22770 The applicants had investigated the matter after a Samic 
employee alleged he had discovered in June that Orion 
had imported water buffalo meat from India and sold it to 
Frey’s Food Brands as AB/B grade beef. 
 
The informant, Tobias Lombard, a former Orion sales 
agent, had provided cellphone videos allegedly showing 
Orion employees using heat guns to remove the original 
labels from goods. 





Extensiveness of Traceability Countermeasures 
22760 
 
Extensiveness of Traceability Countermeasures 
22756 
 
Extensiveness of Traceability Opportunity 
22754 
 
Extensiveness of Traceability Opportunity 
22746 
 
Extensiveness of Traceability Opportunity 
22744 
 
Extensiveness of Traceability Countermeasures 
22737 
 





Extensiveness of Traceability Countermeasures 
22727 
 
Extensiveness of Traceability Countermeasures 
13437 
 
Extensiveness of Traceability Countermeasures 
262939 N/A N/A N/A 
128972 ‘We have sampled dishes from a number of takeaways 
across Gateshead to make sure the customer is being 
sold what is advertised on the menu. 
Detection of adulterants requires advanced 
laboratory analysis 
Opportunity 
213257 ‘Current and former employees of German pizza and 
pasta chain Vapiano told Welt am Sonntag that the 
restaurants regularly serve up discoloured noodles and 
change expiration dates on spoiling food.’........’Meats 
and vegetables were re-labelled, sometimes with 
extended expiration dates. These foods then ended up 
on the plates of customers, smelling peculiar’. 





Extensiveness of Traceability/whistle blowing 
system 
Countermeasures 
212910 ‘Federal Food, Agriculture and Consumer Protection 
Minister Horst Seehofer said in the Bavarian capital of 
Munich that the EU authorities had been informed, as 
there appeared to be a European dimension to the 
fraud’.... ‘German politicians are demanding action at 
European Union level’ 
Extensiveness of Traceability/ Requires 
coordination between law enforcement 




158917 ‘ Food tests discovered turkey DNA in dishes that were 
supposed to be lamb’ 
Detection of adulterants requires advanced 
laboratory analysis 
Opportunity 
213062 ‘The date labels have been forged, so that their real use-
by dates are extended by up to another twelve months’ 





Extensiveness of Traceability/ lack of law 
enforcement/food safety 
Countermeasures 
210798 ‘ bribing inspectors to allow rotten meals to be served in 
public schools and salmonella-contaminated meat to be 
exported to Europe’.... ‘ investigators said that employees 
at two food-processing giants, JBS and BRF, paid federal 
inspectors to ignore the adulteration or expiration of 
processed foods’...... Inspectors also falsified sanitary 
permits, and bribes were channeled to the Brazilian 
Democratic Movement Party of President Michel Temer, 
according to the authorities’.......’one more element that 
will add to the picture of political instability. 
(Inter)national corruption level Motivation 
210792 
 
(Inter)national corruption level Motivation 
165969 
 
Special product attributes Motivation 
130979 N/A N/A N/A 
224 
 
127619 ‘Speaking to The Sun, one whistle-blower said: 'I looked 
at the ingredients and noticed it actually contains pork 
and beef.'I queried it with management but they didn't 
care. Three months on and the menus still say beef 
lasagne, and waiters have not been told to warn 
customers.'‘ 
whistle blowing system Countermeasures 
123057 ‘because some of these people that roast chicken do mix 
them with vulture and customers will not know they will 
buy and eat. What a terrible thing.’ 
Nature of Product/mixed Opportunity 
122960 
 
Nature of Product/ Detection of adulterants 




Nature of Product/ Detection of adulterants 
requires advanced laboratory analysis 
Opportunity 
122912 ‘Evidence was found that rancid chicken that had turned 
yellow through putrefaction was bleached with chemical 
agents to make it look like healthy meat. Much of the 
boxed meat at the plant had begun decomposing before 
it was frozen. Rick Mason, head of food safety at Tower 
Hamlets, said the meat was destined for specialist food 
shops including halal butchers and Afro-Caribbean 
outlets.’ 
Extensiveness of Traceability/ lack of law 




Extensiveness of Traceability/ lack of law 






Extensiveness of Traceability/Food safety Countermeasures 
118807 ‘ Officers conducting a raid of the restaurant on 
Wednesday morning discovered caged dogs in the 
kitchen, a decapitated puppy in the trash and the owner 
himself in the process of decapitating and butchering a 
canine carcass, putting the meat in a cooking pot 
Samples of meat were also taken from the kitchen fridges 
in order to determine the origin of the meat. 
Nature of Product (carcass)/detection requires 
advanced technology testing 
Opportunity 
118699 ‘The defendants had allegedly mixed their meat with 
spices to cover up the bad odour of the meat and sold it 
for 20 Egyptian pounds [about Dh13.6] per kg.’...’the vets 
says its kinda hard to know the different between the 
donkey's meat and the cow's meat’ 
ease of adulteration/ Nature of Product 
(carcass), Detection of adulterants requires 
advanced laboratory testing 
Opportunity 
116586 ‘The duck meat is ground into small pieces and mixed 
with a special red-color sauce, which makes it looks and 
tastes like real beef’ 










Lack of law enforcement/Food safety Countermeasures 
100188 N/A N/A N/A 
94320 
 





Economic Health and Level of Competition Motivation 
88834 
 
Food safety Countermeasures 
75999 ‘Cericola Farms was the subject of allegations by its 
former director of operations, Vashti Dalipsingh, who said 
fraudulent labelling had been happening as far back as 
April, 2015.’.....’Ontario supplier charged with 
mislabelling chicken as organic- An Ontario poultry 
producer that supplied meat to some of Canada's largest 
grocers has been charged with mislabelling conventional 
chicken as ‘certified organic.’…..’They are also charged 
with violating the Organic Products Regulations, which 
sets strict standards for what types of products can be 
labelled ‘organic.’’ 















Nature of Product (whole chopped leg carcass), 





Ease of alteration Opportunity 
69794 
 
Ease of alteration Opportunity 
227 
 
65654 ‘But I just don’t understand, how difficult is it to implement 
the rule of law?’ 
Lack of law enforcement/Food safety Countermeasures 
65652 
 
Lack of law enforcement/Food safety Countermeasures 
65650 
 
Lack of law enforcement/Food safety Countermeasures 
63306 The arrests Monday followed an investigation by the 
Israel Police, Agriculture Ministry, and Health Ministry. 
Additional arrests were expected. 
 
Officials Monday confiscated 30 tons of meat, thousands 
of dollars in cash, and vehicles with secret compartments 
used in the scheme, which involved the cooperative 
efforts of Palestinian and Israeli smugglers. 
requires coordination between law enforcement 
agencies 
Countermeasures 
56555 ‘told the paper that fake duck blood was made from poor-
quality pork blood and might be mixed with formaldehyde 
and industrial pigment, which are harmful to liver and 
kidney’ 
Ease of alteration Opportunity 
56416 
 
Transparency supply chain/Nature of Product/ 




Lack of law enforcement/food safety Countermeasures 
54210 
 
Food safety/lack of law enforcement Countermeasures 
228 
 
54182 The factory had improved its conditions when the officials 
returned for a second inspection on August 5, and it was 
only fined 5,000 yuan for incorrect information on its 
ingredients, the report said. 
Lack of law enforcement/food safety Countermeasures 
54159 
 
Detection of adulterants requires advanced 
laboratory testing 
Opportunity 
51918 ‘They were prosecuted after tests revealed that ‘lamb’ 
mince was being bulked up with cheap cuts of beef 
before being sold on’…...’A sample pattie taken from a 
Trafford bakery was found to contain only 50pc lamb.’ 
Nature of Product/Detection of adulterants 
requires advanced laboratory analysis 
Opportunity 
51537 In a statement following the court ruling on Friday, the 
Food Safety Authority of Ireland (FSAI), which had 
investigated the company in conjunction with Meath 
County Council, welcomed the decision. 
 
The FSAI said the ruling was important for consumer 
confidence in the system. 
Food safety, Requires coordination between 









Extensiveness of Traceability/ /requires 
coordination 
Countermeasures 
36959 ‘The show included footage of ICA employees putting 
labels with new expiration dates on packages of meat 
and reselling them in four different ICA stores.’…...Four 
separate preliminary investigations were launched, but 
three of the investigations were abandoned due to a lack 
of corroborating evidence. ‘ 





36274 No information available for this report N/A N/A 
34495 
 




















Requires coordination between law 
enforcement agencies 
Countermeasures 
27425 ‘Overnight, investigators were testing in virtually every 
country for horse DNA potentially showing up where it 
shouldn’t be. As horse meat was found in everything from 
frozen burgers to packaged lasagna, recalls of 50,000 
tons of meat products were soon underway throughout 
Europe 
Transparency supply chain/Nature of Product/ 
detection requires laboratory testing 
Opportunity 
27179 N/A N/A N/A 
27024 The council's environmental health department, together 
with the Food Standards Agency, detected the illegal 
operation after an extensive and costly investigation. 










26786 Allemang of Clearwater, NE in January after federal 
inspectors discovered 300 pounds of sausages, 400 
pounds of beef jerky, bacon and deer meat in bags 
labeled as ground pork. The mislabeled meats had not 
undergone inspection by the U.S. Department of 
Agriculture, but still bore the USDA mark of inspection. 
Extensiveness of Traceability/food safety Countermeasures 
26777 
 
Extensiveness of Traceability/food safety Countermeasures 
26773 
 
Extensiveness of Traceability/food safety Countermeasures 
26024 The federal jury in Cedar Rapids, IA, found William B. 
Aossey Jr. guilty on 15 counts, including conspiracy, 
falsifying export certificates, and wire fraud. 
Extensiveness of Traceability Countermeasures 
25961 
 





No information is available for this Incident N/A 
25475 
 





Extensiveness of Traceability Countermeasures 
24975 
 
Lack of law enforcement Countermeasures 
231 
 
24965 ‘Jiangsu police said the illegal traders started operating 
soon after the ban was imposed, but were not discovered 
until earlier this year because of their cautious sales 
practice.’….They would take orders for the smuggled 
beef only by phone and dispatch a driver to deliver the 
beef after receiving money via bank transfer, police said’ 
Extensiveness of Traceability Countermeasures 
24384 
 
Extensiveness of Traceability Countermeasures 
24376 ‘The swindle was only detected by the Food Standards 
Agency (FSA) using new scientific techniques because 
the non-chicken material had been so highly processed 
it passed standard DNA tests.’....’When complaints 
began to surface again last year, the FSA launched a 
secret investigation to ascertain whether chicken – the 
most eaten meat in the UK – was being adulterated 
again. At first, scientists could not find any non-chicken 
protein because the meat had been ‘de-natured’ (made 
unrecognisable). The Central Science Laboratory in York 
and York University developed special DNA market 
tests’....’It's like Olympic drug tests; they stay one step 
ahead of the testers,’ said a source close to the 
investigation’......’Using a new DNA marker technique, 
the FSA tested five protein powders from three 
companies. All five were found to contain a non-poultry 
material identified as bovine collagen. Further tests found 
the presence of porcine material in two powders’ 





Extensiveness of Traceability Countermeasures 
23517 
 







Detection of adulterants requires advanced 
laboratory testing 
Opportunity 
23498 The Chinese branch of Wal-Mart super stores is issuing 
a recall of donkey meat products after some of it was 
found to contain fox DNA. 





Detection of adulterants requires advanced 
laboratory analysis 
Opportunity 
23371 Samples of meat were taken and sent to a laboratory to 
be analysed. 
Nature of Product/Detection of adulterants 
requires advanced laboratory analysis 
Opportunity 
23317 ‘…. said on Sunday that Husi, owned by OSI Group of 
Aurora, Ill., repackaged stale beef and chicken and put 
new expiration dates on them. It said they were sold to 
McDonald's, KFC and Pizza Hut restaurants’ 
Extensiveness of Traceability Countermeasures 
23313 
 
Extensiveness of Traceability Countermeasures 
23239 ‘One of the pieces of sausage tested, made by Aktual 
and supplied by Expo Foods, was found to contain the 
high levels of horsemeat’ 
Detection of adulterants requires advanced 
laboratory analysis /Nature of Product (sausage 
mixed) 
Opportunity 
22839 ‘accompanied by a falsified quarantine certificate. ‘It was 
night, and the duty person might not have noticed that it 
was a fake certificate’ 
Food safety/ lack of definition/ Extensiveness of 





Food safety Countermeasures 
22611 
 
Food safety Countermeasures 
233 
 
22293 ‘The case was prosecuted by Assistant United States 
Attorney Richard L. Murphy and Timothy L. Vavricek and 
investigated by the United States Department of 
Agriculture Office of Inspector General Investigations 
and Internal Revenue Service Criminal Investigations.  
‘......’As part of the scheme to ship misbranded meat 
products, USDA export documents were falsified and 
fake health certificates were generated by Midamar and 
ISA employees USDA, Food Safety and Inspection 
Service (FSIS) letterhead’ 
Extensiveness of Traceability (paper 
certificates), Requires coordination between 
law enforcement agencies 
Countermeasures 
22166 ‘ The minced beef was found to contain DNA of pork, 
chicken, and lamb not listed on the label. The minced 
pork detected the DNA of beef, chicken, lamb, and a beef 
and lamb semi-kebab also found pork traces’ 





Detection of adulterants requires advanced 
laboratory analysis 
Opportunity 
22095 ‘Bashas’ upper management became aware of the 
USDA’s investigation and cooperated with investigators, 
court records show. Store officials provided investigators 
with internal records, made employees available for 
interviews and initiated an internal investigation.’......’The 
Arizona-based retailer is operated by Bashas’ Inc., 
reports the Associated Press, and was accused of selling 
meat wrongly labeled ‘.... ‘Officials say workers in the 
meat department at some stores would slap the ‘prime’ 
label on steaks that had been graded as ‘choice’ under 
the USDA system and also mislabeled ‘Kobe’ ground 
beef’ 





Extensiveness of Traceability , Whistle blowing 
system 
Countermeasures 
20303 N/A N/A N/A 
19932 a NSW Food Authority inspection revealed discrepancies 
in the abattoir livestock and slaughter records at the 
abattoir, making it apparent that older animals had been 
processed and supplied to its customers as lamb’ 
Food safety Countermeasures 
19740 ‘ivestigation tested 60 lamb takeaways from a selection 
of Birmingham and London restaurants and revealed that 
40% of the meals were contaminated with other meats. 
‘..The meals that tested positive for undeclared meat 
showed the presence of beef, chicken, and in one sample 
pork, although the latter was not sold as a halal product. 
Detection of adulterants requires advanced 
laboratory analysis 
Opportunity 
19038 Inside the bunker, police discovered an elaborate 
operation, where the Polish ham was repackaged and 
issued with counterfeit labels of Italian companies - 
including prestigious Parma ham producers. 
 
Police confiscated an array of equipment used in the 
fraud such as fridges, knives, hair nets and work stations. 
It may sound like a professional operation - but according 
to police, the workshop was a veritable pigsty. 
Extensiveness of Traceability Countermeasures 
18778 ‘‘The floor was spattered with blood and there was bad 
smell,’ the local Modern Express newspaper reported in 
a grisly dispatch from inside the slaughterhouse. ‘ 





Extensiveness of Traceability (relabelled beef 





lack of law enforcement/ Extensiveness of 
Traceability 
Countermeasures 
17365 Experts called for the establishment of a nationwide 
supervision network and enhanced controls in border 
regions to prevent the products from entering China. 










Requires coordination between law 
enforcement agencies 
Countermeasures 
17269 ‘The pair were due to stand trial at the court but pleaded 
guilty to falsely describing food and failing to comply with 
food traceability requirements.’...’He continued: ‘The rule 
is that food should be traceable from the farmyard to the 
fork’…..Food inspectors found 19 boxes of meat falsely 
labelled as lamb at Farmbox Meats near Aberystwyth in 
Wales, Southwark Crown Court heard. 





Extensiveness of Traceability Countermeasures 





Extensiveness of Traceability/lack of law 
enforcement 
Countermeasures 
16499 ‘AN analysis of eight beef products imported into the 
country by Zambeef seen by The Post has confirmed the 
presence of aromatic aldehyde’ 
Food safety Countermeasure 
16491 The chicken feet tested were found to be unsafe for 
consumption, poisoned with bleach and other chemicals 
meant to make the feet appear fresh-looking and extend 
their shelf life, 
Food safety Countermeasures 
16467 ‘An investigator at the agency, Pontus Elvingson, told the 
BBC that tests were still being done to identify the dye.’ 
Detection of adulterants requires advanced 
laboratory analysis 
Opportunity 
16432 three employees of the animal quarantine and inspection 
station in Qinyang were sentenced to five to six years in 
prison for dereliction of duty. They were found to have 
issued permits without testing pigs and allowed 38,000 
contaminated animals to be sold to Jiangsu and Henan, 
China National Radio reports. 
Food safety (weak quality controls) Countermeasures 
16373 N/A N/A N/A 
237 
 
15265 ‘ Pitt Meadows Meats had reportedly received a positive 
test result for E. coli O157:H7 in September 2010 but did 
not recall the meat, according to the court’s statement of 
facts. However, after a plant employee informed the 
Canadian Food Inspection Agency (CFIA) about the 
positive test result, products were recalled and the plant 
was shut down for a month’ 
Food safety/ Lack of law enforcement Countermeasure 
15263 
 
Food safety Countermeasure 
15261 
 
Food safety Countermeasure 
14781 
 
Nature of Product Opportunity 
14631 
 
No information is available for this Incident N/A 
14349 ‘.....and misbranded because of the unauthorized use of 
a USDA mark of inspection,’. ......’, has been processing 
products from federally inspected establishments and re-
packaging them without the benefit of inspection’ 
Extensiveness of Traceability/ Food safety 




Extensiveness of Traceability/ Food safety 




Extensiveness of Traceability/ Food safety 











lack of law enforcement Countermeasures 
13419 ‘ the USDA sampled two of the remaining pork shoulders 
in storage and determined that it was not fit for human 
consumption.’ 
Food safety Countermeasures 
13361 Producers obtained the pigs by bribing government 
livestock insurance agents, several of whom were also 
sent for prosecution, it said. 
Corruption level of country Motivation 
13331 This is illegal but we cannot punish them unless written 
records are found,’ he said.’ 
lack of law enforcement Countermeasures 
13270 
 
No information is available for this Incident N/A 
1629449 After methanol deaths, liquor makers blame high duties 
for rise in bootleg booze-  
Attention fell on illicit alcohol in the country on September 
18 when seven people died and 16 were hospitalised 
after consuming suspected moonshine in Sungai Buloh. 
— AFP pic 
KUALA LUMPUR, Sept 27 — A near three-fold increase 
in alcohol excise has created strong demand for illicit 
liquor makers, said the Malaysian Liquor Manufacturer 
and Bottler Association in response to recent methanol 
poisoning deaths. 




IRNA says that as the nation’s currency plummets 
against the dollar, and the price of liquor rises, 
consumers increasingly turn to home-made alcohol. 
Price spike- Motivation Motivation 
1589980 The authorities uncovered approximately 1,800 fake 
Pingus and Vega Sicilia labels, computer equipment 
used to falsify labels, and a punching machine to print on 
corks. The restaurant's owner was among four of the 
suspects arrested. 
‘The route of the fake wine bottles has been traced, from 
falsification to distribution,’ Civil Guard Lieutenant Abel 
Marín told Wine Spectator. 
Extensiveness of Traceability Countermeasures 
1525049 found POSITIVE traces of the highly toxic form of alcohol 
— normally used to make antifreeze — in bootleg vodka 
sold in one of the town’s bars. 
Detection requires advanced laboratory testing Opportunity 
1272597 
 
Detection requires advanced laboratory testing Opportunity 
1044355 ‘ An invoice book and samples were also seized, with 
subsequent analysis by authorities identifying ‘large 
discrepancies’ in the alcohol volume stated on the 
products.’ 





1044101 ‘However, close inspection of the label, reveals several 
red flags. 
Each brand of tequila is given a unique serial number, but 
regulator CRT has no record of the one on Blue Cactus, 
which a company called Fernbrew Pty Ltd claims to 
import. 
Australia's Trademarks Act requires tequila bottles to 
include the name of its ‘authorised producer’ in Mexico, 
yet the CRT has no record of the one named by Blue 
Cactus.’ 
Requires coordination between law 
enforcement agencies/ Extensiveness of 
traceability 
Countermeasures 
1044095 ‘However, close inspection of the label, reveals several 
red flags. 
Each brand of tequila is given a unique serial number, but 
regulator CRT has no record of the one on Blue Cactus, 
which a company called Fernbrew Pty Ltd claims to 
import. 
Australia's Trademarks Act requires tequila bottles to 
include the name of its ‘authorised producer’ in Mexico, 
yet the CRT has no record of the one named by Blue 
Cactus.’ 
Requires coordination between law 










Extensiveness of Traceability Countermeasures 
241 
 
999209 The chances that wine lovers would see a 2004 KWV 
Reserve sauvignon blanc were ‘very slim’, because none 
of the contaminated wine had reached consumers. An 
independent laboratory had cleared the remaining stock 
for consumption. 
 
An investigation was launched and two batches of wine 
were isolated when found to contain flavourants. It then 
took a month to complete the internal investigation, 
Barnard said. 
‘Eventually, after an intense process of even going so far 
as having people do lie detector tests, I got an admission 
from two of my wine makers on December 1 that they in 
fact did dabble with those wines. It took me until 
December 3 
Detection requires advanced laboratory testing Opportunity 
997594  
The Food Standards Agency (FSA) has said that it 
appears the bottles originated from Moldova, which 
currently lies outside the EU but has been pursuing 
membership. 
The Italian government and the country’s Prosecco 
producer consortium has been desperately trying to 
clamp down on the illegal trade, both within Italy and 
overseas. 
Extensiveness of traceability, Requires 





Extensiveness of Traceability Countermeasures 
910238  
Laboratory tests revealed the deadly brew contained 
pure alcohol mixed with herbal beverages and high-
caffeine energy drinks. 
detection requires advanced laboratory testing, 




1525351 8,000 bottles of fake Penfolds busted in northern China- 
Local media in Tie Ling city said the city’s Food and Drug 
Administration and police department made the bust after 
nearly half a year of investigation following a raid earlier 
in February on a local winery, which led them to discover 
1,956 bottles of fake Penfolds worth over RMB 2 million 
(US$301,000), in addition to Chinese stickers bearing 
names of Penfolds’ Chinese name ‘奔富’, QR codes and 
label printing machines. 
Further investigation from the February case revealed a 
more extensive network across different provinces, 
according to Chinese media reports. 
Extensiveness of traceability, Requires 





Extensiveness of Traceability Countermeasures 
597655 Tests revealed they contained methanol, which is similar 
to but far more potent than ethanol, the alcohol 
commonly found in liquor. 
Detection requires advanced laboratory testing Opportunity 
772892 
 










833618 Investigators were alerted to the alleged fraud during a 
routine audit of GVG's massive cellar in St.-Loubès on 
Bordeaux's Right Bank in 2014. They found that Borie 
Manoux, a négociant firm also owned by the Castéja 
family that uses the GVG cellar, was missing 200,000 
liters of wine, while GVG had mysteriously gained 
220,000 liters. 






819390 has been under investigation since last year after French 
customs officials found discrepancies and potential 
violations during a routine audit.  
Raphael Michel’s chief executive Guillaume Ryckwaert 
was arrested last June on charges of fraud, deception 
and violations of France’s consumer and tax codes, and 
accused of masterminding the wine fraud racket. He has 
denied any wrongdoing. 









604068 Revenue officers seized 586 litres of a finished ‘vodka’ 
type product that was bottled, sealed, labelled and 
boxed, along with 4,000 litres of the raw alcohol product, 
which would produce in the region of 12,000 litres of 
‘vodka’ type spirits. 
 
They also seized all of the production line apparatus, the 
Extensiveness of Traceability Countermeasures 
244 
 
mixing tank and containers, along with packaging, bottle 
caps and labels which were all counterfeit. 
606888 The ‘factory’ was arranged in a production line system; 
Officers seized all the production line apparatus, mixing 
tank, and containers, along with packaging, bottles and 
labels which were all counterfeit. 
Exteensiveness of Traceability Countermeasures 
616800 Rare Whisky 101’s founders, Andy Simpson and David 
Robertson, reportedly acquired the bottle of Laphroaig at 
an auction in 2015 (the Macallans were simply 
authenticated) and subjected it to a series of tests over 
six months; including examinations of its glass, cork and 
capsule and an analysis of its peat derived compounds 
and malt and grain compounds to prove its provenance. 
Detection requires advanced laboratory 
analysis 
Opportunity 
561485 As reported by The Namibian, the shipment was stopped 
as part of a larger International Customs Operation by 
The World Customs Organization. This nineteen 
Customs Organizations were targeting nineteens ports of 
entry as part of this Operation. Trusted Customs Brokers 
were inspected as part of this coordinated effort to stop 
the importation of counterfeit products into Africa. 










423125 ‘have been charged with a litany of fraudulent actions by 
the Ministry of Primary Industries, including intentionally 
mislabeling wines as the wrong vintage, falsely 
identifying some wine's country of origin, destroying 
winery records, and blending wines from different 
vineyards.’....’The alleged misconduct, dating back to 
2011, 2012, and 2013 Marlborough and Waipara 
sauvignon blanc and pinot noir vintages, was brought to 
light by a whistleblower, the Herald has learned.’ 












142488 ‘ More than 18,600 bottles of counterfeit vodka were 
destroyed Monday after customs officers seized the 
goods before they entered the northern city of 
Tianjin.’....’Bath said the case also marked a positive 
progress on international cooperation to fight piracy and 
China's ability to prevent counterfeit goods from entering 
its border’....’The products copied the trademark of the 
Russian brand Stolichnaya and were seized last 
October’..... 
Requires coordination between law 





126752 But on closer examination they found the vodka was fake 
and the bottles actually contained industrial alcohol often 
used in antifreeze and cleaning products. 
The council raided the premises after a tip-off that it may 
be selling counterfeit booze and found 96 full, six partly-
drunk and 134 empty bottles. 
Detection requires advanced laboratory testing Opportunity 
312826 ‘A Budweiser representative told Hong Kong-based Ming 
Pao that the company had reported the matter to the 
police and is seeking legal action. ‘........’Footage from the 
factory has emerged since and has started going viral. 
It's not hard to see why; in the clips, workers dunk used 
cans into a tub of beer with their bare hands to fill them 
up’… ‘The filled cans are then sent down a conveyor belt 
to get sealed’ 









191531 ‘The top security official in Libya’s capital said Tuesday 
79 people have died over the past four days from drinking 
homemade alcohol, suspected of containing poisonous 
methanol’…’authorities are looking into whether it was 
the methanol or bad fermentation that caused the large 
number of victims’ 
Detection requires advanced laboratory testing Opportunity 
191433 With more than half of Kenyans living below the poverty 
line, few can afford to buy legally sanctioned alcoholic 
drinks. Illicit brews are popular, but occasionally lead to 
deaths when unscrupulous traders lace them with 
methanol to boost profits. 
Economic health condition of the country Motivation 
278598 
 
Detection requires advanced laboratory testing Opportunity 
247 
 
269902 ‘But this one failed for being essentially neutral spirit that 
had never seen the inside of a cask. Following a tip-off 
from a German businessman in Iran, ‘it was tracked down 
to a company in Austria who were canning millions of 
units’, says Low’.....’‘From there it moved to Turkey to be 
distributed into all the neighbouring countries, where 
alcohol is not traditionally allowed.’’...’In 2007, Grants 
Regal Deluxe appeared in a Channel 4 report on 
smuggling across the Kurdistan border into Iran. As one 
smuggler gleefully declared: ‘Everyone drinks it. The 
mullahs are first.’ 
Extensiveness of traceability Countermeasures 
136101 ‘Deaths from drinking illegally brewed alcohol are 
common in India because the poor cannot afford licensed 
liquor. Illicit liquor is often spiked with chemicals such as 
pesticides to increase potency.’ 





Economic health condition of the country Motivation 
262983 
 








190178 ‘‘Laboratory tests found the deaths were caused by the 
high methanol level in the wine,’ Ly Sovann, a 
spokesman for the health ministry, told AFP’...’ Tests 
carried out by the Ministry of Health have found that 
some of the wine involved in at least five separate 
incidents contained up to 12 percent methanol — the 
usual level is around 0.15 percent’  
Detection requires advanced laboratory testing Opportunity 
107111 
 
Extensiveness of Traceability Countermeasures 
249 
 
108263 ‘After our bureau received the complaint, we were given 
information from the company and also samples of 
counterfeit Johnnie Walker Red Label and Black Label 
bottles obtained from a retail outlet. We conducted a 
further investigation that lasted for about two weeks and 
presented the evidence we gathered to the Central 
Intellectual Property and International Trade Court, with 
a request for a search warrant, which was granted by the 
judge,’ said Police Lieutenant Colonel Sumit Chanovit, 
Director of Section 1 of the DSI’s Intellectual Property 
Crime Bureau. 
Detection requires advanced laboratory testing Opportunity 
106911 ‘Worse, you can't even detect it by its cap or the label. 
‘…’Police have also recovered a consignment of the 
spurious liquor. A source said three cartons of Black 
Label and a carton of Absolut vodka had been seized’… 
‘Our investigation is at an initial phase. A team led by 
additional CP Ashok Chand and ACP KPS Malhotra is 
trying to uneearth the source of the racket,’ he said’ 
Detectability, Extensiveness of Traceability, 

















239102 ‘The Kaohsiung District Prosecutors Office in southern 
Taiwan has cracked down on a tax evasion and fraud 
case involving importers allegedly importing edible 
alcohol in the name of alcohol for industrial use, and 
distilleries allegedly using the products to make spirits 
they promoted as being naturally brewed.’.... ‘During the 
investigation by the Criminal Investigation Bureau (CIB), 
two men were found to have imported what they called 
‘undenatured (or pure) alcohol for industrial use’ since 
February 2016, but in fact the alcohol was food-grade, 
prosecutors said’ 
Extensiveness of Traceability Countermeasures 
239100 
 
Extensiveness of Traceability Countermeasures 
239098 
 







154580 reported that after surveilling an illegal transaction 
between two drivers at a remote part of Airport East 
Road, detectives followed one of the vehicles back to a 
workshop located in Hejinying, Gaoliying. .’ 
Extensiveness of Traceability Countermeasures 
251 
 
158922 ‘According to the online auction listing, the wine was 
described as a first growth wine from the Bordeaux 
region in France, which are considered the top ranked 
wines, of which Château Lafite Rothschild is considered 
one of the best. 
However, there were discrepancies with the label, which 
was significantly different from genuine Château Lafite 
Rothschild. According to the description, the wine should 
have been labelled as a Pauillac first growth, reflecting 
the most prestigious wine-growing district of Médoc in the 
Bordeaux region and where Château Lafite Rothschild is 
produced. But the wine was labelled 'Chapelle Lafils' with 
Vin de Pays Bordeaux also appearing on the label, which 
is a 'country wine' classification of lower quality.’...... a 
statement sent to SecuringIndustry.com, JD.com said: 
‘We identified a third party merchant selling wine with a 
Chinese name similar to another brand and confirmed 
that this could easily be confusing to consumers. As a 
result, we immediately removed the product from the site 
before any had reached customers.’ 






Extensiveness of traceability Countermeasures 
182612 ‘‘It was only when we really examined the bottles that we 
noticed things, like the labels didn't look quite right, the 
colour of the liquid didn't look quite the same as others, 
or the level of the liquid was just a bit higher than you’d 
expect for a bottle of that age or producer.’ 













132275 ‘Because of Pakistan's liquor regulations, many people 
illegally brew alcohol at home, and there have been 
several cases of mass poisonings in the past - in 2014 
some 40 people died within a few days as a result of 
drinking tainted alcohol in Sindh.’…...’The local sellers 
were out of stock so they went and bought it from 
somewhere else. Both have died.’.......’With alcohol sales 
tightly regulated, cheap homebrewed spirits often contain 
poisonous methanol. ‘ 
Economic health condition of the country, 
Culture 
Motivation 
129898 N/A N/A N/A 
126768 ‘Trading standards officers said fake Spar own-label 
vodka was found in a non-Spar store in Norwich on 
Friday. ‘….. ‘No cases of ill health associated with this 
counterfeit vodka have currently been reported, but the 
counterfeit Spar Imperial Vodka is said to have a hint of 
acetone smell (similar to nail varnish), with the printed 
wording smudged on the labelling found on the bottles in 
Norwich. ‘ 
Extensiveness of Traceability Countermeasures 
253 
 
107125 ‘She had been selling unaged Chinese spirits, with 
artificial flavouring, labelled as Scotch whisky.’…. 
Extensiveness of Traceability Countermeasures 
106957 Thirty-four bottles of Black Label, one carton of Chivas 
Regal, one carton of Mcdowell No 1 and one carton of 
Blenders' Pride were recovered from the car which Khan 
was driving. 
Extensiveness of Traceability Countermeasures 
106955 
 
Extensiveness of Traceability Countermeasures 
102200 ‘Analysis showed that rather then whisky it was mainly 
water but instead of alcohol there was bacteria and 
mould that could kill people,’ said Staffordshire trading 
standards officer Graham Russell. 
Detection requires advanced laboratory testing Opportunity 
100852 Tests confirmed that both the packaging and the liquid 
inside the bottle were fake. 
Detection requires advanced laboratory testing Opportunity 
100810 ‘Tests carried out on the counterfeit whisky show that it 
has been contaminated with methanol. 
Detection requires advanced laboratory testing Opportunity 
95295 ‘Taipei, June 11 (CNA) Police arrested 12 people for 
allegedlymaking fake red-label rice wine and Kinmen 
Kaoliang Liquor,confiscating more than 9,000 bottles of 
counterfeit brand-namebeverages, officials said Friday. 
 
Police said that the fakes look almost the same as the 
real ones,and even carry labels adopted by Taiwan 
Tobacco and LiquorCorporation late last year to 
distinguish counterfeits from genuineproducts.’ 





Extensiveness of Traceability Countermeasures 
95282 
 
Extensiveness of Traceability Countermeasures 
95223 ‘Taipei, April 28 (CNA) Police in Taiwan and China have 
joined forces to break a Chinese counterfeiting ring that 
allegedly produced and sold fake Taiwanese brands of 
kaoliang liquor in the southeastern Chinese city of 
Xiamen, police said Thursday.’ 
 
‘After an investigation, police found that the fake liquor 
originated from Xiamen.’ 
Extensiveness of Traceability/ Requires 
coordination between law enforcement 
agencies 
Countermeasures 
95170 Police said they had started surveilling the ring since 
October after receiving a tip from a local resident. The 
ring operates from a dilapidated building in Nanhai district 
and has a very organised line of production including 
refilling, bottling, transporting and distribution, said the 
police. 
Extensiveness of Traceability Countermeasures 
95166 
 
Extensiveness of Traceability Countermeasures 
95164 
 
Extensiveness of Traceability Countermeasures 
91946 Samples were sent off for analysis and were found to 
contain isopropanol, which acts as a depressant on the 
nervous system, and Butanol. 
Detection requires advanced laboratory testing Opportunity 
255 
 
87684 Hill allegedly did to hide his conduct was alter or create 
false bills of lading and other records; maintain false 
records of inventory so as to misstate the geographic 
origin or varietal of grapes, wine, or grape juice in his 
company’s inventory; falsely state to his company’s 
employees that grapes grown outside of Napa Valley 
were grown in Napa Valley; move grapes or wine 
between his company’s three facilities to obscure the 
origin of the grapes 






83332 The offence was detected by Revenue officials after a 
visit to his Coppinger’s Bar on Parnell St, Thurles, on 
January 29, 2015. The court heard in September a 
sample from one of 23 bottles taken from Coppinger’s 
Bar was found by the state laboratories to be ‘neither 
pure vodka nor… Smirnoff vodka’. which it purported to 
be. 







73577 A preliminary investigation found the fake alcohol to be 
vodka mixed with methyl alcohol, which was being made 
in the eastern Kharkov region and then sold in small 
grocery shops for about $1 (under the minimum retail 
price) for a half litre bottle. 





Detection requires advanced laboratory testing Opportunity 
66665 
 
Detection requires advanced laboratory 




Detection requires advanced laboratory 
testing/nature of product (mixed) 
Opportunity 
66589 The results of an autopsy on a promising young rugby 
player who died in Bali have revealed he was killed by 
methanol poisoning - likely to have come from an 
incorrectly distilled local brew. 
Detection requires advanced laboratory 




Detection requires advanced laboratory 




Extensiveness of Traceability Countermeasures 
59250 From March 23 to 25, police raided 272 production and 
sales outlets nationwide and found more than 300 
devices used for counterfeiting as well as over 13.5 
million pieces of forged packaging materials, such as 
bottle caps, labels and boxes of well-known brands. 
Extensiveness of Traceability Countermeasures 
257 
 
57501 ‘In early January, inspectors from the city's commerce 
authority informed the local police they had found that 
hundreds of fake bottles of Kweichow Moutai and 
Wuliangye liquor, both famous Chinese brews, were 
being sold in two restaurants in Shaoxing. ‘....’The 
Shaoxing case was just the first step to crack down on 
fake liquors in China and the police will cooperate with 
the industry and commerce authorities across the country 
to fight against forgers in the future,’ Xu said. ‘....’It is hard 
for most consumers to spot the real liquors only by the 
bottles and taste,’ said Cheng Jian, a worker with a 
Beijing-based media company. ‘So I think police and 
related departments should intensify their efforts to crack 
down on fake ones,’ Cheng said. ‘ 





Requires coordination between law 
enforcement agencies 
Countermeasures 
57020 The analysis showed the seized spirits were not genuine 
and were below the required alcoholic strength for vodka. 
Detection requires advanced laboratory testing Opportunity 
54374 Police in Padova said an analysis of the supposed 
champagne revealed it was sparkling table wine. 
Detection requires advanced laboratory testing Opportunity 
258 
 
54276 ‘Recently when a mini-auto coming to Visakhapatnam 
from Odisha was intercepted, liquor bottles were found 
along with those containing water and spirit. 
‘…...Inquiries by the police revealed that the traders are 
resorting to two types of adulteration—mixing either spirit 
or water after removing 25 per cent original liquor and 
replacing the brand labels. They are using spirit procured 
from Pune and Bihar, as it does not raise any suspicion 
among consumers. The traders are allegedly paying 
experts in adulteration Rs 5,000 each for preparing such 
stocks. 
Transparency supply chain Opportunity 
46949 The label looked normal and legit, so she drank the gin, 
not realising it was laced with methanol, which has a high 
toxicity in humans; it takes just 10ml (two tablespoons) of 
the stuff to cause permanent blindness. Its main use is to 
be transformed into formaldehyde, an embalming fluid. 
Detection requires advanced laboratory testing Opportunity 
46444 
 
Detection requires advanced laboratory testing Opportunity 
38085 Laboratory analyses detected deficiencies in following 
two cases: Hraběnka, dry white wine, lot No. 176, country 
of origin: Hungary and Hraběnka, dry red wine, lot No. 
155, country of origin: Hungary. Presence of added water 
amounting to 66% was detected in white wine. As 
regards red wine, presence of unauthorised synthetic 
dyes was revealed (azorubine, patent blue V and 
tartrazine). 
Detection requires advanced laboratory testing Opportunity 
38083 
 






36762 ‘The counterfeiters had blundered by making spelling 
mistakes.’....’The front labels read ‘Produced and 
botteled in Great Britain’. 
The text below the wording ‘Enjoy Glen’s Vodka 
responsibly’ on the rear label should read 
‘DRINKAWARE.CO.UK’, but says ‘D-RINK 
AWARE.CO.UK’.’…...’Investigations by trading 
standards officers in conjunction with the Food Standards 
agency and Glen’s manufacturer Loch Lomond Group 
have revealed the counterfeit spirits have also been 
offered for sale by independent retailers in London, the 
English Midland and other parts of the north of 
Scotland.’.....’These drinks can be produced in 
clandestine premises where there are no controls over 
hygiene or of the composition of the drinks.’ 
Extensiveness of Traceability, Lack of law 
enforcement, requires coordination between 
law enforcement agencies 
Countermeasures 
36747 Trading standards officers discovered the drink 
contained isopropanol, a chemicals used in cleaning 
liquids and aerosol de-icers. 
Detection requires advanced laboratory testing Opportunity 
34383 
 



























Requires coordination between law 
enforcement agencies 
Countermeasures 
33415 ‘The settlement, approved by U.S. Magistrate Judge 
John J. O'Sullivan, came in a lawsuit filed in 2013 by 
several Beck's drinkers who noticed there was almost no 
visible ‘made in the U.S.A.’ language on the beer's 
packaging even though it has been brewed in St. Louis, 
Missouri, since 2012’.....’We reached a compromise in 
the Beck's labeling case,’ said Jorn Socquet, Anheuser-
Busch vice president for marketing. ‘We believe our 
labeling, packaging and marketing of Beck's has always 
been truthful, transparent and in compliance with all legal 
requirements.’ 
Extensiveness of Traceability Countermeasures 
30733 ‘The bottles appear identical to the real thing, apart from 
a tell-tale misspelling on the label on the back, where 
Australia is spelt Austrlia.’ 







30117 In 2008, during an audit by the French fraud agency, 
officials found several inconsistencies. 
Extensiveness of Traceability- Lack of 




29331 Provincial Russian towns from the Baltic Sea to Siberia 
have declared a state of emergency and thousands of 
other victims -- mainly poor -- are receiving medical 
treatment, although hospitals say they are running out of 
beds. Police have started criminal investigations to find 
the origins of the toxic vodka. 
Food safety/ Extensiveness of Traceability Countermeasures 
27526 The fake Smirnoff is labelled ‘Produced in Ireland’ 
whereas real Smirnoff states ‘Produced in the United 
Kingdom’. 
Extensiveness of Traceability Countermeasures 
26354 An undercover investigation by Channel 5 infiltrated the 
crime gangs behind the trade and found one factory in 
east London producing 7,000 fake bottles of Smirnoff 
vodka a day....’The criminals use the latest machinery to 
repackage the bottles with perfect labels replicating 
leading brands’ 
Extensiveness of Traceability Countermeasures 
25575 A shop owner who sold the homemade spirit for about 20 
pence per 200ml has been arrested and an investigation 
has been launched into police officers who allegedly took 
bribes to turn a blind eye to concerns about the drink. 
corruption level of country Motivation 
25463 ‘when there is law against selling and drinking any 
alcohol, so illegal trade of that will increase ‘…’. 
Embarrassed by the scale of the tragedy in a state where 
consumption and sale of liquor is officially banned, police 
have swept through Gujarat in search of those illegally 
selling home-made liquor. ‘ 
Culture, Economic condition of the country Motivation 
262 
 
23285 The police, in collaboration with the Inspectorate for the 
Suppression of Fraud (ICQRF), uncovered some 75,000 
liters of wine labeled Brunello di Montalcino, 90,000 liters 
of supposed Rosso di Montalcino and 2350 fake labels. 
Large quantities of the fake wine were allegedly sold 
between 2011 and 2013. Alarms were raised in a report 
by the Brunello di Montalcino Consortium. 































21551 The licensee, who is a member of Weston’s Pubwatch 
scheme, became suspicious of the legitimacy of the 
vodka and contacted North Somerset Trading Standards.  
Samples of the fake vodka were sent for testing by 
Trading Standards officers and were shown to contain 
iso-propanol – a chemicals commonly found in screen-
wash and antifreeze. 
Detection requires advanced laboratory testing opportunity 
263 
 
21486 police were regularly bribed: ‘There is an officer 
nominated for collecting the bribe. We call this person the 
'dak master'. In every law enforcement office, there is one 
'dak master'. If you pay him, you can carry on with your 
activity.’ 
Culture, Economic condition of the country Motivation 
20124 Forensic testing of counterfeit alcohol has now been 
carried out and vodka seized was found to contain 
Isopropyl alcohol, which is widely-used as a solvent and 
cleaning fluid – and unsafe for human consumption. 
Detection requires advanced laboratory testing Opportunity 
20086 
 
Economic condition of the country (or people?)- 
CULTURE 
Motivation 




18183 According to police, a senior employee disgruntled about 
being sacked tipped them off about alleged frauds in six 
wine-producing areas which included the Gironde, where 
Bordeaux is produced. 






17844 ‘The website said its reporter, after a tip-off from 
‘insiders,’ had purchased four bottles of Jiugui from an 
official store in Beijing and sent them to the National Food 
Quality Supervision and Inspection Center for checks. 
‘….’Its tests showed that samples of the liquor contained 
three plasticizers - diethylhexyl phthalate (DEHP), 
diisobutyl phthalate (DIBP) and dibutyl phthalate (DBP), 
the website said. ‘ 






16573 The bottles were intercepted during a routine stop of a 
truck in Chita, eastern Siberia. The owner of the shipment 
was arrested in March while trying to bribe police to 
release the fake bottles, which bore fake tax stamps. 
Extensiveness of Traceability Countermeasures 
16471 ‘The HCMC police department's economic crimes 
division caught So and Tan on May 18, 2012 loading 23 
cases of Heineken onto a truck in Binh Chanh District, 
according to the indictment. ‘….’Giang confessed to 
renting houses in early May, 2012, and to buying device 
and hiring Cu, Hung and An to clean used bottles, mix 
and bottle the beer.’ 















Extensiveness of Traceability Countermeasures 
16018 ‘Specialist equipment was used as part of the inspections 
to check the authenticity and safety of spirits. The 
suspect vodka was discovered on sale in a Long Eaton 
store and officers are continuing their investigations into 
the extent of the problem.’….’Tests showed that the 
product was deficient in alcohol and contained iso-
propanol, which made it unfit for consumption.’ 
Detection requires advnaced laboratory testing Opportunity 
265 
 
15865 Tests at Mont Tauch's laboratory in France revealed that 
the bottles contained inferior quality bulk wine from South 
America. 
Detection requires advnaced laboratory testing Opportunity 
14642 Tests revealed the bottles had excessive levels of 
methanol, which can cause or blindness or even death. 
Detection requires advanced laboratory testing Opportunity 
13747 NA (Russian) 
 
N/A 
13724 NA (Russian) 
 
N/A 
13417 ‘much of it in rural areas where it is distributed by a wide 
network of sellers who bribe police. The liquor is sold in 
small plastic pouches for as little as 10 rupees, or 2 
cents.’ 
Corruption level of country Motivation 
13398 The Siena edition of the Italian national daily La Nazione 
and the Florentine edition of the Corriere della Sera 
reported yesterday that 17 people and 42 companies are 
currently under investigation for falsifying public 
documents with the intent to commit fraud 
Read more at https://www.decanter.com/wine-
news/adulteration-scandal-surfaces-in-tuscany-
62442/#kJpHiGswAbCSBbmR.99 
Extensiveness of Traceability Countermeasures 
13394 
 
Extensiveness of Traceability Countermeasures 
13390 
 
Extensiveness of Traceability Countermeasures 
266 
 
13347 ‘Hernandez said that as Kurniawan's fame grew in the 
business of rare wines, suspicions about him rose.’... 
‘was arrested by the US Federal Bureau of Investigation 
(FBI) just over a year ago after a raid on his home in Los 
Angeles revealed a locked room which - according to the 
agency - housed a wine counterfeiting 
workshop.’….’asked to provide evidence by video 
because the timing of the trial conflicts with the grape 
harvest.’ 
Special product attributes, supply and pricing Motivation 
13260 ‘The investigation, known as ‘Operation Swill,’ resulted 
from public complaints, confidential sources, and 
samples taken from investigators.’….’ investigators 
procured more than 1,000 open bottles of liquor for 
testing. ‘ 





Food safety/ Requires coordination between 
law enforcement agencies 
Countermeasure 
1637250 The police said that Senior Inspector Mahesh Desai of 
Crime Branch unit 9 had formed a team of officials who 
raided the houses around 4 am and found four people 
replacing the milk with water. The gang's modus operandi 
was : it would slightly cut the packet of branded milk from 
the edges and remove at least half of the milk from it. 
They would then fill the packet with water, and neatlypack 
it again, using candle flame. The milkextracted from the 
branded packets would then be mixed with water and put 
into empty packets withmarkings of noted brands. These 
packets were then distributed to various shops selling 
packaged milk in the suburbs. 
Ease of alteration/ Nature of product / 




1621064 The bus, which came to Pune from Gujarat, was 
intercepted near Purnima Towers building in Swargate, 
following a tip-off. ‘Upon inspection, police found khoya 
being packed in gunny sacks in the luggage space of the 
bus. Soon after the recovery, police contacted Food and 
Drugs Administration (FDA), Pune.  
‘The FDA officials checked the khoya and found it to be 
adulterated,’ police said, adding that the gunny sacks 
containing the adulterated khoya was immediately 
seized. 
Transparency supply chain/Nature of product, 
Detection of adulteration requires advanced 
laboratory testing 
Opportunity 
1596726 They caught two men and one woman in the act of cutting 
plastic bags of branded milk and mixing water in them.   
Transparency supply chain, Availability of 











953235 Civil surgeon Dr Usha Dhingra, and her team collected 
samples of the seized ‘milk’ and other items ,including 
white powder resembling condensed milk.  
‘Though we are going to get the seized material tested at 
food laboratories, prima facie, the entire quantity of 
seized ‘milk’ is synthetic. 
Detection requires advanced laboratory testing opportunity 
268 
 
953240 A food inspector had been suspended for failing to check 
the malpractice, the official added.  
 
Additonal collector KP Mishra said that a joint team from 
the food and revenue departments had raided the factory 
at Chinnoni village and seized 1000 litres of synthetic 
milk yesterday.  
 
 




Food safety, weak quality control, Requires 





Opportunity in time and space Opportunity 
958482 ‘….e the samples collected by the Food Safety 
Department officials are found containing ingredients 
harmful to human health.’ 
Detection of adulterants requires advanced 
laboratory testing/ Availability of knowledge and 
technology for adulteration 
Opportunity 
894255 Four people were arrested on Saturday in Spain because 
of packaging counterfeit baby milk mostly destined for 
China. Eight tons of faked milk was found, according to 
police in Girona on Saturday 
Extensiveness of Traceability Countermeasure 
269 
 
662892 ‘Following credible information, the Task Force raided the 
godown late night on Monday and arrested him on the 
spot and seized the adulterated stuff. Srinivasan and the 
adulterated products were handed over to the Nallakunta 
police for action.’….’The East Zone Task Force raided a 
godown at Nallakunta and nabbed one person for 
allegedly preparing and selling adulterated ghee by 
mixing dalda and selling it in the market.’ 
Availability of knowledge and technology for 




Availability of knowledge and technology for 
adulteration, Nature of product 
Opportunity 
651659 and that the laboratory examination results have been 
forged at his order. 






524537 In August, the employee informed the capital’s health 
authorities, who sealed 425 boxes of four tastes of ice 
cream and ordered the payment of a NT$1.2 million 
(US$39,550) fine. 






279451 ‘The company’s forged kosher certificates were brought 
to the CFIA’s attention in June 2015 after an employee of 
The Kashruth Council of Canada, a non-profit that 
provides kosher certification, noticed some inconsistently 
in the labeling on some of the boxes of cheese delivered 
to one of the two overnight summer camps. When he 
asked Sadiklar to send over certificates to verify the 
kosher status of the cheese, Sadiklar first sent in a 
kosher certificate for the wrong food, according to the 
Toronto Star.’.....The Canadian Food Inspection Agency 
has charged Creation Foods and its vice-president, Kefir 
Sadiklar, with sending cheddar cheese falsely described 
as ‘kosher’ to Jewish summer camps in June 2015. The 
agency alleges forged documents were created to make 
it seem like the cheese adhered to Jewish dietary laws. 
Extensiveness of Traceability Countermeasure 
214328 Following this news, the mother company of Aptamil—
Danone issued a quick statement, reassuring consumers 
that the packages of the faked milk powder are in 
German language and are not authorized for sale 
through official channels in China. Currently, there’s no 
information that indicate the problematic products have 
made their way into the Chinese market. 
Extensiveness of Traceability Countermeasures 
461064 
 
Availability of knowledge and technology for 




107071 When investigators tested milk samples at the Cantile di 
Sparanise factory, in Santa Maria Capua Vetere, they 
found bacteria more than 2,000 times the authorized 
level, Il Mattino said. 
 
Prosecutor Raffaella Capasso said the findings showed 
the adulterated cheese was ‘potentially harmful to public 
health’. In addition to the arrests, the factory and sales 
points were shut down. 




























132152 PFA officials examined 40 containers of milk in 
Faisalabad today. They found it to be adulterated with 
formalin - a chemical used chiefly as a preservative for 
biological specimens - as well as urea, salt and water. 
The food authority disposed of 800 litres of substandard 
milk and arrested two persons in connection with it. 
On December 27, the Supreme Court asked the Punjab 
Food Authority to check all milk plants in the province and 
get milk samples tested in labs, as it was found out they 
contained harmful ingredients. 








Detection of adulterants requires advanced 
laboratory testing 
Opportunity 
84917 they have received complaints of adulterated peak milk 
from consumers which prompted them to swing into 
action leading to the arrest of the suspect while making 
supplies to stores. 
Kolawole said Nnabuihe, 56, who resides at No 42, 
Cameroun Road, Calabar, confessed to be refilling 440g 
(promotion pack) of peak powdered milk with another 
cheaper brand of milk product which he buys in large 
quantity (50kg) and uses to refill the packs. 
Availability of adulteration knowledge and 







Extensiveness of Traceability Countermeasure 
273 
 
74149 The Ministry of Health (MOH) on Wednesday recalled a 
batch of baby formula, ‘Xiang Xue Hai’ with batch number 
20050112, found to be of hazardously low nutritional 
value. 
Food safety Countermeasure 
73836 Following a tip-off, mobile unit of FDA raided a premise 
at ...  
 




Transparency supply chain Opportunity 
70145 
 











54341 ‘Independent testing shows that at least seven per cent 
to 10 per cent of the product is not parmesan cheese,’ 
Moschetta said in his suit, filed in a U.S. federal court in 
New York. 
 
‘In fact, at least seven per cent to 10 per cent of the 
product is cellulose, an anti-clumping agent derived from 
wood chips.’ 





54110 ‘Two drums of chemicals, 50 bags of glucose, hundreds 
of box ... ‘Samples of the product have been taken and 















Supply and pricing due to ban Motivation 
53875 
 
Supply and pricing due to ban Motivation 
53256 Court documents filed by Howe allege that McDonald's 
mozzarella sticks were tested and found to contain more 
water and starch than federal food labeling laws allow. 





Supply and Pricing (Diwali) Motivation 
50465 
 
Supply and Pricing (Diwali) Motivation 
50462 
 
Supply and Pricing (Diwali) Motivation 
50457 
 









50017 Out of the total samples sent, as many as six were found 
to ...  
 




Detection of adulterants requires advanced 
laboratory testing 
Opportunity 
49990 Mother Dairy officials challenged the test reports and 
demanded for a re-test of samples at Kolkata-based 
Central Laboratory, he said. 
The test report of Kolkata’s Central Laboratory has been 
submitted to the District Magistrate Vimal Kumar 
Sharma, who in turn will forward it to the Commissioner 
to seek his approval to initiate legal action against Mother 
Dairy, the official said 










Availability of knowledge and technology, 




Availability of knowledge and technology, 











Requires cooperation between law 
enforcement agencies 
Countermeasures 
33803 The gang was busted by Shanghai police in September 
2015 after Abbott reported the case to the authorities. 










Transparency supply chain, Detection of 
adulterants requires advanced laboratory 
testing 
Opportunity 
31836 CUTTACK: Cuttack district police on Tuesday busted a 
massive food adulteration racket operating from Tangi 
and nabbed two persons while seizing spurious raw 
materials, empty packs and pouches of reputed 
companies. 
Nature of products/Availability of 
technology/availability of adulterants, 
Transparency supply chain 
Opportunity 
31681 The police team seized from here 92 adulterated milk 
bags and 81 liters of adulterated milk. Explaining the 
modus operandi, police said the accused had devised 
two methods to adulterate milk packets. In the first 
method, they would tear open branded milk packets and 
remove some of the milk. Then, they would add dirty 
water to it before resealing the pack with a stapling 
machine. In the second method, the vendors would 
rummage through garbage bins and collect empty milk 
bags. They would then fill 60 per cent milk in the packet 
and add 40 per cent dirty water to it, before resealing it 
with a burning candle. 
Nature of products/Availability of 
technology/availability of adulterants, 
















Food safety, Lack of law enforcement, 
Ectensiveness of traceability 
Countermeasures 
29977 The powder had been ordered destroyed, but a dairy firm 
in the Ningxia Hua autonomous region received the batch 
as debt payment from another company, said the China 
Daily newspaper. The company then sold the milk to five 
other factories in Fujian and Guangdong provinces and 
in the Inner Mongolia autonomous region. 
Food safety, Lack of law enforcement, 




Detection of adulterants requires advanced 
laboratory testing 
Opportunity 
29064 The State Public Health Laboratory has found the 
presence of gum in this delicacy which is an act of 
adulteration as per the provisions of the Prevention of 
Food Adulteration (PFA) Act. 





27316 The products were found substandard after the SMC for 
the first time sent samples to referral laboratories outside 
the state for quality check. 
SMC Health Officer Shafqat Khan said they had found 
food products such as ‘saunf’ powder of the Kanwal 
group and the Khyber-packaged milk unsafe for 
consumption. 






25926 The protein content of many dietary supplements is often 
determined by measuring the amount of nitrogen it 
contains. 
Detection of adulterants reqires advanced 
laboratory testing 
Opportunity 
25387 After analysing the samples, it was found that six well-
known companies are involved in this act. According to 
an officer from FDA, Thane, case has been registered 
against Vasundhara Dairy (Amul), Gujarat Co-op Milk 
Federation, BG Chithale, Mahananda Dairy, Khopoli 
government milk scheme, and Kolhapur District Co-op 
Milk Distribution Group Ltd (Gokul). 





Transparency supply chain/Nature of product Opportunity 
24697 
 
Availability of adulterants/Nature of product/ 
Transparency supply chain 
Opportunity 









23381 ‘…. fraud was confirmed after a chemical analysis of raw 
milk traced the use of formaldehyde in its final product. ‘ 





Detection of adulterants requires advanced 
laboratory testing 
Opportunity 
23203 In 10 of the samples, high alkalinity was found, indicating 
the presence of chemical agents used to mask the 
addition of water and the deterioration of the product 
through the action of bacteria 
Detection of adulterants requires advanced 
laboratory testing 
Opportunity 
23158 ‘According to the prosecution, a raid was conducted by a 
food inspector at the hotel here on June 3, 2006. 
Samples were collected for analysis. ‘…...An analysis 
found that the sample was adulterated because the milk 
fat was found to be less than the minimum prescribed 
standard of 25 per cent, the food inspector said. 





22991 ‘......Surve undertook the investigation after permissions 
were secured From Sr Inspector of Khar police station, 
Mangesh Pote. At around 0530 hrs this morning. police 
raided around 7 places in Khar including Chaupada 
chawl, Dhanpada chawl near Khar (west). Around 572 
Liters of adulteratedf milk was seized and FDA officials 
took the sampling for investigations and the remaining 
quantities were destroyed. The adulterated milk had 
packing of Amul, Gokul and Priyadarshan brands.’ 
Availability of adulterants or technology/ 
Detection of adulterants requires advanced 
laboratory testing, Transparency supply chain 
Opportunity 
22960 used to buy empty packets of branded milk companies. 
‘They would then fill in adulterated milk in these packets 
and sell them. We had received information that the 
water that was used in the adulteration was contaminated 
and can cause illness. 
Availability of adulterants or technology/ 
Detection of adulterants requires advanced 
laboratory testing, Transparency supply chain 
Opportunity 
22947 Four people were caught red-handed by the Samta 
Nagar police after they were found mixing water in 
packets of milk of different brands in an apartment at 
Poisar in Kandivali. 
Availability of adulterants or technology/ 
Detection of adulterants requires advanced 
laboratory testing, Transparency supply chain 
Opportunity 
22928  
On Friday morning, the Dongri police busted a milk adul 
...  
 




Availability of adulterants/ Nature of products, 









Supply and Pricing (Diwali) Motivation 
22676 
 
Supply and Pricing (Diwali) Motivation 
22570 owns two transport companies and a fleet of over 100 
tankers belonging to him are engaged in transporting milk 
from the facilities of Aavin in several districts across the 
state. According to the police, the stolen milk was taken 
in cans and transported in two mini lorries in a well-
planned operation. The police seized the mini lorries with 
milk cans on board near Tindivanam and arrested eight 
persons, including Sathyaraj, Suresh and Ramesh of 
Tiruvannamalai. 
Transparency supply chain Opportunity 
22326 they had test results showing several brands of milk 
formula were grossly deficient in protein. 
Detection of adulterants requires advanced 
laboratory testing 
Opportunity 
21524 ‘The national inspection agency further discovered that 
milk products manufactured by 21 other diary companies 
tested positive for melamine’ 
Detection requires advanced laboratory testing/ 
Historical evidence 
Opportunity 
20697 According to a handout from office of the district 
coordination officer (DCO), Dipalpur Assistant 
Commissioner Imtiaz Khichi, District Officer (health) Dr 
Shabbir Chishti with police team took sample of the milk 
in the vans and found it adulterated with the unhealthy 
ingredients, including urea, formalin, detergent, ammonia 
with some other chemicals. 








20128 ‘Most of they confiscated products carried fake versions 
of the GOST quality label’ 
Food safety/ Extensiveness of Traceability Countermeasure 
19921 
 











Detection requires advanced laboratory testing Opportunity 
17556 
 







17029 ‘The suspects were picked up in a joint operation by the 
Diary Development Authority-DDA personnel and police 
to crackdown on the sale of adulterated milk. ‘…...’Harriet 
Nnamuli, the Principal Dairy Inspector Soroti says the 
operation was prompted by several complaints from 
residents over poor quality milk.’ 





16765 At the heart of the case was what happened to a cheese 
shipment that FDA found ‘contained violative presence of 
micro-biologic material and filth.’ With further 
examination, FDA found the cheese was contaminated 
with Salmonella, E. coli, alkaline phosphatase and 
Staphylococcus. FDA would ultimately order the cheese 
‘refused,’ meaning it could not be imported to the U.S. 
Food safety/border rejection Countermeasures 
16534 in Atlanta reported the presence of bacteria 
(Staphylococcus aureus) in the samples taken from the 
shipment, demonstrating that the cheese was not in fact 
pasteurized as claimed on the entry documents. 
Food safety, border rejection Countermeasure 
16450 
 
Requires coordination between law 





Extensiveness of Traceability Countermeasure 
16188 
 
Food safety Countermeasure 
284 
 
16052 The accused were produced at Bandra Magistrate court 
and have been remanded to police custody till May 31. 
Further elaborating on the modus operandi, cops 
informed that the accused had devised two methods to 
adulterate milk packets. In the first method, they would 
tear open branded milk packets, and mix dirty water in 
them before sealing them with a stapling machine. 
In the second method, the vendors would rummage 
through garbage bins and collect empty milk packets. 
They would then fill 60 per cent milk in the packet and 
mix it with 40 per cent gutter water, and seal it with a 
burning candle. Cops got specific information about milk 
adulteration being carried out in Vile Parle (E) from an 
informer on Sunday, and under the supervision of senior 
police inspector Talegaonkar, PI Tavre hatched a plan 
with PSI Vidhate, Patil and Mudhiraj to nab them. On 
Monday at around 7 am when the accused were about to 
sell the milk packets, cops arrested them. 
Availability of adulterants/Availability of 
technology, Transparency supply chain 
Opportunity 
15529 ‘However, there was a message on the box that it is not 
edible though there was no such warning on cartons of 
those ghee packets, he said.’ 
Extensiveness of Traceability Countermeasure 
15458 
 
Extensiveness of Traceability Countermeasure 
15317 
 





15247 A government sampling of cheeses across Italy revealed, 
however, that 25 percent of the cheeses tested also 
included milk from dairy cows -- less expensive, but also 
less rich. 
Detection of adulterants requires advanced 
laboratory testing 
opportunity 
15234 ‘The Special Operations Team (east) of Cyberabad 
police on Wednesday busted a milk adulteration racket 
after raiding a house at Ghatkesar’…..’The accused 
Barkha Ravi and Md Rasheed prepare a paste by mixing 
urea, milk powder and sunflower oil by putting the 
material in a mixer, Inspector SOT, Narsing Rao said.’ 
Transparency supply chain/ availability of 
adulterants 
opportunity 
15229 Deputy superintendent of police (DSP) Krishan Kumar 
said that the police, on a tip-off, raided a factory near 
Moonak and arrested nine people, who were making 
synthetic milk in the factory by mixing chemicals. 
Opportunity in time and space opportunity 
14965 
 
Detection requires advanced laboratory testing opportunity 
14398 Our review of your Certificates of Analysis for 
environmental samples analyzed by a private laboratory 
indicated that at least two of your environmental samples 
collected on November 24, 2013 and December 11, 2013 
resulted in presumptive positives for Listeria 
monocytogenes in your processing environment. 
Detection requires advanced laboratory testing Opportunity 
286 
 
14384 The action was taken on a priority basis as the supply of 
milk and milk products reach its zenith during the festive 
season, especially during Diwali. ‘Adulterated milk and its 
products are dangerous as it directly affects the health of 
its consumer. 
Supply and Pricing Motivation 
14231 ‘During Diwali, consumption of sweets, milk and its 
products always increases making it the perfect occasion 
or the suppliers of adulterated ‘khoya’, ‘ghee’ and other 
milk products to get active. To check this, state officials 
have conducted random raids and checks at as many as 
40 and odd places in the city within a week’ 






Requires coordination between law 
enforcement agencies 
Countermeasure 
13896 N/A N/A N/A 
13381 Wang Xiaofeng, a Beijing food inspection expert, said it 
is more difficult to detect leather hydrolyzed protein than 
melamine, because it is a type of protein itself. The 
inspection method devised by the Ministry of Agriculture 
checks if hydroxyproline, a type of hydrolyzed animal 
collagen, is contained in the dairy products. If so, it can 
be inferred that the product contains leather hydrolyzed 
protein. 





13327 Officials said that the samples failed to meet the stringent 
quality specifications prescribed under the Food Safety 
and Standards Act 2011. 
Detection of adulterants requires advanced 
laboratory testing 
Opportunity 
13286 Ten samples were sent to lab where all of them were 
found adulterated and sub-standard. 
Detection of adulterants requires advanced 
laboratory testing 
Opportunity 
13282 ‘On Wednesday, the food safety department officials 
seized 200 bottles of misbranded soft drinks and 1,875 
unhygienic water and buttermilk sachets from various 
shops in areas such as T. Nagar and Teynampet.’ 
Food safety/ Extensiveness of Traceability Countermeasure 
13232 
 
Extensiveness of Traceability Countermeasure 
13224 Acting on a tip-off, a FDA team led by Food Safety 
Officers Manek Jadhav and Gopal Mahore carried out 
simultaneous raids at two residential apartments in Nutan 
Complex and Shanti Nagar area of Mira Road at about 6 
a.m. on Friday. 
According to FDA officials the accused would buy 
branded milk packets from distributors. They would then 
remove about 100 to 200 ml milk from each packet and 
then refill it with tap water before sealing it using hot wax. 








Appendix B: Conditional Probabaility Tables (CPT) for country of Origin 
Parents Conditional Probability Table- Country of Origin 























































Opportunity 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.02 0 0.04 0 0.02 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.07 0 0 0 0 
Motivation 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.27 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Countermeasure 0 0 0 0 0.02 0 0 0 0 0.03 0.18 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.02 0 0.02 0.05 0 0 0.02 






Opportunity 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.03 0 0 0.21 0 0 0 0.03 0 0 0 0 0.03 0 0 0 0 0 
Motivation 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.33 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Countermeasure 0 0 0.02 0 0 0.02 0.03 0 0.02 0.04 0.24 0 0 0 0 0 0.05 0 0 0 0.02 0.01 0 0.03 0.01 







Opportunity 0 0 0.03 0 0 0 0 0 0.03 0 0.08 0 0 0.05 0 0 0 0.05 0 0 0.05 0.15 0 0.03 0.05 
Motivation 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.58 0 0.08 0 0 
Countermeasure 0 0 0.03 0.01 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.24 0.03 0 0 0 0.07 0 0.01 0 0 0.05 0 0 0.03 0.12 






Opportunity 0 0.01 0 0 0 0 0.03 0 0 0 0.13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.58 0 0 0 0.03 
Motivation 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.8 0 0 0 0 
Countermeasure 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.04 0.27 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.27 0 0 0 0.04 
Unknown 
 
0 0 0 0 0.04 0 0.08 0 0 0 0 0.08 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.32 0 0 0 0.12 
289 
 
Parents Conditional Probability Table- Country of Origin 






Opportunity 0.07 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.02 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Motivation 0.36 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Countermeasure 0.08 0 0 0.02 0 0 0 0.03 0.02 0 0.02 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.03 0.02 0.2 0 0 






Opportunity 0 0 0.03 0 0 0 0 0 0.03 0 0 0.03 0 0.03 0 0 0 0.08 0 0.08 0.03 0 0.03 0 0 
Motivation 0.33 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Countermeasure 0 0.01 0 0.01 0 0 0 0 0.01 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.03 0.01 0 0 0.08 0.04 0.01 0.02 0 0 





Opportunity 0 0 0 0 0 0.03 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.03 0 0 0 0.03 0 
Motivation 0 0 0.08 0 0 0 0 0.08 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.08 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Countermeasure 0 0 0.03 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.01 0 0 0.03 0.03 0 0 0 0.05 0.03 0 0.01 0 0.04 0.01 0 






Opportunity 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.01 0.01 0.06 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Motivation 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Countermeasure 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.04 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.04 0.04 0 0 0 0 0.04 0.04 0 0.04 0 0 




Parents Conditional Probability Table- Country of Origin 




Opportunity 0.02 0 0 0.22 0.5 0 0 0 0 
Motivation 0 0 0 0.36 0 0 0 0 0 
Countermeasure 0 0 0 0.03 0.16 0.05 0 0 0 





Opportunity 0 0 0 0.34 0.03 0 0 0 0.03 
Motivation 0 0 0 0.17 0.17 0 0 0 0 
Countermeasure 0.02 0 0.02 0.14 0.12 0 0 0.01 0 




Opportunity 0 0.03 0 0.33 0.03 0.03 0 0 0 
Motivation 0 0 0 0 0.08 0 0 0 0 
Countermeasure 0 0 0 0.05 0.05 0 0.01 0.01 0 





Opportunity 0 0 0 0.03 0.09 0 0 0 0 
Motivation 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Countermeasure 0.04 0.04 0 0 0.08 0 0 0 0 
Unknown 0 0.04 0 0 0.04 0 0 0 0 
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Appendix C: Conditional Probability Tables (CPT) 
Conditional Probabilities of 
CNTRFT 
Parents Probability 
Type FFV  1 0 
1 1 0.04 0.96 
1 2 0.00 1.00 
1 3 0.26 0.74 
2 1 0.00 1.00 
2 2 0.00 1.00 
2 3 0.32 0.68 
3 1 0.41 0.59 
3 2 0.08 0.92 
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3 3 0.97 0.03 
4 1 0.09 0.91 
4 2 0.00 1.00 
4 3 0.50 0.50 
 
Conditional Probabilities of 
Type 
Parents Probability 
FFV  1 2 3 4 
1 0.24 0.20 0.21 0.35 
2 0.28 0.15 0.31 0.26 




Conditional Probabilities of 
FLC 
Parents Probability 
Type FFV  1 0 
1 1 0.00 1.00 
1 2 0.55 0.45 
1 3 0.30 0.70 
2 1 0.05 0.95 
2 2 0.50 0.50 
2 3 0.53 0.47 
3 1 0.13 0.87 
3 2 0.00 1.00 
3 3 0.12 0.88 
294 
 
4 1 0.06 0.94 
4 2 0.00 1.00 















Conditional Probabilities of 
China 
Parents Probability 
FLC FFV  1 0 
1 1 0.00 1.00 
1 2 0.00 1.00 
1 3 0.12 0.88 
0 1 0.12 0.88 
0 2 0.00 1.00 
0 3 0.29 0.71 
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Appendix D: Assessment Accuracy  
 
ID FFV  TAN $BP-FFV  
1528051 3 3 1 
913178 1 1 1 
289925 2 2 0.99758567 
289919 2 2 0.99758567 
197572 1 1 0.989840435 
112951 3 3 0.876018242 
90337 3 3 0.977842454 
68861 3 3 0.992059917 
62896 3 3 0.999520531 
58076 3 3 0.999975065 
56019 1 1 0.998240596 
51808 3 3 0.999520531 
297 
 
51462 3 3 1 
17419 4 4 1 
17213 4 4 1 
17141 3 3 0.741353187 
16780 1 1 0.999999048 
16778 1 1 0.999999048 
16774 1 1 0.999999048 
16772 1 1 0.999999048 
16086 3 3 0.945414977 
13319 1 1 0.607666094 
13296 1 1 0.607666094 
788492 3 3 1 
390535 3 3 0.936464035 
121420 3 3 1 
22770 3 3 1 
298 
 
22731 3 3 0.918745204 
213060 3 3 1 
122912 3 3 0.906289431 
118699 1 1 1 
94320 2 2 1 
93111 2 2 1 
69794 1 1 0.997960086 
65654 3 3 0.987642311 
65650 3 3 0.987642311 
63306 3 3 1 
54159 3 3 0.707213208 
51537 3 3 1 
34113 3 3 1 
27179 4 4 1 
26773 3 3 0.998111932 
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25961 1 1 0.945788698 
25475 3 3 0.973100091 
23313 3 3 0.999237774 
22293 3 3 1 
22166 1 1 0.960104719 
22161 1 1 0.960104719 
20303 4 4 1 
18778 3 3 1 
17361 3 3 1 
17269 3 3 0.98865135 
17267 3 3 0.98865135 
16499 3 3 1 
15261 3 3 1 
13557 1 1 0.885504533 
13361 2 2 1 
300 
 
1629449 2 2 1 
1044095 3 3 0.926555131 
828615 4 4 1 
191531 1 1 1 
269902 3 3 1 
244848 4 4 0.511281743 
91946 1 1 0.987555274 
66589 1 1 1 
34363 3 3 1 
34359 3 3 1 
34201 3 3 0.877191916 
34085 3 3 1 
30170 4 4 1 
25575 2 2 0.985500917 
25463 2 2 0.999989005 
301 
 
23185 3 3 1 
22406 3 3 0.94880778 
13747 4 4 1 
13724 4 4 1 
13417 2 2 0.999509216 
13398 3 3 1 
13260 1 1 0.811741271 
1596726 1 1 0.909537089 
631001 4 4 1 
279451 3 3 1 
461064 1 1 0.520506488 
61718 4 4 1 
53875 2 2 1 
53256 1 1 0.970646895 
50469 2 2 0.991298833 
302 
 
50457 2 2 0.997488168 
33748 1 1 0.999666777 
31106 1 1 0.900078711 
29797 1 1 0.7916972 
23594 4 4 1 
22960 1 1 0.855686946 
22570 1 1 0.918031127 
17207 4 4 1 
16450 3 3 0.968345746 
13282 3 3 0.498705735 
13224 1 1 0.940245524 
 
